Nathan Gorham

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms offences, arguing the trial judge erred in failing to exclude a handgun under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The handgun was discovered during a lawful search incident to arrest, but police subsequently breached the appellant's s. 10(b) right to counsel and s. 8 privacy rights through warrantless entries into his apartment.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by failing to consider the breaches cumulatively.

Conducting a fresh s. 24(2) analysis, the Court concluded that while the breaches were serious, their impact was minimal as they occurred after the lawful discovery of the handgun, and society's interest favoured admission.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder by a jury.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by refusing to leave the included offence of manslaughter with the jury, by directing the jury to find he had the state of mind for murder if they concluded he was the shooter, and by improperly instructing the jury on after-the-fact conduct.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge did not err in removing manslaughter, as there was no air of reality to an unintentional killing.

While the trial judge erred in directing the jury on the state of mind for murder, the error was harmless and cured by the proviso, as the jury's finding of planning and deliberation necessarily included an intention to kill.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant was found guilty by a jury of first degree murder for killing his father.

Prior to sentencing, the applicant brought a constitutional challenge arguing that the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole for 25 years violates sections 12 and 15 of the Charter.

The applicant argued that his long-standing mental disorders and substance-induced psychosis at the time of the offence reduced his moral blameworthiness, making the mandatory sentence grossly disproportionate and discriminatory.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application.

The court held that it was bound by the jury's verdict, which necessarily found that the applicant had the requisite specific intent for first degree murder, representing the highest level of moral culpability.

The court found no violation of section 12, as the sentence is not grossly disproportionate for an offender with such high moral blameworthiness.

The court also found no violation of section 15, as the applicant failed to demonstrate that the mandatory minimum sentence disproportionately impacts persons with mental illness, noting that those who lack criminal responsibility or the requisite intent due to mental illness are not subject to the mandatory sentence.

The accused was charged with first-degree murder following a fatal shooting in a parking lot outside a nightclub.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of an alleged eyewitness with a criminal lifestyle and a history as a police informant, as well as circumstantial evidence of post-offence conduct.

The court found the key eyewitness's testimony to be highly unreliable due to numerous internal and external inconsistencies, and concluded that the accused's post-offence conduct did not support an inference of guilt.

Applying the W.(D) test, the court held that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the shooter, resulting in an acquittal.

During a trial for second degree murder, the accused brought a Corbett application to prevent the Crown from cross-examining him on his criminal record should he choose to testify.

The accused's record included dated convictions for assault, weapons offences, and property offences.

The court applied the Corbett factors and concluded that the probative value of the convictions was outweighed by their prejudicial effect, particularly given their age and the risk of propensity reasoning.

The application was granted, and the Crown was prohibited from cross-examining the accused on his criminal record.

During a criminal trial involving allegations of sexual touching, the Crown sought to introduce a redacted transcript from the accused's prior College of Psychologists disciplinary hearing.

The court ruled that admissions made by the accused's counsel at the disciplinary hearing were presumptively admissible as admissions against interest.

However, the court held that these statements should be treated as informal evidentiary admissions rather than formal admissions under s. 655 of the Criminal Code, ensuring the jury is not misled into believing the accused formally admitted the facts in the current criminal proceeding.

The Crown brought an application to introduce similar fact evidence across three counts of sexual assault involving three separate complainants against the accused, a therapist.

The accused opposed the application, alleging an air of reality to collusion among the complainants, and brought a motion to sever the counts.

The court found the similar fact evidence highly probative of the actus reus and concluded the Crown had negated the risk of collusion on a balance of probabilities.

The Crown's application was granted, and consequently, the accused's motion for severance was dismissed.

Two doctors subpoenaed to testify at a murder trial brought a motion seeking an order authorizing them to disclose the deceased child's personal health information under the Personal Health Information Protection Act.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that no such order is necessary because a witness compelled by law to answer relevant questions at trial is not exposed to liability for breaching confidentiality.

The accused was found guilty of unlawfully possessing a loaded prohibited firearm and breaching a weapons prohibition order.

The court considered the gravity of the offences, the accused's criminal record, and his positive prospects for rehabilitation.

After applying a 1.5:1 credit for pre-sentence custody and significant credit for over four years of restrictive bail conditions, the court sentenced the accused to a total of 2.5 years in a penitentiary.

In a joint trial for firearms and drug trafficking offences associated with a criminal organization, the Crown sought to introduce non-expert recognition evidence from a police officer identifying several non-accused individuals in photographs found on the accused's electronic devices.

The accused objected, arguing the officer lacked sufficient prior acquaintance, the evidence was hearsay, and its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.

The court applied the 'prior acquaintance/better position' test and ruled the evidence admissible for seven of the eight individuals, finding the officer had sufficient prior interactions to reliably identify them and that the self-identification fell under a recognized hearsay exception or was admissible for a non-hearsay purpose.

The accused brought a Garofoli application seeking to quash a telewarrant and exclude firearm evidence obtained during a police search of his apartment.

The Information to Obtain relied heavily on information from an alleged confidential informant, and the Crown provided a heavily redacted version of the ITO claiming informer privilege.

The court addressed procedural issues at step six of the Garofoli framework concerning whether the excised material could be considered to support the warrant.

The judge held that the Crown must provide sealed written explanations justifying each proposed redaction and must file sealed evidentiary materials establishing the existence of the claimed confidential informant privilege.

These materials would be reviewed by the court alone to determine whether the privilege and redactions were justified.

The two accused were charged with sexual assault following an incident in a hotel room.

The complainant alleged she blacked out from alcohol consumption and awoke to find one accused sexually assaulting her while the other was present, after having been assaulted by the first accused while unconscious.

The court found the complainant's evidence regarding her memory loss unreliable, noting it conflicted with toxicological evidence and her behavior captured on video.

Both accused testified, with one claiming consensual sex and the other denying any sexual contact.

The court found the evidence of the accused raised a reasonable doubt and acquitted both men.

The accused were arrested after police conducted a high-risk takedown of a parked vehicle based on an uncorroborated confidential informant tip alleging cocaine was inside.

Officers arrested the occupants at gunpoint and searched the vehicle, discovering cocaine and a loaded prohibited firearm.

The court held the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest or search, as the tip was vague, the source’s credibility was not established, and there was no meaningful corroboration.

The warrantless arrest and search breached the accused’s rights under ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter.

Applying the s. 24(2) framework from Grant, the court found the police conduct deliberate and serious and excluded the evidence, resulting in acquittals.

The offender was convicted by a jury of possessing a loaded prohibited firearm, possessing marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, and related offences.

He was subsequently found guilty of two counts of possessing a firearm contrary to prohibition orders.

The offender, a repeat firearms offender, was transporting the drugs and loaded firearm to a known drug dealer.

The court sentenced him to a total of nine years in prison, reduced to four years and ten months after granting enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody due to onerous remand conditions and the justice of the peace's failure to make a written notation under s. 515(9.1) of the Criminal Code.

The co-accused, MacGyver Edwards, brought a motion to remove Edward Sapiano as counsel of record for Tristan Lall due to a conflict of interest.

Mr. Sapiano had previously interviewed Mr. Edwards at a detention centre shortly after his arrest, before realizing they were co-accused in the same murder.

The court found that a solicitor-client relationship was formed during that interview, imparting a duty of loyalty and confidentiality.

Despite a prior waiver signed by Mr. Edwards, the court held that the risk of Mr. Sapiano taking an adverse position against his former client undermined public confidence in the administration of justice.

The motion was granted, and Mr. Sapiano was disqualified.

The accused, a nightclub bouncer and a patron, were charged with aggravated assault following a violent altercation at a crowded nightclub.

The Crown's case relied heavily on eyewitness testimony from security personnel, the victim, and the victim's friend, as well as a statement from the bouncer's former girlfriend.

The court found the eyewitness identification evidence to be highly unreliable due to poor lighting, chaotic circumstances, inconsistencies, and evidence of collusion between the victim and his friend.

The court also admitted prior consistent statements from the bouncer.

Finding the Crown's evidence insufficient to prove identity and participation beyond a reasonable doubt, the court acquitted both accused.