Brendan Gray

The self-represented applicant failed to serve and file his application record and factum by the deadline set in a prior case management direction.

Despite being warned that his attempt to seek leave to appeal did not stay the court's directions and being offered a short extension, the applicant defied the court's orders and claimed the court had forfeited jurisdiction due to bias.

The court dismissed the application for judicial review due to the applicant's repeated failure to follow case management directions and his ungovernable conduct.

The self-represented applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Information and Privacy Commissioner not to continue an inquiry into his request for medical records.

The applicant also sought a sealing order for his application materials.

The court found that the applicant failed to file proper motion materials for the sealing order, instead submitting a voluminous and unorganized microchip.

The court dismissed the motion for a sealing order but directed that the applicant's OHIP number be redacted from the Record of Proceedings.

The court also provided case management directions for the hearing of the judicial review application.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario (IPC) not to proceed with his complaint against his former doctor.

The applicant alleged the doctor improperly accessed and added to his medical record after he issued a 'lockbox' directive.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the IPC's decision reasonable as the doctor was authorized to document patient encounters under professional standards pursuant to s. 19(2) of PHIPA.

The court also found no breach of procedural fairness, as the applicant was given a full opportunity to respond to the IPC's preliminary views.

The applicants sought judicial review and appealed decisions of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario (IPC).

The IPC had found that ransomware attacks encrypting the applicants' data containers constituted an unauthorized 'use' and 'loss' of personal information, triggering statutory duties to notify affected individuals under PHIPA and the CYFSA.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications and appeal, holding that the IPC's interpretation was reasonable and purposive.

The court found that the encryption of data, which made it temporarily unavailable, amounted to 'handling' or 'dealing with' the information, thereby constituting an unauthorized use that required notification regardless of whether the data was actually viewed or exfiltrated.

The Ontario Hospital Association (OHA) brought a motion for leave to intervene as a friend of the court in an application for judicial review and an appeal concerning decisions by the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario.

The underlying proceedings involve whether cyberattacks that encrypt servers without data exfiltration trigger notification obligations under privacy legislation.

The court granted the motion on consent, finding that the OHA's sector-wide insights and expertise would make a useful contribution to the court's understanding of the operational impacts of privacy and security challenges on health care organizations.

The applicant hospital brought a motion for a sealing order to redact details of its cybersecurity infrastructure from the record of proceedings in a judicial review application.

The underlying application concerned an investigation by the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario into a ransomware attack on the hospital.

Applying the Sherman Estate test, the court granted the sealing order, finding that publication of the information would increase the hospital's vulnerability to future attacks.

The court also awarded costs against the respondent tribunal for improperly opposing the motion and filing a letter in lieu of a factum.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC) order requiring the disclosure of a joint venture agreement and payment records to a requester under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FIPPA).

The applicant argued the records were exempt under s. 17(1) as trade secrets and that the IPC breached procedural fairness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the IPC's process was fair and its conclusion that the agreement was mutually negotiated rather than 'supplied in confidence' was reasonable.

The court also declined to consider a new argument under s. 17(2) that was not raised before the adjudicator.

The moving party sought leave to appeal three decisions of the Information and Privacy Commissioner to the Divisional Court.

The respondents requested the court initiate the process under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the proceeding.

The court found that there is no statutory right or jurisdiction to seek leave to appeal from a decision of the IPC to the Divisional Court.

The proceeding was dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process under Rule 2.1.

The applicant sought judicial review of a joint decision by the Ontario and British Columbia Information and Privacy Commissioners rejecting claims of solicitor-client and litigation privilege over documents related to a 2019 cyberattack.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the standard of review for privilege claims is correctness.

The Court found the Commissioners correctly determined that facts existing independently of privileged communications must be disclosed pursuant to statutory duties under the Personal Health Information Protection Act.

The Court also rejected the applicant's argument that the joint investigation breached procedural fairness, finding it was statutorily authorized and the applicant had acquiesced to the process.

The applicant sought judicial review of two decisions by the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario denying him access to his son's personal health information held by a family services agency.

The applicant argued he was entitled to the records under the Divorce Act and various privacy statutes.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the adjudicator's decisions to be reasonable.

The court upheld the adjudicator's findings that the Divorce Act did not mandate disclosure and that the agency properly exercised its discretion in considering the best interests of the child and the applicant's motives.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of race and disability against her employer and its clinic manager.

The Tribunal considered whether to defer the application pending a related complaint to the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, and whether to remove the clinic manager as a personal respondent.

The Tribunal declined to defer the application, finding insufficient overlap between the proceedings.

The Tribunal also refused to remove the individual respondent, noting that her alleged discriminatory remarks were a central issue and the corporate respondent had not assumed liability for her conduct.

The appellant, Barclays Bank PLC, appealed a trial judgment finding its Notice of Early Termination of a complex asset-backed commercial paper transaction invalid and the respondent Devonshire Trust's Notice of Early Termination valid.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that Barclays' notice was invalid due to its fraudulent misrepresentation, bad faith, and the principle that a party cannot benefit from its own wrong, as Barclays' failure to make liquidity payments contributed to Devonshire's insolvency.

The Court also upheld the validity of Devonshire's notice.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part regarding the calculation of Barclays' Settlement Amount, substituting a figure of $264 million for the trial judge's $12,000 valuation, subject to deductions for mitigation.

The plaintiff appealed an order of a Master dismissing her action for delay following a status hearing.

The action arose from the suspension of her nursing licence, allegedly due to a flawed report by the defendant physician.

The Master had applied a rigid two-part test, finding the plaintiff failed to provide an acceptable explanation for the delay.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the Master erred in principle by failing to apply a contextual approach and by ignoring the broader litigation history, including a companion case that resolved a key issue regarding document admissibility.

The order dismissing the action was set aside.

The appellant orthopaedic surgeon appealed a trial judgment finding him negligent in his post-operative treatment of the respondent's fractured femur.

The trial judge found the appellant breached the standard of care by scheduling a follow-up appointment six weeks later instead of monitoring the patient closely, which led to the femur healing in a deformed position requiring invasive surgery.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings on standard of care, causation, and the assessment of damages for future loss of income.

The applicant sought a declaration under s. 140(1) of the Courts of Justice Act that the respondent was a vexatious litigant.

The respondent had initiated numerous actions against medical professionals, regulatory investigators, and opposing counsel, including re‑litigating a medical malpractice claim previously dismissed on summary judgment.

The court found the respondent’s conduct exhibited multiple indicators of vexatious proceedings, including repeated litigation of decided issues, actions lacking a cause of action, and litigation against opposing counsel.

Considering the pattern of abusive litigation and the need to protect the court’s process and potential defendants, the court declared the respondent a vexatious litigant.

The respondent was prohibited from commencing further proceedings without leave of the Superior Court of Justice.

Following the granting of summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s claims against two defendants in a medical negligence action, the court determined the issue of costs.

The successful defendants sought costs after the self‑represented plaintiff failed to deliver responding submissions within the allotted time.

Although the defendants had incurred significantly higher legal costs, each requested a reduced amount.

The court found the proposed amounts reasonable and fixed costs at $7,500 for each successful defendant.

The plaintiff alleged wrongful psychiatric detention and negligence against a hospital and psychiatrist after being held as an involuntary patient for approximately two weeks and reported to the Ministry of Transportation, which led to suspension of his driver's licence and alleged financial losses.

The defendants brought motions for summary judgment, arguing there was no genuine issue requiring a trial because the plaintiff had produced no expert evidence establishing breach of the medical standard of care.

The defendants filed expert reports concluding that the psychiatrist’s clinical decisions and the nursing care met the applicable standards and that the report to the Ministry of Transportation was appropriate.

The court held that medical malpractice claims generally require expert evidence and that without such evidence the plaintiff had no reasonable prospect of success.

Statutory protections under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996 and the Highway Traffic Act also shielded the physician for actions taken in good faith and for mandatory reporting.

Summary judgment was granted dismissing the action against the hospital and physician.

At a contested status hearing under Rule 48.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff sought to continue a civil action alleging misfeasance in public office, negligence, and related claims arising from a professional opinion that led to suspension of her nursing licence.

The court considered whether the plaintiff met the two-part test requiring an acceptable explanation for litigation delay and proof that the defendant would suffer no non-compensable prejudice if the action proceeded.

Although the court accepted that the defendant would suffer no non-compensable prejudice, the plaintiff failed to adequately explain lengthy delays in documentary production, failure to bring an intended motion, and failure to comply with a previously approved timetable.

The plaintiff also failed to provide a clearly articulated plan to advance the litigation.

As the plaintiff did not satisfy both elements of the test, the action was dismissed for delay.