Andreea Baiasu

The applicant, a police officer acquitted of failing to provide the necessaries of life, brought an application to cross-examine the prosecuting Crowns and obtain documents from the Executive Legal Officer and the retired trial judge.

The Crown had appealed the acquittal based on the trial judge's failure to provide reasons.

The applicant sought this evidence to support a fresh evidence application, alleging that ex parte communications by the Crown with the Executive Legal Officer led to the trial judge being prohibited from sitting, which prevented the delivery of reasons.

The Court of Appeal granted the request to cross-examine the Crowns, finding it relevant to the fresh evidence application, but adjourned the requests for document production pending submissions on potential privilege claims.

The appellant appealed his conviction and three-year sentence for sexual assault.

The trial judge found that the complainant was extremely intoxicated and incapable of consenting, relying on circumstantial evidence including the complainant's state when awoken and the presence of the appellant's DNA.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the verdict reasonable and the trial judge's use of common sense inferences appropriate.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the three-year sentence fell within the established range for sexual assault involving forced penetration, regardless of whether the victim was awake or sleeping.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder after stabbing the deceased, who had previously robbed him of a firearm.

On appeal, the appellant argued that administrative errors in compiling the 2022 jury roll violated his Charter rights to a representative jury and caused a miscarriage of justice.

He also challenged the trial judge's refusal to leave self-defence with the jury, the admission of prior discreditable conduct evidence, the voluntariness of his police statement, and the fitness of his 13-year parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no appearance of unfairness in the jury roll process, no air of reality to self-defence, and no errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or sentencing.

The appellant appealed his convictions for discharging a firearm and unauthorized possession of a loaded prohibited firearm in a motor vehicle, as well as his sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding him a party to the shooting based on circumstantial evidence, including his presence in the vehicle and flight from police.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge reasonably concluded from the totality of the evidence, including the appellant's DNA on the firearm and his coordinated actions with the co-accused, that he acted in concert to plan and carry out the shooting.

The sentence appeal was consequently dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of child luring after communicating online with an undercover police officer posing as a 15-year-old girl.

The trial judge relied on the statutory presumption of belief in age and the appellant's failure to take reasonable steps to ascertain the interlocutor's age.

On appeal, the court applied the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Morrison, which struck down the presumption of belief in age as unconstitutional.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's reliance on the unconstitutional presumption and the failure to take reasonable steps to establish the essential element of belief was a reversible error.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction and conditional stays were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, challenging the constitutionality and retrospective application of legislative amendments that abolished peremptory challenges and substituted the presiding judge for lay triers in challenges for cause.

The Court of Appeal held that the amendments did not violate the appellant's rights under ss. 7, 11(d), or 11(f) of the Charter.

However, the Court found that while the change to the challenge for cause procedure was purely procedural and applied retrospectively, the abolition of peremptory challenges affected substantive rights and applied prospectively.

Because the appellant's right to a jury trial vested before the amendments came into force, the abolition of peremptory challenges should not have applied to his trial.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The accused brought an application challenging the constitutionality of Bill C-75 amendments to the Criminal Code, which eliminated peremptory challenges and replaced lay triers with the trial judge for challenges for cause.

The accused argued these changes violated his rights under sections 7, 11(d), and 11(f) of the Charter.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the amendments did not infringe the accused's right to an independent and impartial jury, nor did they violate principles of fundamental justice.

The court also held that the amendments were procedural in nature and applied retrospectively to the accused's trial.

The appellants were convicted by a jury of robbery, having their faces masked, assault with an imitation handgun, and using an imitation handgun.

One appellant was also convicted of resisting a peace officer.

On appeal, the appellants argued the trial judge erred in his instructions on party liability for the firearm offences.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the jury was not properly instructed that a non-gun-wielding intruder must know the other intruder had a firearm to be found guilty as a joint principal.

The appeal was allowed for the joint convictions and disguise charges, but the conviction for resisting arrest was upheld as the appellant's actions constituted active resistance.

The appellant was convicted of assault causing bodily harm and forcible seizure following an alleyway beating outside a nightclub.

At trial, the judge admitted a security guard's written statement identifying the appellant as a participant under the past recollection recorded exception to the hearsay rule.

The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing the statement lacked threshold reliability and that phone call evidence was mishandled.

He also appealed his three-and-a-half year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding the hearsay evidence met the traditional exception's conditions, the jury was properly instructed, and the sentence was proportionate to the gravity of the vigilante attack.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

He had forced his way into the complainant's apartment, confined her, and eventually ordered her to watch him masturbate.

The appellant argued that because he did not touch the complainant or verbally threaten her, his actions did not amount to a threat of sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that in the context of the violent and sexualized atmosphere created by the appellant, his actions constituted a threat to apply force of a sexual nature.

The appellant appealed his conviction for weapons trafficking under s. 99 of the Criminal Code.

He argued that the Crown failed to prove he knew the sale of the gun was unauthorized, and that the finding he aided and abetted the transfer was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the defence had conceded the knowledge element at trial by focusing exclusively on whether the appellant played a role in the transfer.

The Court also held that the trial judge's conclusion regarding aiding and abetting was amply supported by the evidence.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board had no obligation to make further inquiries beyond the joint position of the parties based on the record.

The Court noted the appellant's progress, the existence of a treatment plan, and concluded that the Board's disposition was the least onerous and least restrictive available.

The young person appealed his convictions for sexual assault and unlawful confinement as an aider and abettor.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions relating to the main sexual assault in the bedroom, finding the trial judge's factual findings supported the inference that the appellant intended to assist his friends.

However, the Court quashed the convictions relating to an earlier 'tickling incident' because the trial judge failed to provide any analysis of how the appellant aided and abetted that specific assault.

The appeal was allowed in part, with a new trial ordered on the quashed counts.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual exploitation under s. 153(1) of the Criminal Code.

He argued the trial judge erred in characterizing his relationship with the complainant as exploitative.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusion was fully justified given the appellant was 11 years older, acted as the complainant's drug supplier and street protector, and took advantage of the resulting power imbalance.

The appellant appealed a sentence of indeterminate detention following a dangerous offender designation.

He argued the trial judge erred in concluding there was no reasonable possibility of eventually controlling his risk in the community.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusion was firmly grounded in the evidence, noting the appellant committed the predicate offence while on conditional release.

The respondent was found not criminally responsible for aggravated assault and other charges.

The Ontario Review Board granted him an absolute discharge, finding he no longer posed a significant risk to public safety.

The hospital appealed, seeking to introduce fresh evidence that the respondent had rapidly decompensated, resumed substance abuse, and become aggressive shortly after his discharge.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding it could reasonably have affected the board's decision as it undermined the factual foundation of the absolute discharge.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the board for a rehearing.

The appellant was convicted of the first degree murder of his estranged wife.

He appealed the conviction, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable as the evidence did not support findings of planning and deliberation or criminal harassment.

He also argued that a decision tree provided to the jury was misleading and that the trial judge failed to give a proper W.(D.) instruction regarding his testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the evidence reasonably supported the verdict on all bases left to the jury, the decision tree was properly contextualized by the trial judge's instructions, and the substance of the W.(D.) principles was adequately conveyed.

The appellant appealed a second-degree murder conviction arising from a fatal shooting during a gang-related confrontation at a public festival.

The appeal challenged the jury charge on former s. 34(2) self-defence, the refusal to leave provocation under s. 232 to the jury, and the trial judge’s review of the evidence.

The court held that the charge, read as a whole, fairly presented self-defence and correctly focused the jury on the critical moment of the shooting.

It further held that there was no air of reality to provocation because the defence position was deliberate self-preservation, not loss of self-control, and found no material misstatement or omission in the evidentiary review.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed after conviction for possession of a loaded prohibited firearm under s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code.

Following the court's earlier ruling that the mandatory minimum sentence was unconstitutional and that the trial sentence was manifestly unfit, the remaining issue was whether the respondent should be re-incarcerated after having completed the sentence originally imposed.

The court held that a fit sentence at trial would have been two years less a day, with 12 months' credit reducing the remaining custodial term to 12 months.

However, given the lengthy appellate delay, the respondent's successful completion of the conditional sentence, and his demonstrated rehabilitation, the court permanently stayed execution of the 12-month sentence.

The accused appealed his convictions for violent offences against a former friend, while the Crown appealed the refusal to designate him a dangerous offender.

The court dismissed the conviction appeal, holding that the trial judge made no reviewable errors in applying the credibility framework, assessing the forensic evidence, or giving reasons.

On the sentence appeal, the court held that the trial judge erred in law by importing intractability into s. 753(1), by treating spontaneity and absence of 'serial' offending as defeating pattern, and by misapprehending the availability of long-term offender style community control for a non-sexual violent offender.

The offender was designated a dangerous offender and the disposition was varied to five years' imprisonment followed by a ten-year supervision order.