Reasons for Decision

Court File No.: CV-17-494 (Kingston)
Date: 2025-06-05
Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Between:
Kunal Tipu, by his Litigation Guardian, the Public Guardian and Trustee, Plaintiff
– and –
Dr. Munchi, Dr. Habib, Dr. Eid, the Estate of Dr. Duncan Scott, Deceased, Dr. Watson, Dr. Paterson/Vanner, Kingston General Hospital and Hotel Dieu Hospital, Defendants

Appearances:

• Kathleen Lindsey, for the Public Guardian and Trustee
• Stephanie Pearce and Isabelle Corbeil, for the defendant physicians/moving parties
• Kim Dullet and Emilie Roy, for the defendants, Kingston General Hospital and Hotel Dieu Hospital
• Andrew Reeson, for Kingston Police Services Board
• Randy Sutton and Aliyyah Jafri, for Eli Lilly Canada Inc.

Heard: In writing, at Kingston

Judge: Graeme Mew

Introduction

[1] The moving parties are physicians who have been sued by Kunal Tipu. They ask the court to declare that Kunal Tipu is a vexatious litigant, and seek an order prohibiting Mr. Tipu from starting or continuing any proceeding in any court governed by the Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c C.43, including Superior Court of Justice court file numbers CV-17-00000494-0000 (Kingston), CV-20-00635619-0000 (Toronto), CV-22-00000805-0000 (Brampton), and CV-23-00000062-0000 (Kingston), without first obtaining leave from a judge of the Superior Court of Justice.

[2] In the instant case, Madam Justice Williams has declared Mr. Tipu to be a party under a disability, and appointed the Office of the Public Guardian and Trustee (“PGT”) as his litigation guardian: Tipu v. Munchi, 2024 ONSC 5310.

[3] Except where otherwise referenced, in proceedings mentioned in these Reasons for Decision, Mr. Tipu has not been declared a party under a disability, and has represented himself. He was given notice of this motion, but has not responded.

[4] These reasons draw heavily, and unapologetically, from the factum filed by the moving parties.

Overview

[5] Kunal Tipu has commenced sixteen legal proceedings in Ontario since 2017, as well as at least one proceeding in the Superior Court of Quebec. Seven of the sixteen actions, including the instant case, allege medical negligence by Mr. Tipu’s treating physicians. I will refer to these seven actions as the “medical actions”. Two of the actions have been dismissed as vexatious. A third action has been stayed pending the resolution of questions regarding Mr. Tipu’s capacity. The remaining three actions have been stalled at the pleadings stage, with Mr. Tipu having taken no steps to move these matters forward.

[6] The PGT previously acted as Mr. Tipu’s guardian of property between 2015 and 2022. During that time, Mr. Tipu commenced six of the seven medical actions, despite lacking the legal status to do so. Since the appointment of the PGT as his litigation guardian in this proceeding, Mr. Tipu has continued to communicate directly with the lawyers representing the moving parties. Each of the medical actions are alleged by the moving parties to contain the hallmarks of vexatious proceedings. Mr. Tipu seeks extraordinary sums of money in damages (in excess of millions and sometimes billions of dollars); the pleadings are duplicative and repetitive of each other; the pleadings contain odd formatting including paragraphs that are disjointed, rambling or confusing, with Mr. Tipu referring to himself in the first and then the third person, and attaching irrelevant or confusing attachments. Many of the allegations contained in the claims are largely unintelligible.

Facts

[7] A table summarising the ongoing proceedings in any Ontario court to which Kunal Tipu is a party is appended to these Reasons for Decision.

[8] The moving parties identify ten active legal proceedings in which Mr. Tipu is a named party, and seven which have been disposed of where Mr. Tipu is a named party. In total, he is the plaintiff in sixteen of the seventeen identified actions.

[9] For the purposes of this motion, the evidentiary focus has been on the seven medical actions involving the defendant physicians.

The “Munchi action” (Kingston court file no. CV-17-494)

[10] This medical negligence action was commenced on 9 November 2017. At that time, Mr. Tipu was a self-represented plaintiff. All of the named defendants have delivered statements of defence. Mr. Tipu seeks damages in excess of $90 million.

[11] Based on a generous reading of his pleading, Mr. Tipu asserts claims of negligence, breach of contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress and breach of privacy with respect to medical care and treatment provided to him between 2013 and 2017. Some of his claims are also related to, and overlap with, Consent and Capacity Board (“CCB”) proceedings.

[12] In 2021, the defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the action because Mr. Tipu had failed to serve any expert evidence in support of his claim. On the return date of that motion, and before the defendants commenced their submissions, Mr. Tipu stated that it would be unfair for the motion to proceed because he lacked the capacity to represent himself in the action. As a result, the summary judgment motion was adjourned to address the issue of capacity. Justice Williams ordered that the action be stayed in the interim. In her endorsement of 27 July 2021 (unreported), Justice Williams expressed concern about the length of time that the action had been hanging over the heads of the defendants, adding that “there were many valid reasons why the defendants’ motions should have been heard…as scheduled”. With some reluctance, she adjourned the summary judgment motion and ordered Mr. Tipu, who was assisted by counsel for the purposes of the hearing, to obtain a capacity assessment which would specifically address the issue of whether Mr. Tipu had the mental capacity to represent himself in litigation. Justice Williams ordered that the action be stayed in the interim.

[13] Despite the stay of proceedings, Mr. Tipu attempted to amend his statement of claim by, inter alia, increasing the damages sought to over $2 billion.

[14] As memorialised in the subsequent decision of Justice Williams on the motion brought under Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO 1990, Reg 194 for orders declaring Mr. Tipu to be a party under a disability and appointing the PGT as his litigation guardian, capacity assessments obtained by Mr. Tipu did not assist her in deciding whether he was a party under a disability. She noted that Mr. Tipu had attempted to manipulate the outcome of at least one of the assessments and that although Mr. Tipu had obtained three assessments, he had failed to attend the one assessment that the defendant physicians had arranged for him.

The “Balmaceda actions” (Toronto court file nos. CV-19-626253 and CV-20-635163)

[15] On 27 August 2019, Mr. Tipu issued a statement of claim against Dr. Balmaceda and Eli Lilly Canada claiming damages in excess of $900 million. This statement of claim was never served on either of the defendants. No steps have been taken in this file since the action was commenced.

[16] On 4 February 2022, Mr. Tipu issued another statement of claim against Dr. Balmaceda and Eli Lilly Canada. He also named Dr. Balachandran Chandrarajan. Damages in excess of $980 million are claimed. The defendants were served.

[17] The two statements of claim are virtually identical, other than the addition of Dr. Chandrarajan and some paragraphs detailing Mr. Tipu’s alleged damages. Eli Lilly defended the action. Both Eli Lilly and the defendant physicians brought motions to have the statement of claim struck out in part or in whole. The motion was scheduled to be heard on 30 November 2020.

[18] On 23 November 2020, the lawyer acting on behalf of Mr. Tipu contacted the lawyers for the moving parties requesting an adjournment of the scheduled court date.

[19] The parties consented to the adjournment request and the motion was rescheduled to 2 February 2021. On 22 January 2021, the lawyer acting for Mr. Tipu served the proposed amended statement of claim on the defendants which addressed many of the deficiencies identified in the defendants’ motion materials. Accordingly, the motion to have the statement of claim struck was withdrawn.

[20] On 31 May 2022, the lawyers for the defendant physicians wrote to the court requesting a stay of the action pending determination of the issue of Mr. Tipu’s capacity in the Munchi action. The court responded that the defendant doctors would need to bring a motion to obtain the stay of proceedings.

[21] No further steps have been taken to advance the Balmaceda action.

The “CCB action” – Kingston court file no. CV-21-234

[22] On 12 August 2021, Mr. Tipu commenced an action against Dr. Jonathan Fairbairn, Dr. Simon O’Brien and Dr. Samir Prasad, as well as Michael Magill, the Consent and Capacity Board and Providence Care Hospital, for damages in excess of $2.9 billion. Doctors Fairbairn, O’Brien and Prasad are psychiatrists who provided psychiatric care to Mr. Tipu. They had previously been involved in Consent and Capacity Board proceedings initiated by Mr. Tipu, either as parties and/or witnesses, or had made findings of incapacity with respect to Mr. Tipu.

[23] In the CCB action, Mr. Tipu alleged that the defendants had forced him to take antipsychotic medication that caused adverse side effects. He also challenged a finding of incapacity made by the defendant physicians and argued that there were no grounds to force a Community Treatment Order. Mr. Tipu pleaded that he had sustained a “lot of side effects” due to the conduct of the defendants.

[24] On 24 August 2021, by way of a letter to the registrar, the lawyers for the Consent and Capacity Board requested a dismissal of the claim pursuant to Rule 2.1.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure as being frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process. A similar request was subsequently made on behalf of the defendant physicians.

[25] On 31 January 2022, a lawyer for the PGT advised the court that, pursuant to Rule 7.02(1.1)(a), the PGT, as Mr. Tipu’s Guardian of Property, was automatically appointed as his litigation guardian with respect to the proceeding. The letter further advised that the PGT did not oppose the motion to dismiss the claim pursuant to Rule 2.1.01.

[26] On 22 February 2022, I granted the motion to dismiss the claim: Tipu v. Fairbairn, 2022 ONSC 1188. I agreed with the submission made by the defendant doctors that, on its face, the statement of claim contained hallmarks of vexatious proceedings as articulated in Gao v. Ontario WSIB, 2014 ONSC 6497. I also concluded that the substance of the plaintiff’s claim fell within the jurisdiction of the Consent and Capacity Board, and could not be relitigated in the Superior Court in the manner in which Mr. Tipu’s claim attempted to do.

The “Brampton action” (Brampton court file no. CV-22-805)

[27] On 14 March 2022, Mr. Tipu commenced an action in Brampton against Doctors Fairbairn, O’Brien and Prasad, as well as Dr. Million, Michael Magill, Dr. Loew and Providence Care Hospital, for damages in excess of $2.904 billion. According to the affidavit of Marie-Ève Caissy, dated 24 March 2025, the claim has never been properly served on the defendants.

[28] Mr. Tipu pleads in his statement of claim that the defendants forced him to take antipsychotics without his consent, and he challenged the finding of incapacity. He further pleaded that he was given the wrong thyroid medication and that Dr. Loew lied on a stomach test.

[29] Mr. Tipu has not taken any steps to move this action forward since filing his statement of claim in 2022.

The “Toronto action” (Toronto court file no. CV-22-678639)

[30] On 18 March 2022, Mr. Tipu issued a further claim against Doctors Fairbairn, O’Brien and Prasad, as well as Dr. Million, Michael Magill, Dr. Jacob Loew and Providence Care Hospital, seeking damages in excess of $2.1 trillion.

[31] In his statement of claim, Mr. Tipu alleges that the defendants forced him to take antipsychotics without his consent, and challenged a finding of incapacity. He further pleaded that he was given the wrong thyroid medication, and that Dr. Loew lied on a stomach test.

[32] A copy of the statement of claim was left at Dr. Loew’s clinic in late November 2022. Doctors Fairbairn, O’Brien and Prasad were never served.

[33] On 24 May 2023, by way of a letter to the registrar, the lawyers for the defendant physicians requested dismissal of the claim pursuant to Rule 2.1.01(1) on the basis that the claim was frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process.

[34] On 13 June 2023, Madam Justice Akbarali made a finding that the claim was frivolous, vexatious and abusive, and dismissed the claim: Tipu v. Prasad, 2023 ONSC 3551.

The “Watson action” (Kingston court file no. CV-23-062)

[35] On 7 March 2023, Mr. Tipu issued another statement of claim in Kingston against Dr. Eid (his name is Dr. Eif), Dr. Habib, Dr. Munshi (misnamed Dr. Munchi), Dr. Duncan Scott, Dr. Shayna Watson, the Kingston General Hospital and Hotel Dieu Hospital, seeking damages in excess of $1.29 billion.

[36] According to the affidavit of Ms. Caissy, the claim has never properly been served on the defendant physicians, but a copy of the statement of claim was sent to Dr. Watson by regular mail.

[37] On 19 May 2023, the lawyers acting for the defendant physicians wrote to the court asking that the action be stayed while the court addressed the issue of Mr. Tipu’s capacity in the Munchi action.

[38] On 30 June 2023, I ordered that the Watson action should be stayed until such further or other order of the court as deemed appropriate following completion of the capacity assessment in the Munchi action.

[39] Mr. Tipu has taken no steps to advance this action since March 2023.

Law and Analysis

[40] Pursuant to s. 140(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, the court has the authority to declare a party a vexatious litigant:

Vexatious proceedings
140 (1) If a judge of the Superior Court of Justice or of the Court of Appeal is satisfied that a person has persistently and without reasonable grounds instituted vexatious proceedings in any court or conducted a proceeding in any court in a vexatious manner, the judge may make an order that includes any of the following terms:

1. No further proceeding may be instituted by the person in any court, except by leave of a judge of the Superior Court of Justice.
2. No proceeding previously instituted by the person in any court shall be continued, except by leave of a judge of the Superior Court of Justice.
3. Any other term that is just.

[41] Pursuant to s. 140(3), if a party is declared vexatious, they may still institute or continue a proceeding with leave of the court.

[42] In Kaufman LLP v. Kechichian and Essilor v. Kechichian, 2021 ONSC 1173, Mr. Justice M. Smith explained that the two purposes for declaring a party as vexatious are: (1) to prevent litigants from harassing others; and (2) to protect the vexatious litigant from squandering their own resources.

[43] Although declaring a person to be vexatious is an extraordinary power that must be exercised with great care, a person who is declared to be a vexatious litigant is not deprived of their access to justice. Such an individual is still allowed to initiate and continue proceedings, so long as they can satisfy a judge that they have a prima facie case and that the proceedings are not an abuse of process: Lenczner Slaght LLP v. Glycobiosciences Inc et al, 2025 ONSC 829.

[44] The factors to be considered when determining whether a litigant is vexatious or not were set out in Re Lang Michener and Fabian:

a) the bringing of one or more actions to determine an issue which has already been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction constitutes a vexatious proceeding;
b) where it is obvious that an action cannot succeed, or if the action would lead to no possible good, or if no reasonable person can reasonably expect to obtain relief, the action is vexatious;
c) vexatious actions include those brought for an improper purpose, including the harassment and oppression of other parties by multifarious proceedings brought for purposes other than the assertion of legitimate rights;
d) it is a general characteristic of vexatious proceedings that grounds and issues raised tend to be rolled forward into subsequent actions and repeated and supplemented, often with actions brought against the lawyers who have acted for or against the litigant in earlier proceedings;
e) in determining whether proceedings are vexatious, the court must look at the whole history of the matter and not just whether there was originally a good cause of action;
f) the failure of the person instituting the proceedings to pay the costs of unsuccessful proceedings is one factor to be considered in determining whether proceedings are vexatious;
g) the respondent's conduct in persistently taking unsuccessful appeals from judicial decisions can be considered vexatious conduct of legal proceedings.

[45] In determining whether a litigant should be declared vexatious, the court can consider both judicial and non-judicial proceedings: GoodLife Fitness Centres Inc. v. Hicks, 2019 ONSC 4942.

[46] Having regard to the factors set out in Re Lang Michener and Fabian, it can be seen that a number of the enumerated factors are relevant to Mr. Tipu’s situation.

Issue already determined by the court

[47] On 9 September 2021, the Consent and Capacity Board (CCB file no. 21-2657) rendered decisions confirming that the mental health criteria for reviewing Mr. Tipu’s Community Treatment Order were met; and confirming Dr. Fairbairn’s finding that Mr. Tipu was incapable with respect to treatment with anti-psychotic medication and a community treatment plan dated 20 July 2021. In my subsequent decision in Tipu v. Fairbairn, I found that the issues raised by Mr. Tipu in that action had already been adjudicated by the CCB and, further, that the substance of the plaintiff’s claims fell within the jurisdiction of the CCB and could not be relitigated in this court.

[48] Less than a month after the CCB action was dismissed, Mr. Tipu issued his claims in the Brampton action and the Toronto action, which mirrored the claims and allegations which had been made in the CCB action.

[49] I accept the submission made on behalf of the defendant doctors that Mr. Tipu is continuously relitigating matters which have already been determined, and which are not within the court’s jurisdiction.

[50] Furthermore, the two Balmaceda actions also duplicate some of the same parties and largely repeat the same allegations.

Obvious that actions cannot succeed

[51] Two of the seven civil actions which involve the moving parties have been dismissed as vexatious, and a third has been stayed by the court while the issue of Mr. Tipu’s capacity was under determination. Mr. Tipu has taken no meaningful steps to advance the other proceedings.

[52] Nor has Mr. Tipu served any supportive expert evidence in any of the medical actions. In the instant proceeding, Mr. Tipu did provide the defendants with an expert report from Dr. Sujay Patel, dated 20 May 2020, which had concluded that the defendant physicians had met the expected standard of care in their treatment of Mr. Tipu. Significantly, as appears from the supplementary affidavit of Ms. Caissy dated 29 April 2025, it would appear that a manipulated version of Dr. Patel’s report bearing the date of 30 March 2025 was received by the moving parties’ lawyers, despite Dr. Patel’s confirmation that he had neither prepared nor sent a report in 2025.

[53] Furthermore, it is apparent on the face of the pleadings in many of the actions commenced by Mr. Tipu that the events referred to occurred many years ago and, hence, that the actions are presumptively statute barred by operation of the Limitations Act, 2002.

[54] As already noted, two of the non-medical actions have been dismissed as frivolous, and a Rule 2.01 hearing is pending in another non-medical action: Tipu v. Police, CV-22-00000965 (Brampton).

[55] In their factum, the defendant physicians make reference to non-medical actions involving “Cara know as Receipe”. Mr. Tipu filed a claim in 2023 against that party and another party, Knightstone, in Brockville. That action was dismissed by Mr. Justice Abrams as frivolous, pursuant to Rule 2.1.01, on 30 November 2023. Mr. Tipu then brought a second action against “Cara know as Receipe” in Kingston. I dismissed that action as frivolous, pursuant to Rule 2.1.01, on 4 March 2025.

[56] In court file no. CV-20-635619, as against Eli Lilly, Mr. Tipu alleged breach of contract or inducing breach of contract, conspiracy to harm and intentional infliction of mental distress in relation to his use of Zyprexa®, an antipsychotic medication used to treat mental disorders such as bipolar disorder and schizophrenia.

[57] Eli Lilly submits, and I agree, that it is plain and obvious that Mr. Tipu’s claim is incapable of success. The claim articulates no reasonable cause of action, it has not been prosecuted, the claim itself is largely unintelligible and disjointed, and the relief sought is exorbitant and unrealistic.

[58] Having regard to the foregoing, I agree with the moving parties that all of the statements of claim in the actions brought by Mr. Tipu bear some (and in some of the cases, many) of the unmistakable hallmarks of querulous pleadings, as set out in Gao, including rambling discourses characterised by repetition and a pedantic failure to clarify, a switching of the narrative between first and third person when Mr. Tipu refers to himself, curious formatting, and multiple methods of emphasis.

Actions brought for improper purposes

[59] In the seven medical actions, Mr. Tipu has named fifteen physicians. Most of them have been named in more than one action (Dr. Fairbairn and Dr. Prasad are named in three separate actions, all of which are aimed at appealing a community treatment order which was confirmed by the CCB; Dr. Balmaceda is named in two actions that repeat the same allegations). The existence of multiple similar actions and naming the same physicians in those actions clearly demonstrates that these multifarious proceedings were brought for purposes other than the legitimate assertion of legal rights.

[60] As already referenced, the majority of the claims in these actions are repetitive, often restating similar allegations, without introducing new or substantive legal issues. It is clear from the amounts claimed that Mr. Tipu’s intent is not to resolve a genuine claim for damages. These duplicative actions disrupt the normal course of legal proceedings and waste judicial resources, reinforcing the conclusion that the actions have been pursued for improper purposes, including making collateral attacks on involuntary treatment orders and litigating Mr. Tipu’s ongoing and fixed disagreements with his psychiatric diagnosis.

[61] The non-medical actions also reveal a propensity to litigate for improper purposes. Ms. Caissy’s supplementary affidavit makes reference to an action commenced by Mr. Tipu against Bruce Engel, who appears to have been a lawyer who may have acted for Mr. Tipu in court file no. CV-24-070 (Kingston). Mr. Tipu alleges that he paid cash to Mr. Engel, who also took a Legal Aid certificate, it being illegal to take both. He accuses Mr. Engel of having stolen money from him.

[62] Mr. Engel has filed a statement of defence in which he denies any wrongdoing and asks for the action against him to be stayed or dismissed until such time as a litigation guardian is appointed on Mr. Tipu’s behalf. He also pleads a limitation defence, stating that the legal services in question were provided to Mr. Tipu in 2015.

[63] While it is obviously not appropriate to make any judgment about the veracity or plausibility of Mr. Tipu’s claim against Mr. Engel, the moving parties suggest that suing previous lawyers is a characteristic of vexatious litigation because it reflects a pattern of abusing the legal system to retaliate and relitigate, rather than to generally resolve a legal dispute.

[64] Mr. Tipu has also started an action against his brother, Mr. Kanwal Tipu (court file no. CV-24-337 (Kingston)). In the statement of claim, Mr. Tipu seeks damages because his brother “took advantage of the all situation all his life” and alleges that his brother misappropriated funds. His brother denies all allegations made.

[65] I agree with the moving parties that issuing a claim against a family member without a legitimate legal basis for doing so is also evidence of an intention to cause unnecessary stress or hardship, rather than seek a just resolution.

Issues raised are repeated and supplemented

[66] The issuance of seven medical actions which are largely repetitive of each other is, the moving parties submit, a clear characteristic of a vexatious proceeding. All of the claims revolve around the same central issue – the alleged improper diagnosis and treatment of schizophrenia, including with a prescription of anti-psychotic medication.

[67] I agree with the moving parties that such repetitiveness serves no legitimate legal purpose and only burdens the court system. By repeatedly issuing new actions in relation to the same issue, Mr. Tipu is attempting to relitigate matters that have already been addressed, demonstrating an intent to harass or cause undue distress to the defendants, rather than to assert a valid legal claim. The continuous repetition of these claims, in the absence of new facts or legitimate grounds, makes the proceedings vexatious in nature.

Whole history of the matter

[68] The moving parties submit that Mr. Tipu’s statements of claim, regarded in the round, are highly confusing, with allegations that are often difficult to categorise into recognisable causes of action. It is often unclear how the claims are connected to the relief that Mr. Tipu seeks, making it challenging for the defendants and the court to discern the basis for these legal actions.

[69] The moving parties submit that the confusing and repetitive nature of the claims suggest that Mr. Tipu is engaging in vexatious litigation, creating unnecessary legal turmoil without valid grounds.

[70] I agree. Taking into account the pattern of behaviour exhibited throughout Mr. Tipu’s time in court, including the repeated, unclear and meritless claims, it is readily apparent that Mr. Tipu is a vexatious litigant.

Conduct outside the courtroom

[71] Mr. Tipu made repeated attempts to amend his statement of claim in this proceeding, despite having been told, on a number of occasions, that the action was stayed. It took the defendants three years to ascertain Mr. Tipu’s legal capacity to self-represent, in part because Mr. Tipu failed to attend a court ordered capacity assessment, and then took steps to organise his own capacity assessment, without notifying the defendants.

[72] Furthermore, Mr. Tipu has repeatedly sent duplicative emails to the lawyers for the moving parties, none of which are relevant to the issues to be addressed in the legal proceedings. In his correspondence, Mr. Tipu raises irrelevant issues, requests settlement payments and then resends documents that have been previously circulated. In the period from 28 November 2024 to 30 April 2025, Mr. Tipu emailed the lawyers for the defendant physicians over ninety times.

[73] It can also be seen that there is a pattern of Mr. Tipu issuing new claims shortly after previous ones are dismissed. The new actions restate the same, or substantially similar facts, sometimes being filed in different court registries, seemingly to avoid prior rulings or to harass the defendants further. Such behaviour reflects an abuse of process. The attempt to relitigate settled matters and prolong proceedings unnecessarily is also a hallmark of vexatious litigation.

[74] As previously referenced, there is good reason to believe that Mr. Tipu altered an expert report and sent it to the lawyers for the moving parties. Unauthorised modifications to an expert report are, as the moving parties submit, “worrisome” and suggest an improper attempt to influence the outcome of a case. Such conduct would, in and of itself, be considered vexatious.

Effect of Litigation Guardian Appointment

[75] As already noted, Mr. Tipu was declared a party under a disability in September 2024. The PGT was appointed as his litigation guardian. The lawyer for the PGT has confirmed that the PGT is not taking a position on this motion.

[76] I agree with the moving parties that Mr. Tipu’s status as a party under a disability does not prevent him from being declared a vexatious litigant under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

[77] A party under a disability is an individual who, by reason of age, mental incapacity, or other cognitive limitations, cannot adequately instruct a lawyer or conduct litigation independently. The appointment of a litigation guardian is a procedural safeguard to ensure that the individual’s interests are adequately represented, and that litigation proceeds in a fair and orderly manner: Auriemma et al. v. Cristoveanu, 2023 ONSC 5072.

[78] A vexatious litigant designation, on the other hand, addresses the misuse and abuse of court processes. A vexatious litigant is one who repeatedly initiates meritless, frivolous or abusive proceedings, often relitigating the same issues or targeting individuals with baseless claims. A designation as a vexatious litigant serves the Court’s institutional interest in safeguarding the integrity of the judicial process and protecting both individual parties and public resources from abuse: Lenczner Slaght LLP v. Glycobiosciences.

[79] Mental incapacity does not immunise a party from being subject to a vexatious litigation order. In the present case, the existence of Mr. Tipu’s disability is likely the explanation for much if not all of his vexatious conduct. That does not, however, excuse or legitimise such conduct. Furthermore, the PGT is not Mr. Tipu’s litigation guardian in any of the other ongoing actions issued by Mr. Tipu although, as noted, in some of those actions questions have either been raised as to his capacity, or the proceedings were put on hold, pending determination of his capacity in relation to this action.

[80] In Huang v. Braga, 2020 ONCA 645, this court had concluded that the plaintiff lacked capacity for herself in three actions arising from a motor vehicle accident that had occurred in 2000. The PGT was appointed as the plaintiff’s litigation guardian. The plaintiff subsequently brought six proceedings aimed at overturning the appointment of the PGT, including three proceedings in the Court of Appeal. The respondent eventually brought a motion under Rule 37.16 seeking an order that the moving party be prohibited from bringing further motions or appeals without leave of the court. The PGT then proceeded to settle the three actions arising from the motor vehicle accident, subject to court approval. That approval was subsequently obtained. The claimant then sought leave to appeal the settlement approval order. In refusing to grant leave to the claimant to appeal the settlement approval, Pepall J.A., using s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act as guidance for her analysis, observed that in the past, the moving parties’ motions and appeals had been found to be abusive and frivolous, and concluded that any continuation of the proceedings would also be abusive in nature.

[81] In Falardeau v. Owen Sound Police Service Board, 2021 ONSC 6180, a plaintiff had been found to be a party under a disability and the PGT was appointed as his litigation guardian on 6 August 2010. On 4 March 2011, the court made an order pursuant to s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act requiring the plaintiff to obtain leave from the court before commencing any actions against the defendant. It was concluded that the plaintiff met the criteria for a vexatious litigant at the time that the order was made.

[82] I am satisfied that, as in Falardeau, and, implicitly in Huang, the plethora of frivolous or vexatious proceedings brought by Mr. Tipu warrant an order being made under section 140, notwithstanding the issues relating to his capacity.

Decision

[83] I am satisfied that the order requested pursuant to s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act should be made. The purpose of the section is to protect litigants and the overall integrity of the justice system against those who continually abuse the court process by engaging in frivolous and vexatious litigation. In making such an order, it is not the court’s intention to punish Mr. Tipu, but, rather, to limit the costs imposed on the system and on other litigants as a result of his behaviour.

[84] As previously noted, the making of a vexatious litigant order does not deprive Mr. Tipu of his right to launch or continue court proceedings. Rather, it allows the court to supervise the initiation or continuation of such proceedings. The burden is shifted to Mr. Tipu to establish that there is a reasonable basis for instituting or continuing proceedings.

[85] For the foregoing reasons, I make the following orders:

a) A declaration that the plaintiff, Kunal Tipu, has persistently and without grounds instituted vexatious court proceedings and has conducted court proceedings in a vexatious manner, within the meaning of s. 140(1) of the Courts of Justice Act;

b) A declaration that the plaintiff, Kunal Tipu, is a vexatious litigant pursuant to s. 140(1) of the Courts of Justice Act;

c) An order that the plaintiff, Kunal Tipu, is prohibited from instituting or continuing any proceeding in any court in the Province of Ontario, except and until such time as leave is granted by a judge of the Superior Court of Justice pursuant to s. 140(3) of the Courts of Justice Act;

d) An order that all proceedings previously instituted by Kunal Tipu in any court in the Province of Ontario that are not yet finally disposed of are hereby stayed, except and until such time as leave is granted by a judge of the Superior Court of Justice pursuant to s. 140(3) of the Courts of Justice Act;

e) An order that the following actions are dismissed on the grounds that they are frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process: CV-17-494 (Kingston), CV-19-626253 (Toronto), CV-20-635619 (Toronto), CV-22-805 (Brampton), and CV-23-062 (Kingston).

[86] I make no order as to costs.

Mew J.
Released: 05 June 2025

Appendix

Ongoing Proceedings

Court File Number	Location	Short Title of Proceeding
CV-17-00000494-0000	Kingston	Tipu v Munchi
CV-19-00626253-0000	Toronto	Tipu v Eli Lilly Canada Inc. (Zyprexa)
CV-19-00631499-0000	Toronto	Tipu
CV-20-00635619-0000	Toronto	Tipu v Eli Lilly Canada Inc. (Zyprexa)
CV-22-00000805-0000	Brampton	Tipu v Prasad
CV-22-00000965-0000	Brampton	Tipu v Police
CV-23-00000062-0000	Kingston	Tipu v Eif
CV-24-00000070-0000	Kingston	Tipu v Engel
CV-24-00000224-0000	Kingston	Tipu v Cara know as Receipe
CV-24-00000337-0000	Kingston	Tipu v Tipu

Finally Disposed of Proceedings

Court File Number	Location	Short Title of Proceeding
CV-13-00484288-0000	Toronto	Bank of Montreal v 1827432 Ontario Inc.
CV-21-00000234-0000	Kingston	Tipu v Fairbairn
CV-22-00678639-0000	Toronto	Tipu v Prasad
CV-23-00000036-0000	Brockville	Tipu v Cara know as Receipe
CV-23-00699124-0000	Toronto	Tipu v Bank of Montreal
CV-24-00000092-0000	Kingston	Tipu v Williams

Disposed of Consent and Capacity Appeals

Court File Number	Location	Short Title of Proceeding
CV-17-0000027700-AP	Kingston	Tipu v Munshi
CV-18-0000005300-AP	Kingston	Tipu v Munchi
CV-18-0000035600-AP	Kingston	Tipu v Prasad
CV-20-0000015500-AP	Kingston	Tipu v O'Brien
CV-21-00000234-AP	Belleville	Tipu v Fairbairn