K.L. Campbell

In a trial for second-degree murder, the accused brought a pre-trial application to exclude or edit a video recording of the killing, arguing the graphic images would inflame the jury.

The Crown voluntarily edited the video to conceal the pooling of blood and the gunshot wound to the deceased's head.

The court ruled the edited video recording was admissible, finding its probative value in showing the factual circumstances of the murder substantially outweighed any potential prejudice to the accused.

The accused was found guilty of kidnapping with intent to hold for ransom and conspiracy to commit kidnapping.

The victim was violently abducted, confined for a week, and tortured by co-conspirators.

The accused was arrested while attempting to collect the $500,000 ransom.

The court applied the Kienapple principle to stay the unlawful confinement charge.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, the court determined a fit sentence was 7 years imprisonment.

After applying 1.5:1 credit for pre-sentence custody and additional credit for harsh lockdown conditions, the accused was sentenced to 2 years and 2.5 months in the penitentiary.

The accused was convicted of two separate murders and faced a potential order under s. 745.51 of the Criminal Code that his parole ineligibility periods be served consecutively, totaling 41 years.

The accused challenged the constitutional validity of s. 745.51, arguing it violated ss. 7 and 12 of the Charter by permitting life-long sentences without hope of release.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the discretionary power to impose consecutive parole ineligibility periods for multiple murders does not require or permit grossly disproportionate sentences.

The court also noted that the royal prerogative of mercy provides a realistic hope of eventual release.

The accused was charged with kidnapping, unlawful confinement, extortion, assault causing bodily harm, and conspiracy after a complainant was abducted, tortured, and held for ransom.

The accused was arrested while attempting to collect the ransom money, and text messages on his phone linked him to the ongoing kidnapping enterprise.

The court found the accused guilty of unlawful confinement, kidnapping, and conspiracy, holding that he intentionally joined the continuing kidnapping offence and the existing conspiracy.

The accused was acquitted of extortion and assault causing bodily harm, as the extortion was completed before his involvement and there was no evidence he participated in the torture.

In a pre-trial motion for a first-degree murder case, the Crown sought to admit evidence of the accused's prior discreditable conduct, including drug trafficking, acts of violence, and motive.

The court endorsed agreements between the parties allowing evidence of the accused's drug trafficking to provide narrative context, and allowing witnesses to state they feared the accused without detailing specific prior violent acts.

The court also ruled that the Crown could lead evidence of the accused's motive—specifically that he killed the deceased in retaliation for a prior assault by the deceased's close associate—finding its probative value outweighed any prejudicial impact.

At the close of the Crown's case in a jury trial for conspiracy to commit murder and related firearms offences, the accused moved for a directed verdict of acquittal on the conspiracy count.

The accused argued there was no evidence they participated in a conspiracy to murder the complainant.

The court reviewed the circumstantial evidence, including a prior bank fraud involving the parties, cell phone communications, video surveillance of the accused acting in concert, and the coordinated ambush of the complainant.

Applying the test for a directed verdict, the court found there was some admissible evidence upon which a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could infer an agreement to murder the complainant.

The application for a directed verdict was dismissed.

Prior to the testimony of the complainant in a trial for conspiracy to commit murder and attempted murder, the parties sought a ruling on the permissible scope of cross-examination regarding the complainant's prior acts of misconduct.

The court ruled that defence counsel could cross-examine the complainant on the factual details underlying his prior convictions, withdrawn charges, and uncharged misconduct detailed in police occurrence reports, provided there was a good faith basis.

However, defence counsel could not cross-examine the complainant on the factual allegations underlying charges for which he was acquitted, as an acquittal represents a verdict of legal innocence, though they could question him on accompanying uncharged fraudulent activities.

The Crown brought a certiorari application to quash a preliminary inquiry justice's decision to commit the accused to trial for assault simpliciter rather than the charged offence of sexual assault.

The preliminary inquiry justice had found that the brief struggle in an apartment vestibule lacked any sexual contact, language, or motive, and that inferring a sexual purpose was mere conjecture.

The reviewing court held that the preliminary inquiry justice committed no jurisdictional error in concluding the evidence did not reasonably support an inference of sexual assault.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was found guilty of unlawfully possessing a loaded prohibited firearm and breaching a weapons prohibition order.

The court considered the gravity of the offences, the accused's criminal record, and his positive prospects for rehabilitation.

After applying a 1.5:1 credit for pre-sentence custody and significant credit for over four years of restrictive bail conditions, the court sentenced the accused to a total of 2.5 years in a penitentiary.

In a joint trial for firearms and drug trafficking offences associated with a criminal organization, the Crown sought to introduce non-expert recognition evidence from a police officer identifying several non-accused individuals in photographs found on the accused's electronic devices.

The accused objected, arguing the officer lacked sufficient prior acquaintance, the evidence was hearsay, and its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.

The court applied the 'prior acquaintance/better position' test and ruled the evidence admissible for seven of the eight individuals, finding the officer had sufficient prior interactions to reliably identify them and that the self-identification fell under a recognized hearsay exception or was admissible for a non-hearsay purpose.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for assault causing bodily harm arising from a group altercation outside a restaurant.

At trial, the judge rejected the appellant's testimony that he was engaged in a consensual two-punch fight or acting in self-defence, instead accepting the Crown witnesses' evidence that the appellant and his friends engaged in a one-sided attack on the complainant.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge provided inadequate reasons, failed to properly apply the W.(D.) framework for assessing credibility, and erred in assessing reliability.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were adequate, the burden of proof was correctly applied, and the credibility findings were reasonable.

The accused, charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, brought a renewed application to stay the proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter following a mistrial.

The court held that under s. 653.1 of the Criminal Code, the earlier s. 11(b) ruling by the first trial judge was binding on the parties, and it was not in the interests of justice to revisit those findings.

After analyzing the additional delay caused by the mistrial and scheduling the retrial, the court concluded that the total delay of nearly 35 months, while lengthy, did not violate the accused's right to be tried within a reasonable time when balanced against the serious nature of the offence and the lack of prejudice to fair trial interests.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for sexual assault.

The complainant, a physically disabled woman, died before the trial concluded, and her videotaped police interview was admitted into evidence.

The appellant argued that his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter was violated due to a four-year delay, that the videotaped statement was insufficiently reliable, and that the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding digital penetration.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's delay analysis, her admission of the hearsay statement under the principled exception, or her assessment of the evidence.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for committing an indecent act and dangerous driving.

The trial judge had convicted the appellant of the indecent act based on a perceived legal presumption that intent to act wilfully arises when the act is seen by another person.

The appeal court found this to be a legal error, as no such presumption exists, and ordered a new trial on the indecent act charge.

The appeal against the dangerous driving conviction was dismissed, as the trial judge reasonably concluded the appellant's driving in heavy fog was a marked departure from the standard of care.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on an 'over 80' charge.

At trial, the judge excluded the results of the accused's breath samples under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the arresting officer should not have arrested the accused without first administering a roadside screening test.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge failed to conduct a proper Grant analysis.

Applying the three-pronged Grant test, the court concluded that the police conduct was in good faith, the breath samples were minimally intrusive, and the evidence was highly reliable and essential to the truth-seeking function of the trial.

The breath sample evidence was ruled admissible, the acquittal was set aside, and a conviction was entered.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on an 'over 80' charge.

The trial judge had excluded the Intoxilyzer results under s 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the arresting officer should not have arrested the respondent without first administering a roadside breath test, despite having reasonable grounds for an approved instrument demand.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge erred by failing to conduct a proper s 24(2) analysis.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the police conduct was in good faith, the breath demand was minimally intrusive, and the evidence was highly reliable and crucial to the case.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a conviction entered.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentration over 80.

He argued the trial judge failed to adequately address his argument that breath samples were not taken 'as soon as practicable'.

The Superior Court found the trial judge's reasons were legally inadequate for failing to expressly address the issue.

However, applying the curative proviso, the Court held a new trial was unnecessary because the trial record clearly established the 13-minute delay waiting for another officer to secure the appellant's vehicle was reasonable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a 14-month custodial sentence imposed for assault and breach of probation against his parents.

The trial judge had effectively imposed a 21-month sentence, which was seven times longer than the appellant's longest previous sentence of 90 days.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge erred in principle by imposing a sentence that was an inordinate and unjustified jump in severity, violating the step principle.

The appeal was allowed, and the custodial sentence was reduced to time served, with the three-year probation order remaining in effect.

During the execution of a search warrant for firearms, the accused was detained but not immediately advised of her right to counsel due to officer safety concerns.

After the residence was secured, there was a further delay before she was advised of her rights.

Upon finally being advised of her rights and asked if she wished to call a lawyer, she spontaneously stated, 'I use it for protection' in reference to a firearm found in a briefcase.

The court found a breach of s. 10(b) of the Charter due to the delay, but admitted the statement under s. 24(2), concluding it was voluntary, spontaneous, and would have been made regardless of the breach.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittals on charges of impaired driving and driving over the legal limit.

The trial judge had found that the accused was not in 'care or control' of his vehicle because it was mechanically inoperable after breaking down in a live lane of traffic.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge committed a palpable and overriding error by failing to recognize the realistic risk of danger posed by an intoxicated person remaining in the driver's seat of a vehicle stranded in a live lane of traffic.

Findings of guilt were entered and the matter was remitted for sentencing.