D. Humphrey

The two accused were jointly charged with importing cocaine after arriving at Pearson International Airport from Trinidad and Tobago with over 4.9 kilograms of cocaine concealed in their luggage.

Both accused testified that they believed they were smuggling money, jewellery, or documents for a friend, and had been repeatedly assured that no drugs were involved.

The court found that while the accused's evidence was troubling and not entirely believable, it raised a reasonable doubt as to their actual knowledge.

Furthermore, the Crown failed to prove wilful blindness, as the accused had made some inquiries that lowered their suspicions, and the court was not convinced they deliberately refrained from further inquiries to remain ignorant.

Both accused were acquitted.

The appellant, a surgeon, appealed his conviction for sexually assaulting a hospital housekeeper.

He argued the trial judge made several errors in assessing credibility, including improperly considering race in finding a power imbalance, misapprehending evidence, and making a Browne and Dunn error.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly based the power imbalance on the parties' respective roles in the hospital and made no reversible errors in his credibility assessments or application of the law.

The applicant, a doctor, applied to sever a three-count indictment alleging sexual assaults against two different complainants (a patient and a co-worker) occurring years apart.

The applicant argued that joinder would cause prejudice and improper propensity reasoning.

The Crown opposed, arguing the evidence was intertwined and a viable similar fact application would be brought.

The court dismissed the application, finding a factual and legal nexus between the counts, and concluded that in a judge-alone trial, the risk of prejudice could be managed with appropriate evidentiary rulings.

The applicants, charged with sexual assault and administering a stupefying drug, sought a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to a 39-month delay between the charges and the trial date.

The court analyzed the delay using the Morin framework, attributing portions to inherent time requirements, defence actions, Crown actions, and institutional delay.

Although the court found actual and inferred prejudice, the unreasonable delay was calculated to be only one month beyond the Morin guidelines.

The court concluded that this short period of unreasonable delay was outweighed by the societal interest in having the serious charges determined on their merits, and dismissed the application.

The appellant, a high school math teacher, appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual exploitation of a 16-year-old student.

He argued the trial judge erred by treating a cross-examination question as evidence, failing to address improbabilities in the complainant's evidence, and attaching no weight to his good character evidence.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding that any error regarding the cross-examination question was harmless, the trial judge's credibility assessments were reasonable and supported by the evidence, and the trial judge did not err in her treatment of the character evidence given the private nature of the offences.