Abuse of process

The Applicant sought an order barring the Crown from prosecuting him for an allegation of choking, arguing that the charge formed part of a prior resolution and that prosecution would amount to double jeopardy under sections 725(1) and 725(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown argued that the choking allegation was not part of the previous proceedings and could be prosecuted.

The court found that the choking allegation was not previously adjudicated or considered, and therefore, the Crown was not barred from proceeding.

The application was dismissed.

The plaintiffs sought partial summary judgment in a civil action for damages following a motor vehicle accident, arguing that the defendant should be bound by findings made in a prior provincial offences trial acquitting the driver of careless driving.

The court denied the motion, holding that the findings in the earlier trial were not determinative of the issues in the civil action, given the different burdens of proof and the fact that the defendant was not a party to the earlier proceeding.

The court found that relitigation of the driver’s role in the accident was not an abuse of process and that the defendant should be permitted to fully marshal evidence at trial.

The court considered an application by Donna Mary Whibbs for an order declaring Daniel Lee Dobson a vexatious litigant under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The decision reviews the parties' history of litigation, including proceedings before the Landlord and Tenant Board, restraining order applications, and multiple Small Claims Court actions.

The court found that Dobson had persistently and without reasonable grounds instituted vexatious proceedings and conducted litigation in a vexatious manner, primarily to harass the applicant and her counsel.

The court granted a tailored vexatious litigant order prohibiting Dobson from instituting or continuing proceedings against Whibbs and her counsel without leave of the court.

The court considered a motion by the plaintiff to strike portions of the defendant’s statement of defence and counterclaim in a property dispute.

The court found that much of the defendant’s pleading was irrelevant, scandalous, or pleaded evidence rather than material facts, and that it amounted to an abuse of process.

The court struck numerous paragraphs and ordered the defendant to serve and file a fresh, compliant pleading, with the process to be supervised by the court.

The applicant, William Malamas, sought leave to commence an application for judicial review of decisions by the Office of the Independent Police Review Director.

The court dismissed the application, finding that Malamas had not satisfied the requirements under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act for leave to proceed as a vexatious litigant.

The court held that the proposed proceeding was an abuse of process and lacked reasonable grounds, as it was intrinsically linked to prior litigation that led to the vexatious litigant order.

This decision addresses the constitutionality of routine strip searches of young persons in pre-trial custody, focusing on four Black adolescent female applicants charged in the high-profile homicide of Kenneth Lee.

The court found that routine strip searches, conducted without individualized grounds or prior authorization and involving complete nudity, violated sections 7 and 8 of the Charter.

The court declined to grant a stay of proceedings, instead holding that the appropriate remedy was a reduction in sentence for any applicant found guilty, to reflect the Charter breach.

The ruling provides detailed analysis of the legal and regulatory framework, the psychological impact of strip searches, and the evolving standards for custodial searches in youth justice settings.

The court considered a request by the Toronto Police Service Board and Detective Constable Matthew Mungal to dismiss the proceeding under Rule 2.1.01 as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The action, brought by J. Craig Anderson as litigation guardian for his son, alleged failures by the Toronto District School Board and others to accommodate the minor plaintiff’s disabilities and respond to bullying and misconduct.

The court declined to dismiss the action under Rule 2.1.01, finding the claim was bona fide and did not exhibit the hallmarks of a frivolous or vexatious proceeding.

The court emphasized the importance of access to justice for self-represented litigants and directed the parties to attend a case conference.

The court dismissed Dana Proctor’s action against Penske Truck Leasing as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process under rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The claim, arising from a truck rental dispute, included wide-ranging and implausible allegations and relief, including conspiracy, electronic harassment, and requests for judicial review of Alberta court decisions.

The court found the action lacked legal merit, repeated issues from prior proceedings, and was marred by irrelevant and repetitive content.

Zurich Insurance Company Ltd. moved for a declaration that an Assignment Agreement between Mometal Structures Inc. and 9357-1578 Quebec Inc. was null and void, and for dismissal of three related actions as an abuse of process.

The court found that the Assignment Agreement was not precluded by the subcontract, was not a bare assignment of a cause of action, and that 9357 was not required to immediately disclose the Assignment Agreement.

Zurich's motion was dismissed.

The court considered motions by the respondent, Mohammad Rahbar, to have the appellant, Nasya Peters, declared a vexatious litigant and for security for costs in relation to her appeal.

The court found that Ms. Peters had engaged in persistent, vexatious, and abusive litigation conduct, both in court and through communications with the respondent and his counsel.

The court declared Ms. Peters a vexatious litigant and ordered her to pay $10,000 into court as security for costs before she could continue her appeal.

The court granted the defendants' motion to strike the Amended Statement of Claim in its entirety, with leave to amend, on the grounds that it amounted to an abuse of process and was time-barred by the 15-year ultimate limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The claim, brought by G. Scott Paterson against the Royal Bank of Canada and others, alleged a campaign of defamation and economic interference culminating in regulatory proceedings by the Ontario Securities Commission.

The court found that the claim sought to re-litigate issues already settled by the OSC and that Paterson was aware of the essential facts giving rise to his claim well before the expiry of the limitation period.

The court considered a motion by Marc Castillo and Castillo HR Consulting Inc. to stay the action for abuse of process due to Peninsula Employment Services Ltd.'s failure to immediately disclose settlement agreements with three former co-defendants.

The court found that the delayed disclosure of these agreements, which required the settling defendants to cooperate with the plaintiff, fundamentally altered the adversarial landscape and violated the strict requirement for immediate disclosure.

As a result, the action was permanently stayed.

The court also addressed, in obiter, the obligations of the Independent Supervising Solicitor regarding the production and accessibility of electronic documents seized under an Anton Piller Order.

The court considered a request by Canadian Tire Bank to dismiss the plaintiff's action as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process under rule 2.1.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court declined to dismiss, finding that the pleadings, read generously, disclosed a core complaint that was not clearly frivolous or abusive.

The court emphasized that rule 2.1 is a blunt instrument reserved for the clearest of cases and is not a substitute for other procedural motions.

The court declared Glycobiosciences Inc. and Kevin Drizen vexatious litigants under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The decision reviews a lengthy history of litigation by Glyco and Drizen, noting repeated unsuccessful actions, disregard for adverse rulings, and failure to pay costs.

The court imposed restrictions on their ability to commence or continue proceedings in Ontario without leave, and stayed all ongoing matters.

The reasons also address the legal test for vexatious litigant status and the balancing of access to justice with the need to protect the court system from abuse.

The court dismissed Douglas LaFramboise’s action against Robert Kostyniuk as an abuse of process under Rule 2.1.01.

The claim arose from a prior action in which Kostyniuk, as counsel for Sylvia Zwaan, obtained judgment against LaFramboise for unlawful conversion.

The court found that LaFramboise’s new action was a collateral attack on prior decisions, was barred by absolute privilege, and that Kostyniuk owed no duty of care to LaFramboise.

The court emphasized the robust application of Rule 2.1 to prevent frivolous or vexatious litigation.

This decision addresses an application by Robert Freedland seeking a stay of a section 117.05 firearms disposition proceeding on grounds of abuse of process, alleging the Crown reneged on an agreement made during his preliminary hearing and that the hearing is motivated by malice following his overturned conviction.

The court found no abuse of process, holding that the original agreement not to pursue firearms charges applied only to the criminal trial and did not immunize the applicant from the regulatory firearms disposition process.

The court also granted an order for an out-of-town Crown Attorney to conduct the section 117.05 hearing due to perceived fairness concerns but denied the request to summon former jurors to investigate alleged obstruction of justice, finding no evidentiary basis for such an order.

The plaintiff, Blackstone Paving and Construction Limited, sought a stay of the defendant Town of Newmarket’s counterclaim, arguing that the Town’s failure to immediately disclose a settlement agreement with third party R.V. Anderson Associates Limited constituted an abuse of process.

The court found that the settlement did not materially change the litigation landscape or the adversarial relationship among the parties, and thus did not trigger an immediate disclosure obligation.

The application was dismissed, with costs reserved to the outcome of trial.

The court granted a stay of proceedings in a prosecution for historical sexual assault and physical assault, finding multiple and egregious breaches of the accused’s rights under section 7 of the Charter.

The breaches included lack of jurisdiction by military police, bias and improper involvement in family law proceedings, failure to preserve and disclose evidence, and destruction of relevant evidence.

The court found that the cumulative effect of these breaches undermined the integrity of the justice system and that no remedy short of a stay would suffice.

The appellant, David E. Wires, appealed a Superior Court judgment that recognized and enforced an arbitration award obtained by the respondent, La Française IC 2.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: improper constitution of the arbitral tribunal due to alleged bias, lack of standing of the respondent, and errors in the arbitrator's costs award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the application judge correctly determined that relitigating the bias issue was an abuse of process, that the respondent had standing, and that the costs award was properly recognized and enforced without double-counting.

The appellant, an inmate, appealed a Superior Court decision dismissing his action against the Commissioner of the Correctional Service of Canada under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The original action alleged deliberate power cuts to his cell and sought damages and an order for an extension cord.

The Superior Court dismissed the action as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, noting jurisdictional issues and a lack of cause of action, and ruled against the admissibility of the appellant's affidavit evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no clear error or misdirection by the motion judge, and affirmed that Rule 2.1.01 is intended for summary dismissal of such claims, precluding the need for affidavit evidence.