COVID-19

Manuel Maric appealed his conviction for refusing to comply with a breath demand, alleging errors by the trial judge regarding judicial notice of duty counsel advice, consideration of his Covid-19 fear as a reasonable excuse, handling of his Charter application, and limitations on cross-examination.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's assessment of credibility, the finding that Covid-19 fear was not a genuine excuse, and the proper disposition of Charter issues and control over cross-examination.

The informant sought to issue process for a private prosecution, alleging her employer violated the Genetic Non-Discrimination Act by requiring her to take a COVID-19 rapid antigen test as a condition of employment.

At the pre-enquête hearing, the court considered whether a rapid antigen test qualifies as a 'genetic test' under the Act.

The court found that a rapid antigen test merely detects the presence of viral nucleoprotein antigens and does not analyze DNA or RNA.

As the informant failed to establish a prima facie case, the court declined to issue process.

The applicant father and respondent mother disputed which parent should have decision-making responsibility regarding their 11-year-old child's routine and COVID-19 vaccinations.

The mother opposed vaccination based on personal and family medical history, while the father supported it.

After hearing expert evidence from both sides, the court qualified the father's expert in infectious diseases but rejected the mother's expert's qualifications regarding the COVID-19 vaccine's safety and efficacy.

The court took judicial notice of the safety and efficacy of routine childhood immunizations but declined to do so for the COVID-19 vaccine, instead relying on the father's expert evidence.

Finding the mother's opposition to be irrational and not evidence-based, the court granted the father sole decision-making authority over all vaccinations for the child.

The accused pleaded guilty to assault causing bodily harm and awaited an in-person sentencing hearing where the Crown would seek a custodial sentence.

The accused was unvaccinated against COVID-19.

The court considered whether to impose a bail condition requiring the accused to receive a COVID-19 vaccine to mitigate the risk of transmission in the courtroom and correctional facilities.

The court held that while a vaccination mandate could be constitutionally justifiable, a 14-day strict house arrest and testing quarantine prior to the sentencing hearing was an equally effective and less intrusive alternative under section 515(4)(h) of the Criminal Code.

The offender was found guilty of break and enter and sexual assault after entering an intoxicated and sleeping co-worker's hotel room using a master key.

The Crown sought a sentence of two years less a day, while the defence sought 9 to 12 months.

The court considered the significant breach of trust, the vulnerability of the victim, and the offender's lack of insight, balanced against his pro-social background and the collateral consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court imposed a global sentence of 20 months' imprisonment, followed by three years of probation and ancillary orders.

The applicants, charged with drug trafficking, brought an application alleging a violation of their right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay was over 26 months.

The court found that late disclosure of police radio communications caused significant delay that was not attributable to the defence.

After deducting delay caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the net delay remained above the 18-month presumptive ceiling.

The court granted the application and ordered a stay of proceedings.

Subsequently, the court summarily dismissed the Crown's application for forfeiture of seized funds, finding no reasonable prospect of success and that it would be unjust to permit forfeiture following a judicial stay.

The applicant father and respondent mother engaged in a high-conflict parenting dispute over their four-year-old child.

The father had unilaterally relocated the child from Brampton to Wolfe Island without notice to the mother, effectively frustrating her parenting time.

The court found that the father had engaged in a pattern of coercive control, financial abuse, and psychological abuse against the mother, and had repeatedly denied her parenting time, including during COVID-19 lockdowns.

The court denied the father's relocation, ordered the child returned to the mother's primary residence in Toronto, and granted the mother sole decision-making responsibility.

The father was granted specified parenting time and ordered to pay child support based on an imputed income.

The defendant, charged with speeding under the Highway Traffic Act, brought a motion for a stay of proceedings alleging a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The court calculated the total delay and deducted neutral time, including the period of court closures due to the COVID-19 pandemic, bringing the net delay below the 18-month presumptive ceiling.

The court found that the defence failed to take meaningful steps to expedite the proceedings or put the Crown on timely notice regarding disclosure issues.

The application was dismissed and the matter proceeded to trial.

The plaintiff brought a summary judgment motion in a wrongful dismissal action after being terminated without cause following more than 36 years of service.

Applying the Bardal factors, the court fixed reasonable notice at 24 months, holding that age, lengthy service, lifelong employment, and pandemic-era job market conditions placed the case at the high end of the range, but did not amount to extraordinary circumstances warranting notice beyond 24 months.

The court further found the employer breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing in the manner of dismissal by using a defective termination letter, failing to clearly advise of statutory entitlements and benefit continuation, and mishandling post-termination payments, causing compensable mental distress.

Damages of $146,743.21 were awarded, plus interest, subject to mitigation through a trust over earnings during the balance of the notice period.

Sentencing decision arising from convictions for historical domestic violence offences against two former intimate partners, including indecent assault, sexual assault, common assaults, and pointing a firearm.

The court emphasized proportionality, denunciation, deterrence, statutory aggravating factors for intimate partner abuse and abuse of trust, and the significant impact of the offences on the victims.

While the offender's advanced age, frailty, multiple medical conditions, lack of prior record, and the pandemic were treated as collateral consequences warranting some moderation, the court held that a substantial penitentiary term remained necessary.

A global sentence of 43 months less 71 days' credit was imposed, together with DNA, firearms, sex offender registry, and no-contact orders.

The accused, charged with sexual assault and assault, brought an application alleging a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay from the date of the charge to the anticipated end of the trial was 27.4 months.

The court deducted 168 days of defence delay and 192 days of delay caused by the COVID-19 pandemic as an exceptional circumstance.

The remaining net delay of 15.5 months fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The application was dismissed.

The accused, charged with impaired driving and failing to remain at the scene of an accident, brought a Charter s. 11(b) application seeking a stay of proceedings due to delay.

The delay was primarily attributed to the late disclosure of a breath room video and the suspension of court operations due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court calculated the net delay at 12 months and 17 days, falling below the 18-month Jordan ceiling.

The court found that the delay was not unreasonable and dismissed the application.

The accused, charged with impaired driving, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing unreasonable delay.

The total delay from arrest to the anticipated end of trial was over 25 months.

The court deducted defence delay and a significant period of delay caused by the COVID-19 pandemic as an exceptional circumstance.

The remaining delay fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling.

The court found the defence did not demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the proceedings, and the application was dismissed.

The applicant, awaiting trial for first-degree murder and firearms offences, sought bail based on changed circumstances since his initial detention order.

The court found that trial delays due to the Covid-19 pandemic, a recent outbreak at the detention centre, a strengthened release plan, and a pre-trial ruling strengthening the Crown's case constituted material changes warranting a fresh analysis.

However, after weighing the secondary and tertiary grounds under s. 515(10) of the Criminal Code, including the applicant's repeated possession of loaded handguns and the strength of the Crown's case, the court concluded that detention remained necessary and dismissed the application.

The appellant pled guilty to robbery and using an imitation firearm and was sentenced to a global custodial sentence of 23.5 months after pre-sentence custody credit.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred in applying Gladue principles, failed to consider rehabilitation, and that the sentence should be reconsidered due to the Sharma decision and COVID-19 lockdowns.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge appropriately applied Gladue principles, considered rehabilitation, and already accounted for COVID-19 hardships.

A conditional sentence was unavailable as the sentence was not less than two years.

Sentencing for sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching involving repeated sexualized touching of a child over a period of years in a family-friend setting.

The court emphasized the primacy of denunciation and deterrence in child sexual offence sentencing, citing contemporary appellate guidance that such offences are violent crimes causing profound and lasting harm.

Despite finding high moral culpability and recognizing that jail would ordinarily be required, the court treated the pandemic, the offender's age, and significant health conditions as exceptional circumstances justifying a conditional sentence.

A sentence of two years less one day to be served in the community under house arrest, together with probation and multiple ancillary protective orders, was imposed.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing that the continuing pandemic should affect sentencing principles.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot because the appellant had already served his custodial sentence.

The Court declined to consider the pandemic's effect on sentencing principles, noting it had recently opined on the issue in another case.

The applicant, convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment, sought interim judicial release pending her appeal, citing concerns about contracting COVID-19 in custody.

The court assessed the application under the public interest criterion of s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code.

Finding that the grounds of appeal were not strong, the offence was exceptionally serious, the release plan was inadequate, and the COVID-19 risk in her institution was low, the court concluded that the applicant's detention remained necessary in the public interest.

The application for release was dismissed.

Sentencing decision following convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference arising from non-consensual intercourse with a 15-year-old complainant.

The court held that denunciation and deterrence were the primary sentencing objectives under ss. 718.01 and 718.2 of the Criminal Code, and relied on recent appellate guidance emphasizing higher penitentiary terms for sexual offences against children.

A COVID-19-based sentence reduction was refused because any reduction would be arbitrary and would undermine proportionality.

The court imposed a 48-month penitentiary sentence on the sexual interference count, credited 669 days for pre-trial custody plus 106 days for lockdown conditions, stayed the sexual assault count under Kienapple, and made most of the requested ancillary orders except a s. 161 order.

The accused applied under s. 520 of the Criminal Code to review a prior detention order in a prosecution involving historic allegations of kidnapping, sexual assault with a weapon, and uttering death threats.

The court found a material change in circumstances arising from the Covid-19 pandemic and the resulting adjournment of the trial, entitling the accused to a fresh bail hearing.

Although the court concluded the accused narrowly met the reverse onus on the primary ground, it held detention remained necessary on the tertiary ground given the apparent strength of the Crown's case, the horrific circumstances of the alleged offences, the accused's past flight, repeated delay attributable to the accused, and a weak release plan.

The bail review application was dismissed.