Court File and Parties

Court File No.: CV-24-1828
Date: 2025/06/27
Court: Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Between:
Donna Mary Whibbs (Applicant)
and
Daniel Lee Dobson (Respondent)

Applicant Counsel: J.D. Ekpenyong
Respondent: Self-Represented

Heard: March 21, 2025
Judge: I.R. Smith

Introduction

[1] Ms. Whibbs (the “applicant”) alleges that Mr. Dobson (the “respondent”) is a vexatious litigant. She applies pursuant to s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C-43 (the “CJA”) for orders prohibiting the respondent from instituting further proceedings or from continuing proceedings previously instituted.

[2] For the reasons which follow, the relief sought is granted in part.

Background

[3] The applicant and the respondent were in a conjugal relationship. Since that relationship ended, according to the applicant, the respondent has harassed her by engaging in persistent unmeritorious litigation against her.

Landlord and Tenant Board Proceedings

[4] The applicant says that she and the respondent lived together in her residence. When their relationship failed in 2022, she asked him to move out. He refused to do so, claiming that he was a tenant. The respondent eventually left but also then filed an application with the Landlord and Tenant Board (the “LTB”) in which he alleged that he had been unlawfully evicted, among other arguments.

[5] In reasons dated June 19, 2023, the Vice-Chair of the LTB found that the applicant and the respondent had been in an intimate relationship, and that they were living together for that reason. In other words, their relationship was not one of landlord and tenant, and therefore the provisions of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 17 did not apply. The respondent’s application to the LTB was therefore dismissed.

[6] In discussing the issue of costs, the Vice-Chair noted that the applicant’s counsel had more than once appeared at the hearing unprepared and that the respondent had also acted inappropriately by making a complaint about the Vice-Chair’s conduct, instead of raising his concerns directly with the Vice-Chair. The respondent later said he had no concerns with the Vice-Chair continuing to preside over the proceedings. Quite apart from these observations, it is apparent from these reasons that both parties failed to act with civility during this proceeding. In any case, the application was dismissed and there was no order for costs.

[7] The respondent launched an appeal from the dismissal of his LTB application. He brought a motion to adduce fresh evidence on that appeal, which motion was dismissed on May 24, 2024 by Braid J. Her endorsement indicates that the respondent’s attempt to adduce fresh evidence came after a deadline set by Standryk J. and that the respondent was “prohibited from bringing a further fresh evidence application.” In her oral reasons, Braid J. criticized both the respondent and the applicant’s counsel for their handling of the motion. With respect to the latter, Braid J. said as follows:

He arrived fifteen minutes late, telling me that he couldn’t find the Zoom link which is not acceptable. He was not robed and said he thought it was a small claims court matter today. This indicates that he simply was not properly prepared for this hearing. More concerning is the fact that Mr. Ekpenyong did not answer direct questions from the court and, on one point, misrepresented a fact. I have great concerns about this conduct.

[8] Ultimately, the LTB appeal was heard by Krawchenko J. on March 5, 2025, and dismissed for reasons released March 10, 2025. Notwithstanding the direction of Braid J., the respondent referred to documents she had ruled inadmissible. Krawchenko J. found that the Vice-Chair had made no error in determining that the respondent had not been the applicant’s tenant, and dismissed the respondent’s allegation of bias on the part of the Vice-Chair (a position he had raised and then abandoned during the LTB proceedings). Krawchenko J. noted that the conduct of both parties before the LTB was marked by incivility and that this had made the Vice-Chair’s task in managing the proceedings difficult.

Restraining Order Proceedings

[9] In May of 2022, the applicant brought an application for a permanent restraining order against the respondent. Pending the hearing of that matter, the applicant moved ex parte for a temporary restraining order. That request was granted in chambers by Sloan J. on May 11, 2022, and continued by Walters J. on May 20, 2022, until full argument of the request for a temporary order could be heard on notice. After hearing argument on May 27, 2022, Bingham J. granted the temporary restraining order pending the hearing to consider the request for a permanent restraining order.

[10] The respondent did not appeal from the order of Bingham J. but did move for an order that the application for a restraining order be withdrawn. That motion came before Walters J., who found in an endorsement dated September 14, 2022, that she could not make the order the respondent was seeking.

[11] The application for a permanent restraining order was heard over two days in February of 2024. The requested order was made by Gibson J. and it is dated April 16, 2024. In his reasons (found at 2024 ONSC 2211), after finding the respondent an incredible witness, and cataloguing some of his worrying behaviour towards the applicant (including the breach of the previous temporary restraining orders), Gibson J. found as follows (at para. 14):

I find that the Applicant has legitimate and reasonable grounds to fear for her safety from the Respondent. This is manifest on both a subjective and objective basis. The Respondent has demonstrated a lengthy period of harassment or irresponsible, impulsive behaviour with the objective of harassing or distressing the Applicant. The conduct complained of has been persistent and there is a reasonable expectation that it will continue without court involvement.

[12] In his costs endorsement dated May 31, 2024, Gibson J. noted that the applicant sought a significant costs award in part because the respondent “repeatedly called the Applicant’s counsel a liar and impugned the integrity of the Applicant’s counsel.” The respondent resisted the applicant’s request for costs, and requested costs himself, taking the position that the applicant’s counsel was unreasonable, had acted in bad faith, and had appeared in court unprepared. Gibson J. noted that both sides had engaged in ad hominem attacks against the other. He found, though, that although the matter had been “hotly contested” it was the respondent whose conduct “was often egregious.” Gibson J. continued as follows:

There is little doubt that, had he been a lawyer, a report to the Law Society would have been warranted in respect of his conduct. No one, whatever their status, is entitled to conduct scorched-earth litigation tactics and slander opposing counsel with impunity. Self-represented litigants should not be insulated from costs consequences merely because of that status.

[13] Gibson J. awarded costs against the respondent in the amount of $60,000 (finding that the much greater amount sought by the applicant was “excessive”). The respondent has not made any attempt to pay the costs awarded by Gibson J.

[14] The applicant says that when she attempted to enforce the costs order by securing a notice of garnishment against the respondent, he responded by filing a motion to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal in the Court of Appeal. That motion was heard and decided by Favreau J.A. on September 23, 2024. In her endorsement, she noted that the respondent had not filed an affidavit in support of his motion and that the applicant’s affidavit on the motion was neither sworn nor commissioned. She therefore declined to consider that affidavit. After finding that there was no merit to the respondent’s appeal, Favreau J.A. wrote as follows:

Finally, while Ms. Whibbs did not provide evidence of prejudice if this appeal is allowed to proceed, it is evident from the trial judge’s reasons – and even from the materials provided by Mr. Dobson himself – that Mr. Dobson has engaged in a pattern of harassment vis-à-vis Ms. Whibbs. The proceedings have included ongoing attacks on Ms. Whibbs and her counsel, which the trial judge described as “scorched-earth litigation tactics”. These are the hallmarks of a vexatious proceeding. To allow Mr. Dobson to proceed with this appeal would simply allow him to prolong this conduct, which is obviously prejudicial to Ms. Whibbs.

[15] For these and other reasons, Favreau J.A. dismissed the respondent’s application for an extension of time. She awarded costs against the respondent in the amount of $2,500.

[16] I note that the respondent prepared and served a notice of motion for an extension of time to file for a review of the decision of Favreau J.A. by a full panel of the Court of Appeal. That notice is dated October 16, 2024, but it seems that it was never filed with the Court of Appeal.

[17] The respondent also moved in this court to set aside the garnishment. A motion to stay the order was dismissed by Edwards J. on October 2, 2024. He awarded costs of $500 against the respondent. The garnishment issue was heard on its merits by Tweedie J. on January 22, 2025. In her endorsement, she noted that neither party had filed proper materials or followed the directions ordered in that regard by Breithaupt Smith J. on October 30, 2024. Tweedie J. dismissed the respondent’s request to set aside the garnishment, but ordered both sides to bear their own costs given the applicant’s failure to file documents in compliance with the order of Breithaupt Smith J. Tweedie J. noted that “this has been a pattern in the past.”

Small Claims Court Defamation Proceedings

[18] The respondent sued the applicant in Small Claims Court. His claim is dated August 28, 2023. The basis for it is that the applicant had allegedly defamed him during her testimony before the LTB and in various court proceedings. The applicant says that the respondent was advised that testimony given during a tribunal or court proceeding cannot form the basis of a defamation claim, yet he nevertheless proceeded with the claim.

[19] The applicant brought a motion to dismiss this claim and that motion was heard on February 20, 2024, in the absence of the respondent. The endorsement of the Small Claims Court judge on that date, the following conclusion:

… the [respondent’s] Claim has no merit and is in itself frivolous and vexatious. This Court makes this Order pursuant to its general power as set out in Rule 12.02(3) and, this Court further Orders that the Claim is on its face inflammatory, a waste of time, a nuisance and an abuse of the Court’s process. It is amply clear from the above materials filed in this matter and the [applicant’s] Affidavit in Support that the [respondent’s] only intention in bringing this Claim is to harass and vex the [applicant].

[20] However, I am advised that the respondent was able to establish that he had not been notified of the hearing date for the motion and had not attended because he did not know about it. The order dismissing his claim was set aside. Counsel for the applicant advised that thereafter the parties attended a settlement conference where he asked that the matter be set down for trial.

Small Claims Court Eviction Proceedings

[21] The respondent also launched a Small Claims Court proceeding against the applicant and the applicant’s counsel on July 15, 2024. In it he alleges, inter alia, that counsel participated in the respondent’s illegal eviction from the applicant’s residence. In his claim, the respondent refers to the applicant as his “landlord” and makes factual assertions that have been rejected by the LTB. He accuses counsel of negligence and misrepresentations. He also alleges that property of his was damaged in the course of the allegedly illegal eviction.

[22] I was advised that the applicant was noted in default on this matter. She gave evidence that she failed to respond because she lost track of this case in the myriad of proceedings that have been initiated in this matter.

The Hearing on the Present Application

[23] The parties appeared before McArthur J. on January 9, 2025. In his endorsement from that date, McArthur J. gave directions for the hearing of this matter, including respecting the filing of affidavits and respecting time limits for evidence and submissions.

[24] In her affidavits, the applicant sets out the history of the litigation between her and the respondent and opines that because the respondent has obtained a fee waiver certificate he is at liberty to launch frivolous proceedings without consequence. Cost awards against the respondent, now totalling a substantial amount, also do not appear to have deterred him. She writes that “I really need a break from his persistent and relentless proceedings.”

[25] The respondent’s affidavit evidence complains that he was not properly served with the application (although he brought no motion in this respect and was, at the hearing, clearly well-versed in the issues and the contents of the application), restates evidence which was rejected in the LTB proceedings, sets out his attempts to settle with the applicant, accuses the applicant of fraud in connection with the applicant’s request for costs before Gibson J., accuses counsel of lying to the court repeatedly, and blames the applicant and her counsel for the fact that the legal proceedings between them have dragged on. The respondent also deposed that he is involved in a lawsuit where he has alleged that he was “seriously injured while detained by the police in 2022.” He says that an order labelling him as a vexatious litigant would prejudice his position in that case.

[26] At the hearing before me, the respondent began by requesting an adjournment, which I denied for reasons given orally. The main basis for the request was the respondent’s hope to be represented by counsel.

[27] The respondent then cross-examined the applicant on her affidavits. The themes of that cross-examination included the parties’ attempts to settle[^1] (the applicant’s position was, essentially, that the respondent’s efforts in this regard were insufficient), the applicant’s contact with the respondent’s aunt (which evidence was largely irrelevant), the circumstances of the respondent’s eviction and the involvement of the police in that matter (the applicant gave evidence consistent with the conclusions of the LTB), whether the costs award made by Gibson J. was justified (the applicant said that it was), whether the respondent caused damage to the applicant’s residence (she said that he did), and whether she had received insurance money as a result (she had but could not remember the amount).

[28] Counsel for the applicant then cross-examined the respondent. The respondent said that he did not know how many motions he had brought in the family proceedings, but later said there had been four. When asked on which if any of his legal proceedings he had been successful, the respondent replied that he had been successful in noting the applicant in default in the Small Claims Court and in his request to lead fresh evidence (notwithstanding the conclusion of Braid J. to the contrary). The respondent denied that the various cases he has launched against the applicant (and her counsel) have sought to have the courts decide issues that have already been litigated and decided. He denied that he was pursuing litigation as a means to harass the applicant. He said that the applicant’s counsel had lied to the court repeatedly. The respondent said that he was motivated to resolve his litigation with the applicant but that the applicant and her counsel were preventing him from doing so by being unreasonable on the issue of costs. He questioned the correctness of the decision of Gibson J.

[29] In the course of his evidence, the respondent testified that he had launched five lawsuits, only two of which involve the applicant. I know very little about the other three actions. The respondent also said that he had launched four applications. I do not know what those applications are about, although I assume that one of them is his application to the LTB. Except as described earlier in these reasons, I have little information about motions brought by the respondent in the context of the restraining order proceedings, although it appears from the Case History Report in evidence that there were at least three. The applicant has not seen fit to put adequate information about these other actions, claims, applications, or motions in the record before me.

[30] Counsel for the applicant made submissions in favour of the making of a vexatious litigant order, emphasizing the frivolous and repetitive nature of the proceedings brought, or arguments made, by the respondent, the respondent’s failure to pay any of the cost awards made against him, and the emotional and financial cost of these proceedings to the applicant. Counsel submitted that the respondent has posted online allegations of corruption against several of the judges of this court who have dealt with the proceedings between the applicant and the respondent, but he led no evidence on this point (although he attempted to lead new evidence during his submissions). Counsel’s effort to cross-examine the respondent on this issue did not yield any clear admission, although the respondent did seem to acknowledge in his submissions that he had posted information online about one or more members of the court. He claimed that he had taken that information down almost immediately.

[31] The respondent’s submissions addressed the applicant’s alleged fraudulent insurance claim, the applicant’s alleged persistent perjury, the applicant’s counsel’s alleged professional negligence, an allegation that Tweedie J. was covering up something that happened during the parties’ trial management conference because she released a redacted transcript of that proceeding, the respondent’s efforts to settle matters with the applicant, the applicant’s alleged unreasonableness in settlement discussions, the alleged fraudulent nature of counsel’s bill of costs submitted to Gibson J., an allegation that Braid J. had altered an endorsement, and questioning the correctness of the conclusions of Gibson J.

[32] The hearing before me was not a model of civility, efficiency, or professionalism. The parties and counsel were rude to each other and spoke over each other. They ignored the time limits set for them by McArthur J. The affidavit materials presented by both sides were poorly prepared. Counsel for the applicant at one point gave advice to his client while she was in the witness box and under cross-examination. Much of the respondent’s cross-examination of the applicant was irrelevant (but I was able to form the view that the applicant’s testimony was credible and that she was testifying as straightforwardly as possible in response to a disjointed cross-examination). Counsel’s cross-examination of the respondent was not especially effective and was hampered by the fact that he had not prepared complete materials to put to the respondent. Nevertheless, I was able to conclude that the respondent was both evasive and defensive. Counsel’s attempt to lead new evidence after I had already begun to hear submissions was, obviously, improper.

The Law

[33] The court may make an order limiting a litigant’s right to institute or continue proceedings where it is established that the litigant has “persistently and without reasonable grounds instituted vexatious proceedings in any court or conducted a proceeding in any court in a vexatious manner”: CJA, s. 140(1). This test is disjunctive and may be satisfied either by a finding that proceedings are vexatious or have been conducted in a vexatious manner: Rubio v. Leigh, 2024 ONSC 6215, para 481; Austin v. House, 2022 ONSC 2349, para 15.

[34] Section 140 of the CJA was recently amended, the new version coming into force on October 15, 2024. The corresponding provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 (Rule 2.2.01), were also recently amended. I agree with the observation of Mitrow J. in Rubio v. Leigh, 2024 ONSC 6215, para 474, who concluded that the recent changes to s. 140 “are principally procedural rather than substantive” and that the “substantive criteria contained in the new s. 140(1) are similar to the old s. 140(1).” Accordingly, reference to cases which have considered applications for a vexatious litigant order and which pre-date the amendments, remains useful.

[35] In Pyper v. Goble, 2023 ONSC 5389, aff’d 2024 ONCA 372, a case decided before these legislative changes, the state of the law respecting the nature of vexatious proceedings was well-summarized by Ryan Bell J. as follows (at paras. 11–13):

Where a judge of the Superior Court of Justice is satisfied that a person has “persistently and without reasonable grounds” instituted vexatious proceedings in any court, or conducted a proceeding in any court in a vexatious manner, the judge may order that no further proceeding be instituted by the person in any court or a proceeding previously commenced not be continued, except by leave of the judge.

While a person’s access to justice is a fundamental right, the court must be diligent to ensure that its processes are not abused by any particular litigant to the detriment of not only those directly involved in the litigation, but also the system at large. In Foy v. Foy (1979), 26 O.R. (2d) 220 (C.A.) Blair J.A., writing in dissent, described the rationale of provisions in the Vexatious Proceedings Act, legislation that preceded s. 140 of the CJA. The rationale remains the same:

It is not difficult to perceive the object of the Vexatious Proceedings Act. The protection afforded honest litigants by the exercise of the Court’s inherent jurisdiction to control abuse of process is subject to a serious limitation. It can only be exercised ex post facto. The vexatious litigant has the luxury of being able to initiate proceedings and to force the other party to the expense and inconvenience of responding. The severe financial burden which can be inflicted on a responding party is made obvious by this case. Moreover, the onus of proving that a proceeding is an abuse of process will always be on the responding party. Clearly the purpose of this legislation was to overcome the unfair advantage enjoyed by a vexatious litigant and, in cases where an order is made under the Act, to place upon him the onus of establishing that any proposed proceedings are not an abuse of the process of the Court. Significantly, the vexatious litigant is not deprived of the right to bring proceedings. Rather, the burden is shifted: the vexatious litigant must establish to the Court’s satisfaction that there is a prima facie ground for the proposed proceedings.

In Currie v. Halton Regional Police Services Board (2003), 233 D.L.R. (4th) 657 (Ont. C.A.) the Court of Appeal for Ontario endorsed the analysis of Henry J. in Lang Michener et al. and Fabian et al. (1987), 59 O.R. (2d) 353 (High Ct.). In Lang Michener, Henry J. identified hallmarks of vexatious proceedings:

(a) the bringing of one or more actions to determine an issue which has already been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction constitutes a vexatious proceeding;

(b) where it is obvious that an action cannot succeed, or if the action would lead to no possible good or if no reasonable person can reasonably expect to obtain relief, the action is vexatious;

(c) vexatious actions include those brought for an improper purpose, including the harassment and oppression of other parties by multifarious proceedings brought for purposes other than the assertion of legitimate rights;

(d) it is a general characteristic of vexatious proceedings that grounds and issues raised tend to be rolled forward into subsequent actions and repeated and supplemented, often with actions brought against the lawyers who have acted for or against the litigant in earlier proceedings;

(e) in determining whether proceedings are vexatious, the court must look at the whole history of the matter and not just whether there was originally a good cause of action;

(f) the failure of the person instituting the proceedings to pay the costs of unsuccessful proceedings is one factor to be considered in determining whether proceedings are vexatious; and

(g) the respondent’s conduct in persistently taking unsuccessful appeals from judicial decisions can be considered vexatious conduct of legal proceedings.

See also: Ontario v. Jogendra, 2012 ONSC 3303, paras 47–50; Szot v. Cozzi, 2025 ONSC 424, paras 33–37; Ottawa Police Services Board v. Moore, 2025 ONSC 537, paras 15–16; Tipu v. Munchi, 2025 ONSC 3342, paras 42–45.

[36] I note also that, in determining whether a particular litigant is a vexatious litigant, that person’s conduct both in and out of court may be relevant: Bishop v. Bishop, 2011 ONCA 211, paras 8–9.

[37] Where it is established that a litigant qualifies as a vexatious litigant, pursuant to the newly amended s. 140 of the CJA, the court may make an order that includes any of the following terms:

1. No further proceeding may be instituted by the person in any court, except by leave of a judge of the Superior Court of Justice.
2. No proceeding previously instituted by the person in any court shall be continued, except by leave of a judge of the Superior Court of Justice.
3. Any other term that is just.

[38] Rule 2.2.07 provides that a vexatious litigant order shall be in Form 2.2G and that the judge making such an order “shall specify the details of any limitations in the order’s application.” The CJA and the rule therefore make it plain that an order made against a vexatious litigant may be very broad and represent a comprehensive prohibition on litigation (absent leave of the court) or may be more tailored to the circumstances of a particular litigant or issue.

[39] While an order limiting a person’s access to the courts should be made cautiously (Dobson v. Green, 2012 ONSC 4432, para 6), the court must bear in mind that the resources of the administration of justice are limited. This point was recently emphasized by Myers J. in Sieluzycki v. Ontario, 2024 ONSC 5695 (Div. Ct.), paras 33–34:

… There is no right to bring frivolous or vexatious civil proceedings. Frivolous and vexatious proceedings are dismissed summarily. In fact, the problems posed by vexatious proceedings and vexatious litigants are so pervasive as to be the subject of numerous laws and rules designed to curtail them. (Consider, for example, the overlapping content of Rules 2.1, 21.01(3)(d), and 25.11(b) and (c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.) To the same end, amendments to s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act have just recently been proclaimed into force to decrease procedural constraints and costs involved to declare someone to be a vexatious litigant.

Given that the court’s resources are very limited and constrained, efforts to limit abusive proceedings will enhance access to justice generally by freeing up scarce court resources to be available to parties with meritorious or at least non-frivolous issues. They also protect defendants from being vexed with unrecoverable costs responding to meritless proceedings.

Discussion

[40] I open my discussion of the issues by observing that the state of the record and the conduct of both the respondent and applicant’s counsel have made the task of piecing together and understanding the history of this matter – and of drawing conclusions based on that history – unnecessarily difficult. Both the respondent and Mr. Ekpenyong appear to believe that it is acceptable behaviour to be persistently rude to one another, to speak over each other, to fail to follow the court’s directions, and to fail to show the court respect. Neither has assisted the court by preparing a complete and intelligible record.

[41] Nevertheless, I have been able to come to an understanding of the history of litigation between the respondent and the applicant (and her counsel) and to be able to draw the conclusions which follow. While, like many of my colleagues who have been involved in this matter, I have deemed it necessary to comment on the conduct of counsel for the applicant, that conduct is relevant only insofar as it informs an assessment of the conduct of the alleged vexatious litigant, the respondent. The respondent emphasizes counsel’s conduct, including what he says are acts of dishonesty, as part of the justification for his continued litigation in this matter.

[42] I do not accept this argument. While it is very clear that the respondent and Mr. Ekpenyong dislike each other intensely, and that some of counsel’s conduct will have been irritating to the respondent, I am satisfied that the respondent’s pursuit of litigation against the applicant and counsel is motivated by a desire to harass the applicant and, to a lesser extent, her counsel. Obviously, no misconduct or negligence on the part of the applicant’s counsel could justify the use of the legal process in this way. It is an abuse of the court’s process.

[43] In my view, the evidence establishes that the respondent is a vexatious litigant. The factors laid out in Lang Michener, which I address in the order Henry J. listed them, are all in play on this application (some to a greater extent than others):

(a) The respondent has brought at least three proceedings (the LTB proceedings and both Small Claims Court cases) based on the same facts and largely the same issue: his allegedly improper eviction from the respondent’s home. While the legal issues raised in each of these three cases may not be perfectly identical, there is substantial overlap between the cases. The factual issues which are the respondent’s focus, and which have their root in his eviction, are raised again by him in all the proceedings.

(b) The small claims launched by the respondent appear to me to be frivolous and without merit. This is especially so of the defamation claim, insofar as it rests on statements made in court. The motion to withdraw the application for a temporary restraining order, heard and dismissed by Walters J. was also clearly without merit. The appeal of the LTB decision was weak at best and based in part on an argument which the respondent had abandoned before the LTB. The respondent’s proposed appeal to the Court of Appeal was described by Favreau J.A. as having “no merit.”

(c) I have already said that I am satisfied that the proceedings brought by the respondent are intended to harass the applicant and, to a lesser extent, her counsel. The respondent’s antipathy for both the applicant and counsel is obvious. I accept the evidence of the applicant that her effort to garnish the respondent’s wages was the catalyst for the respondent’s attempt to extend the time to appeal the restraining order proceedings to the Court of Appeal. Favreau J.A. concluded that to permit the extension of time would be to allow the respondent to continue his “pattern of harassment” of the applicant and her counsel.

(d) It is obvious that the respondent has in the various proceedings described herein taken issues previously raised and “rolled [them] forward” repeatedly. I refer in particular to the circumstances of his eviction from the applicant’s residence. In addition, he has launched a Small Claims Court matter against the applicant’s counsel. Henry J. referred to each of these steps as “a general characteristic of vexatious proceedings.”

(e) A view of the whole history of the proceedings demonstrates the vexatious nature of the conduct of the respondent. Giving allowance for the fact that the respondent is unrepresented, and even if it was reasonable for him to launch an application before the LTB, and perhaps even to test the conclusion of the LTB on appeal, his conduct of the various proceedings – described above – has been vexatious. His repeated resort to the courts, the recycling of arguments, the launching of unmeritorious claims, the attacks on counsel, his uncivil conduct in court and before the LTB, the failure to pay costs, and his extra-judicial harassment of the applicant, all point to this conclusion.

(f) The respondent has failed to pay any of the cost awards made in favour of the applicant. Indeed, as already observed, her attempt to enforce a costs award appears to have motivated some of his conduct as a vexatious litigant. Certainly, the costs awards against the respondent have had no deterrent effect.

(g) The respondent’s appeal of the LTB decision was weak at best. His proposed appeal to the Court of Appeal against the restraining order and costs had “no merit” according to Favreau J.A.

[44] Each of these factors points to the conclusion that the respondent is a vexatious litigant insofar as the applicant and her counsel are concerned. I add, though, that the respondent’s out of court conduct is also relevant to an assessment of this question. In this regard, I point to the conclusion of Gibson J. that the respondent has engaged in a pattern of out of court harassment of the applicant. This supports the conclusion that the respondent’s conduct in court, marked by incivility, frivolousness, and vitriol aimed at the applicant, is part and parcel of a broader pattern of harassment of her.

[45] I have been urged to take into account allegations said to have been made online by the respondent against members of the court. While there is support for this submission based on the respondent’s own submissions to me, and while I am inclined to think that such allegations are relevant to the question of whether the respondent is a vexatious litigant, in this case I give them little or no weight given the failure of the applicant to lead proper evidence on the point.

[46] Nevertheless, I am satisfied that the applicant has established both that the respondent “persistently and without reasonable grounds instituted vexatious proceedings” and that he “conducted a proceeding … in a vexatious manner”: CJA, s. 140.

[47] While there is evidence before me that the respondent is engaged in other litigation against litigants other than the applicant and her counsel, that evidence is so vague and incomplete that I have concluded that I cannot make any vexatious litigant order that extends beyond the litigation involving the applicant and her counsel, as the applicant has requested that I do. In other words, it is possible that the litigation against others is meritorious and brought for a proper purpose and that the respondent’s vexatiousness is confined to cases involving the applicant, for whom he harbours a special animus.

Order and Costs

[48] For these reasons, I make the following orders:

1. THIS COURT DECLARES that Daniel Lee Dobson:
   a. has persistently and without reasonable grounds instituted vexatious court proceedings and has conducted court proceedings in a vexatious manner within the meaning of subsection 140(1) of the Courts of Justice Act; and
   b. is a vexatious litigant pursuant to subsection 140(1) of the Courts of Justice Act.

2. THIS COURT ORDERS as follows:
   a. Daniel Lee Dobson is prohibited from instituting or continuing any proceeding in any court in the Province of Ontario, against Donna Mary Whibbs and/or John David Ekpenyong, except and until such time as leave is granted by a judge of the Superior Court of Justice, pursuant to subsection 140(3) of the Courts of Justice Act.
   b. All proceedings against the parties identified in clause (a) that were previously instituted by Daniel Lee Dobson in any court in the Province of Ontario and that are not yet finally disposed are hereby stayed except and until such time as leave is granted by a judge of the Superior Court of Justice, pursuant to subsection 140(3) of the Courts of Justice Act.
   c. Any proceeding against the parties identified in clause (a) instituted by Daniel Lee Dobson on or after the date of this Order without leave of a judge of the Superior Court of Justice and in violation of this Order shall be a nullity ab initio.
   d. This Order is subject to the right of appeal provided in subsection 140(2.3) of the Courts of Justice Act.

[49] The applicant may serve and file written costs submissions of no more than three double-spaced typed pages plus a bill of costs within 7 days of the release of these reasons to my judicial assistant at mona.goodwin@ontario.ca and copy to Kitchener.SCJJA@ontario.ca. The respondent may serve and file responding costs submissions of no more than three double-spaced typed pages within 14 days of the release of these reasons.

I.R. Smith
Released: June 27, 2025

[^1]: The parties agreed that evidence of their settlement discussions was relevant and admissible at this hearing.