Breana Vandebeek

The appellant was convicted of possession of a loaded, chambered, prohibited handgun found in his one-bedroom condominium during the execution of a search warrant.

He appealed both conviction and sentence.

On the conviction appeal, the appellant argued misapprehension of evidence and unreasonable verdict, contending that his brother or a third party may have placed the firearm in the unit.

The Court of Appeal held these submissions amounted to speculative inferences unsupported by the evidentiary record and dismissed the conviction appeal.

On the sentence appeal, the court found no error in principle in the 20-month custodial sentence, holding it was restrained, consistent with parity, and appropriately reflected the aggravating circumstances of a loaded firearm in a residential building.

Two appellants, addicted to fentanyl, set fire to a rowhouse using Molotov cocktails at the direction of their fentanyl dealer, killing three occupants and seriously injuring a fourth.

Both pleaded guilty to three counts of manslaughter and one count of arson causing bodily harm and received sentences of 16 and 17 years respectively, plus $250,000 restitution orders each.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the sentencing judge's treatment of mitigating factors including addiction and mental health, and held the sentences were not demonstrably unfit.

However, the court quashed the restitution orders, finding the sentencing judge failed to weigh the appellants' ability to pay and imposed them as a mechanical afterthought.

Fresh evidence of post-sentencing cooperation with authorities was not admitted.

The appellant, a bar manager, was convicted of sexual assault and voyeurism after sexually assaulting a female employee in the bar basement while intentionally having the incident recorded by a security camera.

The appellant appealed on three grounds: (1) the trial judge over-relied on the complainant's demeanor when assessing credibility; (2) the trial judge misapplied the adopted admissions rule by relying on text messages between the appellant and his co-accused; and (3) the trial judge misapplied the doctrine of reasonable expectation of privacy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the convictions.

The appellant appealed from conviction and sentence for sexual interference and sexual assault.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty based on evidence of sexual touching during a car ride, while acquitting on two other alleged incidents due to reliability concerns.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's use of prior consistent statements (text messages) to assess credibility and reliability, and his application of the W.(D.) framework and the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

The appellant also appealed the sentence of 21 months custody, arguing the trial judge erred in finding a position of trust, misapplying sentencing principles, and refusing to impose a conditional sentence.

The appellate court dismissed all grounds of appeal and the application for fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the Crown’s appeal from a stay of proceedings entered after a trial judge found that correctional officers, including Officer Warburton, used excessive force and then colluded to cover up the incident by filing false reports and giving misleading testimony.

The trial judge found a violation of the respondent’s Charter rights and determined that a stay was the only appropriate remedy to protect the integrity of the justice system.

The appellate court held that the trial judge’s findings were supported by the evidence, her legal analysis was correct, and her remedy was justified in the circumstances.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered the sentence of a young person, G.D., who committed serious offences at ages 15 and 16 and was sentenced as a youth at age 19.

The court reviewed fresh evidence of rehabilitation and determined that transferring G.D. to an adult correctional facility would undermine his progress.

The court set aside part of the custodial sentence and probation order, substituting shorter custody and a longer probation period, in the interests of justice.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeals of David Beak and Yostin Murillo from their convictions for first degree murder and sexual assault in the killing of Rhoderie Estrada.

The court found that the trial judge’s instructions to the jury on constructive first degree murder, post-offence conduct, and the handling of evidence and objections were accurate and complete.

The grounds of appeal advanced by both appellants, including issues of causation, post-offence conduct, jury instructions, and procedural fairness, were all rejected.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the conviction appeals of Khalid Yousuf and Adrian Myles Puentes-Reed, who were convicted of multiple offences related to drug trafficking, proceeds of crime, and possession of firearms after being found in a "safe house" in Thunder Bay.

The court found that the trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence or err in law, and that the verdicts were reasonable based on the circumstantial and direct evidence connecting both appellants to the contraband and the operation of the safe house.

This decision concerns a judicial screening on a "faint hope" application under section 745.6 of the Criminal Code, in which Ronald Cyr seeks a reduction in his parole ineligibility period following a first-degree murder conviction.

The court reviews the statutory criteria, the facts of the offence, the applicant’s conduct and character, and the positions of the parties.

The judge finds that there is a reasonable prospect a jury could reduce the parole ineligibility period and orders that a jury be empaneled to hear the application.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal of Barrington Grant’s conviction for possession of a loaded firearm.

The appellant had challenged the admissibility of evidence obtained under a warrant, but his application was dismissed at trial.

After his conviction, related proceedings involving the same information to obtain (ITO) resulted in stays due to disclosure issues.

The Crown conceded the appeal in light of these developments and a prior Court of Appeal decision in R. v. Khamo, which quashed a conviction based on the same evidence.

The court set aside the conviction, ordered a new trial, and entered a stay of proceedings.

The decision concerns a "faint hope" application by Timothy Belisle, convicted of first-degree murder, seeking a reduction in his parole ineligibility period after serving 15 years.

The court reviews the legislative history and legal standards for faint hope applications, the applicant’s background, conduct, and rehabilitation efforts, as well as the positions of both parties.

Ultimately, the court finds that Mr. Belisle has not demonstrated a reasonable prospect of success before a jury and dismisses the application.

The appellants were convicted by a jury of second degree murder following the shooting death of the victim in a restaurant washroom.

The central issue on appeal was whether the trial judge erred in admitting surveillance video of the appellants at a motel with a firearm on the night prior to the shooting as prior discreditable conduct evidence, and whether the jury was properly instructed as to its permissible uses.

The majority of the Court of Appeal had found no error in the admission or instruction, while the dissenting judge would have ordered new trials.

A majority of the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals substantially for the reasons of the majority of the Court of Appeal, affirming the convictions.

The appellant, Marvin Gurango, appealed his three-year custodial sentence for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario found no error in principle or law in the sentencing judge’s decision, nor was the sentence manifestly unfit.

The court emphasized the importance of denunciation and deterrence for this offence and found the sentence consistent with similar cases.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms offences, arguing the trial judge erred in failing to exclude a handgun under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The handgun was discovered during a lawful search incident to arrest, but police subsequently breached the appellant's s. 10(b) right to counsel and s. 8 privacy rights through warrantless entries into his apartment.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by failing to consider the breaches cumulatively.

Conducting a fresh s. 24(2) analysis, the Court concluded that while the breaches were serious, their impact was minimal as they occurred after the lawful discovery of the handgun, and society's interest favoured admission.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder by a jury.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by refusing to leave the included offence of manslaughter with the jury, by directing the jury to find he had the state of mind for murder if they concluded he was the shooter, and by improperly instructing the jury on after-the-fact conduct.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge did not err in removing manslaughter, as there was no air of reality to an unintentional killing.

While the trial judge erred in directing the jury on the state of mind for murder, the error was harmless and cured by the proviso, as the jury's finding of planning and deliberation necessarily included an intention to kill.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Guled Mohamed, appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

He raised three grounds: the trial judge erred in finding he lacked standing to challenge the search warrant, erred in inferring guilt from circumstantial evidence, and rendered an unreasonable verdict due to insufficient evidence of his knowledge of the cocaine.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings on standing, the application of circumstantial evidence, and the reasonableness of the verdict.

The court clarified that a trial judge is not bound to accept the Crown's theory on standing if the accused presents contradictory evidence, and reiterated the standard for assessing circumstantial evidence and unreasonable verdicts.

The applicant was found guilty by a jury of first degree murder for killing his father.

Prior to sentencing, the applicant brought a constitutional challenge arguing that the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole for 25 years violates sections 12 and 15 of the Charter.

The applicant argued that his long-standing mental disorders and substance-induced psychosis at the time of the offence reduced his moral blameworthiness, making the mandatory sentence grossly disproportionate and discriminatory.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application.

The court held that it was bound by the jury's verdict, which necessarily found that the applicant had the requisite specific intent for first degree murder, representing the highest level of moral culpability.

The court found no violation of section 12, as the sentence is not grossly disproportionate for an offender with such high moral blameworthiness.

The court also found no violation of section 15, as the applicant failed to demonstrate that the mandatory minimum sentence disproportionately impacts persons with mental illness, noting that those who lack criminal responsibility or the requisite intent due to mental illness are not subject to the mandatory sentence.

The appellants, Thulani Chizanga and Shamar Meredith, appealed their convictions for second-degree murder and Mr. Meredith appealed his sentence.

The main issues on appeal included the admissibility of a "Super 8 Video" as prior discreditable conduct evidence, the trial judge's jury instructions on joint enterprise liability, post-offence demeanour evidence, and defence theories, as well as sentencing errors related to aggravating factors and mitigating circumstances.

The majority dismissed all appeals, finding no legal errors in the trial judge's decisions regarding evidence admissibility, jury instructions, or sentencing.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the conviction appeals and ordered a new trial, arguing the Super 8 Video was improperly admitted and instructed upon, particularly concerning its probative value for joint enterprise to kill.