Jessyca Greenwood

During a first-degree murder trial, the accused brought an application for a mistrial and other relief following the late disclosure that undercover officers placed in his cell had audio-monitored their communications.

The accused sought further disclosure, challenged the Crown's claim of investigative privilege over the monitoring device, and argued the monitoring violated section 8 of the Charter.

The court dismissed the applications, finding that the Crown properly asserted public interest privilege over the device's specifics.

The court also held that the audio monitoring was lawfully conducted for officer safety under section 184.1 of the Criminal Code and did not constitute an unreasonable search or seizure.

The application for a mistrial was dismissed.

The accused brought numerous pre‑trial motions in a prosecution alleging forgery‑related offences, money laundering, and income tax fraud arising from a business producing false identification cards.

The motions included challenges to the Crown’s addition of counts under s. 574 of the Criminal Code, Charter claims concerning warrantless seizure of telephone subscriber information and production orders, delay under ss. 11(b) and 7 of the Charter, applications for particulars, certiorari to quash the committal, and allegations of prosecutorial misconduct and abuse of process.

The court held that the Crown lawfully added additional charges disclosed by the preliminary inquiry evidence and rejected the Charter challenges to subscriber information and production orders.

Delay claims were dismissed because most delay was attributable to inherent case complexity and defence availability rather than the Crown, and no significant prejudice was shown.

The court also rejected allegations of abuse of process and prosecutorial misconduct, finding they lacked an evidentiary foundation and did not justify an evidentiary hearing.

During the execution of a search warrant for firearms, the accused was detained but not immediately advised of her right to counsel due to officer safety concerns.

After the residence was secured, there was a further delay before she was advised of her rights.

Upon finally being advised of her rights and asked if she wished to call a lawyer, she spontaneously stated, 'I use it for protection' in reference to a firearm found in a briefcase.

The court found a breach of s. 10(b) of the Charter due to the delay, but admitted the statement under s. 24(2), concluding it was voluntary, spontaneous, and would have been made regardless of the breach.