toxicology

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge provided insufficient reasons, failed to properly consider expert toxicology evidence regarding the complainant's intoxication and capacity to consent, and erred in relying on equivocal post-offence conduct.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge failed to explain her pathway to concluding the complainant was unconscious and incapable of consenting, failed to address gaps in the expert evidence, and improperly jumped to an inference of guilt based on post-offence conduct.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for impaired driving, dangerous operation, and failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended toxicology evidence by rejecting his claim that he only consumed over-the-counter pain medication, failing to recognize that codeine (and its metabolites hydrocodone and morphine) can be found in such medication.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error, as there was no evidence the specific medication ingested contained codeine, and the trial judge was not required to take judicial notice of that possibility.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation and exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood following a single-vehicle accident on January 31, 2017.

The Crown established that the defendant was found in the driver's seat of a severely damaged vehicle that had travelled over 150 meters off the road.

The defendant's blood alcohol content was measured at 220 milligrams at 2:10 and 3:01 a.m., which toxicological evidence interpolated back to 220-260 milligrams at the time of the accident.

The court rejected Charter arguments regarding the right to counsel and found the defendant guilty on both counts.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood following a motor vehicle collision on March 5, 2016.

The defence brought a Charter motion alleging a breach of section 10(b) rights due to police failure to provide an interpreter to explain the defendant's rights to counsel, given the defendant's limited English proficiency.

The court conducted a blended Charter voir dire and trial.

The court found that while the defendant's first language was not English, there was insufficient objective evidence that the defendant failed to understand his rights to counsel or other information provided by police at the time of detention and arrest.

The court rejected the Charter breach argument and admitted the breath sample results.

The court found the defendant was the driver of the vehicle and convicted on both counts.

The appellant appealed her summary conviction for impaired driving and driving over 80.

At trial, the Crown relied on a toxicologist's report that assumed the appellant had not engaged in bolus drinking within 15 minutes prior to the incident.

The trial judge found sufficient circumstantial evidence to disprove bolus drinking and convicted the appellant.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and reversed the burden of proof.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual inferences regarding the absence of bolus drinking.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol following a collision at a gas station.

The Crown's case relied on observations of impairment before and after arrest, breath sample analysis, and toxicological evidence.

The defendant raised multiple Charter applications challenging the lawfulness of the arrest, the demand for breath samples, interpretation services, and the right to counsel.

The court found the defendant guilty on both counts after rejecting all Charter challenges and finding compelling evidence of impairment based on the totality of circumstances.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder and aggravated sexual assault in the death of a 29-year-old woman found naked in a wooded park in Guelph.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on DNA evidence linking the appellant to the deceased, forensic entomology evidence establishing time of death, and toxicology evidence showing cocaine in the deceased's blood.

The trial judge admitted evidence of a subsequent assault by the appellant on another sex worker (the "Barrie incident") to establish motive and rebut innocent association.

The appellant appealed on three grounds: admissibility of the Barrie incident evidence, unreasonableness of the verdict on causation and fault elements, and adequacy of jury instructions.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the Barrie incident evidence was wrongfully admitted and that the jury instructions on the fault element in murder were deficient.

The accused was charged with operation of a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol and failing to stop at the scene of an accident to avoid civil or criminal liability.

The Crown's case relied on breath samples taken more than two hours after the alleged offence and expert toxicology evidence.

The defence raised a bolus drinking theory, arguing that the accused consumed a large quantity of alcohol immediately before driving, such that his blood alcohol concentration was below the legal limit at the time of operation.

On the failure to remain charge, the issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused left the scene with intent to escape liability.

The court found the accused not guilty on both counts, accepting his evidence regarding the timing and pattern of alcohol consumption and finding reasonable doubt regarding his intent in leaving the scene, particularly given his voluntary return within 35 minutes.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood following a single-vehicle accident.

The Crown's case was overwhelming except for one issue: whether the accused consumed the majority of the alcohol either shortly before driving or after the accident.

The toxicologist testified that assuming driving occurred at 3:45 p.m., the accused's BAC would have been between 350 and 405 milligrams.

The Crown conceded it could not prove the accused drove within two hours of the breath test.

The trial judge found that the issue of bolus drinking (consuming large amounts of alcohol shortly before driving) or post-accident drinking was a live issue on the record.

Given the presence of an open vodka bottle in the accused's purse, the amount of vodka missing from the bottle, the accused's attempt to prevent police from finding the bottle, and the minimal signs of impairment observed by officers at the scene, the trial judge concluded there was a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused had consumed 7.5 ounces or more of vodka at the relevant time.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operation with blood alcohol content over 80 mg/100 ml on April 6, 2015.

A McDonald's employee reported observing an impaired driver, providing a license plate.

Police located the vehicle and observed erratic driving before stopping it at the accused's residence.

The Crown relied on breath test evidence and expert toxicology opinion.

The defence challenged the arrest under section 8 of the Charter and argued the expert report's assumptions were not established.

The court found reasonable and probable grounds for arrest but excluded the expert report due to evidence of bolus drinking (consumption of alcohol shortly before testing).

The court acquitted on both charges, finding the evidence of impairment insufficient to meet the beyond reasonable doubt standard.

The accused, a police officer and qualified breath technician, was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood following a collision with a parked pickup truck.

The accused fled the scene and attempted to obstruct justice by having his wife falsely claim she was the driver.

The Crown relied on expert toxicological evidence to "read back" breath test results to the time of the collision, as the presumption of identity was unavailable due to the delay in testing.

The accused claimed bolus drinking and that distracted driving, not impairment, caused the collision.

The court rejected the accused's testimony as incredible and unreliable, found the Crown proved the absence of bolus drinking beyond a reasonable doubt, and convicted on both charges based on the expert evidence and the accused's own admissions regarding his impaired judgment and decision-making.

The accused was charged with impaired operation and over 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood following a single-vehicle motor vehicle collision on an icy road.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the arrest under sections 8 and 9 of the Charter, and the adequacy of the right to counsel consultation under section 10(b).

The court rejected all Charter applications, finding that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest based on the odour of alcohol, the accused's admission to drinking, the circumstances of the accident, and his apology for committing a DUI.

The court found the accused's testimony unreliable and incredible.

On the trial on the merits, the court convicted the accused on both counts based on expert toxicological evidence establishing a blood alcohol concentration over 80 at the time of driving, corroborated by observations of impairment and the accused's own admissions.

The accused was charged with driving while impaired by alcohol and driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown presented evidence from a civilian witness, a police constable, and a breath technician showing signs of impairment and breath readings of 190 and 180 milligrams.

The accused testified that he had consumed only two beers before driving and consumed a 13-ounce bottle of vodka after arriving at the Home Depot parking lot.

The court found credible evidence supporting the post-driving consumption of alcohol and, considering all evidence together, harboured a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired at the time of driving.

The accused was acquitted on both counts.

The accused was charged with driving with excess alcohol (over 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood).

The Crown relied on expert toxicology evidence to establish the accused's blood alcohol level at the time of driving, as the breath tests were taken more than two hours after the alleged offence and the statutory presumption of identity could not be applied.

The defence raised evidence of bolus drinking—specifically, that the accused consumed 1 to 2 ounces of Sambuca liqueur (38% alcohol) immediately before driving.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that no large quantities of alcohol were consumed within 15 minutes of driving, creating a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused's blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit at the time of operation.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle, operation over 80 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood, and dangerous operation of a motor vehicle following a high-speed collision on the QEW.

The Crown's case was significantly hampered by the investigating officer's inability to testify due to a serious ATV accident, the unavailability of a key witness, and a conceded Charter breach regarding blood test evidence obtained under a demand.

The Crown proceeded by way of summary conviction and relied on hospital blood test results, expert toxicology evidence, and witness observations of impairment.

The court admitted hospital blood test records as business records and found the defendant guilty on all three counts based on the blood alcohol analysis and evidence of dangerous driving.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown's case relied on two intoxilyzer breath tests showing readings of 161 and 166 milligrams percent.

The defence argued that the accused's moderate to severe gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD), combined with consumption of a large meal and alcohol, could have caused regurgitated stomach alcohol to produce false high readings on the breath tests.

The court found that the defence evidence established a reasonable doubt regarding the proper functioning of the instrument and that the accused's blood alcohol concentration was likely below the legal limit at the time of the offence.

The accused was charged with alcohol-impaired care or control and care or control with excess blood alcohol following an incident on July 29, 2011.

The Crown sought to rely on breath sample readings to establish the over 80 charge.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine whether the Crown could rely on the statutory presumption of identity under s. 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, and whether the Crown could prove the absence of bolus drinking.

The court found that while the police proceeded "as soon as practicable" in obtaining breath samples, the Crown failed to prove that the first sample was taken within two hours of the last observed care or control.

The court also found that the Crown proved the absence of bolus drinking based on circumstantial evidence.

The over 80 charge was dismissed due to the Crown's inability to establish the two-hour requirement for the presumption of identity.

The accused was charged with seven offences arising from a motor vehicle collision on August 29, 2010, on Six Nations Territory.

The charges included failing to comply with a recognizance, operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol causing bodily harm (four counts), and operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol causing death (two counts).

The court found that the accused was driving at excessive speed (100-120 kph in an 80 kph zone) while significantly impaired by alcohol (blood alcohol concentration between 66-144 mg/100mL), with defective vehicle brakes and tires, in foggy night conditions.

The other driver, who was also impaired, made a left turn into the accused's path.

The court convicted the accused on all counts, finding that his impaired driving was a significant contributing cause to the deaths of two passengers and injuries to three others.