Kerry McVey

The Crown applied to revoke the accused's bail on secondary and tertiary grounds following his conviction for 12 counts of human trafficking related offences.

The Crown relied on the accused's prior human trafficking conviction, historical and recent breaches of court orders, and new uncharged breaches involving recruitment of models and entertainers.

The defence argued the accused had complied with conditions and the new breach evidence was unreliable.

The court found the accused's detention warranted on both secondary grounds (substantial likelihood of re-offending given his history, nature of offences, and continued recruitment activities) and tertiary grounds (to maintain confidence in the administration of justice, considering the gravity of the offences, the strength of the case post-conviction, and the likelihood of a lengthy penitentiary sentence).

The court vacated the previous release order and ordered the accused's detention.

The offender was found guilty of sexual assault and theft under $5,000, and pled guilty to failing to comply with a SOIRA order.

The offences occurred when the offender followed an intoxicated victim into her apartment building and sexually assaulted her in the stairwell, subsequently stealing her bank cards.

At the time of the offences, the offender was on probation for a prior sexual assault conviction.

The court sentenced the offender to a total of 4 years and 2 months in custody, less credit for pre-sentence custody, followed by 3 years of probation and ancillary orders.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, robbery, and fraud.

The court found the accused guilty of sexual assault and fraud.

For the robbery charge, the court found the accused guilty of the lesser included offence of theft under five thousand dollars, as the timing between the theft and the subsequent sexual assault was unclear, preventing a finding of "immediate" connection required for robbery.

The decision involved a detailed analysis of consent in sexual assault cases, the reliability of witness testimony given intoxication and memory gaps, and the application of reasonable doubt principles.

The accused was charged with sexually assaulting his wife during their marriage.

The Crown's case relied on a single incident from 2002.

The court applied the W.D. framework to assess credibility, finding the accused's evidence raised a reasonable doubt.

The court also noted significant inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony and a strong motive to fabricate arising from a bitter family court dispute over child custody and access.

The charge was dismissed.

This decision addresses two applications for certiorari brought by the Crown, RCMP, and Ottawa Police Services to quash lower court rulings that ordered the disclosure of Drug Recognition Expert (DRE) rolling logs in drug-impaired driving cases.

The Superior Court considered the impact of recent amendments to the Criminal Code (Bill C-46) on the relevance and disclosability of these logs, particularly in light of the Ontario Court of Appeal's decision in R. v. Stipo.

The court found that the Code amendments constituted a significant change in circumstances, but ultimately concluded that the amendments do not alter the requirement for disclosure of rolling logs where the DRE's opinion is not corroborated by toxicological results.

However, where toxicological analysis does corroborate the DRE's call, the rolling log is no longer relevant to challenge the DRE's opinion.

The court indicated it would quash the disclosure orders in the specific cases at hand because the DRE calls were corroborated by toxicology, but declined to issue a mandamus order.

The defendant pleaded guilty to two counts: possession of child pornography for the purpose of transmission and possession of child pornography.

The defendant's collection contained 60,165 still images (14,207 unique) and 1,626 videos (1,290 unique) depicting various forms of child sexual abuse.

The court imposed a global sentence of 28 months imprisonment (28 months on the making available count and 18 months on the possession count, served concurrently), along with ancillary orders including a mandatory DNA order, lifetime SOIRA registration, a 10-year section 161 order, and forfeiture of seized materials.

The sentencing was guided by the Court of Appeal's decision in R. v. Inksetter, which established that denunciation and general deterrence are paramount sentencing objectives for child pornography offences.

Bruce Carson was convicted of fraud on the government under section 121(1)(d) of the Criminal Code, following appeals to the Ontario Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada which overturned his initial acquittal.

The sentencing hearing considered mitigating factors, including his age, admissions shortening the trial, dated criminal record, and the attempted nature of the fraud.

Aggravating factors included his prior fraud record and the potential for significant financial gain.

The court emphasized general deterrence and denunciation for offences impacting government integrity.

Considering the dramatic negative effect on Carson's life and the prior uncertainty of the law, the court imposed a suspended sentence with 12 months probation and 100 hours of community service, rejecting the Crown's request for a conditional sentence.

The accused pleaded guilty to possessing child pornography between February 1, 2017 and June 1, 2017, contrary to Section 163.1 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown proceeded by indictment, triggering mandatory minimum penalties.

Police discovered 863 unique images and 5 unique videos of child pornography depicting extremely young children in explicit sexual acts.

The accused had organized and catalogued the materials.

The court imposed a sentence of 19 months imprisonment, followed by 3 years probation, with ancillary orders including DNA registration, a 20-year Sexual Offence Identification Registration Act order, and a 10-year Section 161 order prohibiting attendance at public swimming areas where children are present and restricting computer and internet use.

The accused pleaded guilty to making available child pornography videos, possessing child pornography videos, and breaching a probation order.

The court imposed a global sentence of three years imprisonment.

The sentencing decision emphasizes the serious nature of child pornography offences, the vulnerability of child victims, and the need for denunciation and deterrence.

The court rejected the accused's explanation that he accessed the material to understand his own victimization, finding it demonstrated a lack of insight into the harm caused to children.

The court considered the accused's difficult background, including exposure to sexual abuse and family dysfunction, but found these factors did not significantly mitigate the serious nature of the offences.

The offender was convicted after trial of possessing a weapon (knife) for the purpose of committing a criminal offence and knowingly uttering a threat to cause bodily harm.

He subsequently pled guilty to failing to appear in court and breaching a recognizance condition.

The central sentencing issue was whether to impose a conditional discharge or a suspended sentence, given the offender's status as a permanent resident and the potential immigration consequences of a conviction.

The court considered the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Pham regarding the relevance of collateral immigration consequences to sentencing decisions and concluded that while such consequences may be considered, they cannot dominate the sentencing process or result in inappropriate sentences.

The court imposed suspended sentences with probation rather than a discharge, finding that the serious nature of the offences and the offender's disregard for the justice system precluded a discharge despite significant personal mitigating circumstances.

The defendant pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography and making child pornography available.

His devices contained 133,266 images (28,052 unique) and 3,032 videos (1,144 unique) depicting extreme sexual abuse of children as young as one year old.

The court imposed a sentence of two years less a day in custody for possession, followed by three years probation, with a concurrent one-year sentence for making available.

The sentence balanced denunciation and deterrence as paramount objectives under section 718.01 of the Criminal Code against mitigating factors including genuine remorse, psychological assessment indicating low risk of reoffending, and voluntary engagement in treatment.

The accused was convicted of two counts of sexual assault against his daughter, occurring over several years.

The court weighed aggravating factors, including the extreme breach of trust and lack of remorse, against mitigating factors such as the accused's lack of a prior record and the comparatively low-level nature of the sexual conduct.

The court sentenced the accused to 27 months' imprisonment, emphasizing the principles of deterrence and denunciation for sexual offences against minors.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, forcible confinement, criminal harassment, and breach of probation arising from an incident on August 16, 2016.

The Crown alleged that the accused sexually assaulted the complainant in a shower room at an apartment after she had been drinking heavily.

The accused's defence was that the complainant consented to sexual intercourse in exchange for drugs.

The court found the complainant's evidence credible, detailed, and supported by physical evidence and circumstantial evidence.

The accused's evidence was riddled with internal and external inconsistencies.

The court convicted the accused on all counts.

The appellant, a taxi driver, appealed his conviction and 30-day sentence for sexual assault of a passenger.

He argued the trial judge provided insufficient reasons regarding the complainant's reliability and improperly considered his race and religion during sentencing.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were sufficient and clearly addressed the reliability of the complainant's evidence.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed, as the trial judge's repeated references to the appellant's ethnicity and religion breached his Charter right to equal treatment.

The sentence was vacated and a new sentencing hearing was ordered.

The appellant brought a motion seeking a stay of a 12-month driving prohibition pending the appeal of her conviction for having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired.

The court previously found that the prohibition caused hardship.

However, after reviewing the trial record, the court concluded that the appeal lacked merit, as the trial judge's findings regarding impairment were reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The motion for a stay was dismissed.

The court determined the burden of proof regarding consent in a sexual interference prosecution under section 151 of the Criminal Code where section 150.1(2.1) applies.

The accused, a 16-year-old, was charged with sexual interference and sexual assault involving a 15-year-old complainant.

The defence argued that the Crown bears the burden of disproving consent beyond a reasonable doubt, despite section 150.1 referring to consent as a "defence." The court held that section 150.1(2-2.2) operates to add consent as an element the Crown must prove, rather than imposing a burden on the accused to prove consent.

Therefore, the Crown must prove the absence of consent beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction acquittal on a charge of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

The trial judge found that the investigating officer lacked the required reasonable suspicion to make an approved screening device demand under s. 254(2) of the Criminal Code, rendering the demand an unreasonable search contrary to s. 8 of the Charter.

The breathalyzer results were excluded under s. 24(2), leading to an acquittal.

On appeal, the court held that the officer’s testimony demonstrated a misunderstanding of the legal threshold for making a screening demand and supported the trial judge’s finding that the officer did not possess the necessary subjective belief.

The exclusion of the evidence and resulting acquittal were upheld.

The Crown applied under s. 490(3) of the Criminal Code to retain a seized laptop hard drive for further investigation, while the respondent sought its return, alleging a warrantless seizure in breach of s. 8 of the Charter.

The police had seized the laptop from the respondent as he left a residence that was subject to a search warrant for child pornography.

The court found the arrest was unlawful and the seizure warrantless, but held the seizure was reasonable due to exigent circumstances, specifically the imminent risk of evidence destruction.

The court granted a 12-month extension for the detention of the hard drive, finding the investigation complex due to the ongoing efforts to decrypt the 26-digit alphanumeric password.

The accused brought a Corbett application seeking to limit the Crown’s ability to cross‑examine him on his criminal record if he testified.

The defence requested that assault convictions be excluded and robbery convictions be characterized as thefts.

The court reviewed the principles governing the admissibility of prior convictions under s. 12(1) of the Canada Evidence Act and the balancing framework from R. v. Corbett.

Given the defence’s extensive reliance on the complainant’s criminal record, the relevance of the accused’s record to credibility, and the need to avoid presenting a distorted picture to the jury, the court declined to edit the record.

The accused’s criminal record was therefore admissible in full, subject to limiting instructions to the jury.

The Crown brought an application under s. 715 of the Criminal Code to admit preliminary inquiry testimony of an independent witness who had moved to Nicaragua and was therefore unavailable to testify at trial.

The defence argued the Crown failed to make sufficient efforts to secure the witness’s testimony through technological means such as videoconference under ss. 714.1 and 714.2 of the Criminal Code.

The court held that while efforts to obtain live testimony are a relevant factor, failure to pursue electronic testimony is not fatal to an application under s. 715.

Applying the principles in Potvin and Saleh, the judge concluded the accused had a full opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the preliminary inquiry and that the evidence was reliable and corroborated.

The prior testimony was therefore admitted to be read into the trial record.