Katrina Mulligan

Otomic Contractors Ltd. (Otomic), an excavating contractor, sued Royal 7 Developments Ltd. (Royal 7), a property owner and developer, for $217,945.74 in unpaid excavation work on a multi-phased condominium project and sought a construction lien.

Royal 7 counterclaimed for $273,700.31, alleging Otomic failed to complete work and overcharged for volumes, forcing Royal 7 to hire a related company, Toocor Ltd., to finish.

The court found that Otomic's truck count method for billing was reasonable and accepted, and that Royal 7's payments had become slow and holdbacks unpaid, leading to the breakdown.

The court dismissed Royal 7's counterclaim, finding no overcharge and that Otomic was not responsible for Toocor's costs due to the non-arm's length relationship and Royal 7's failure to formally terminate or request Otomic's return.

The court granted Otomic's claim for $217,945.74 and declared its construction lien valid.

The appellant, Anna Trubashnik, appealed her conviction for public mischief, arguing errors by the trial judge and seeking to admit fresh evidence, specifically a videotaped police interview and medical evidence.

The court applied the R. v. Palmer test for fresh evidence, relaxing the due diligence requirement for criminal cases.

It found the videotaped statement, which revealed the appellant's state of mind and doubts about the alleged robbery, to be relevant, credible, and potentially outcome-determinative.

The appeal was granted, and a new trial was ordered to allow the trial judge to consider this fresh evidence.

The appellant, Ramanpreet Sran, appealed his conviction for driving with excess blood alcohol (over 80) contrary to s. 235 of the Criminal Code.

The appeal was based on three grounds: alleged unlawful and arbitrary detention (s. 9 Charter), lack of reasonable suspicion for an Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand (s. 9 Charter), and failure to provide an interpreter for Panjabi (s. 10 Charter).

The appellate court, applying a standard of review of palpable and overriding error for factual findings and correctness for legal standards, dismissed the appeal.

The court found no Charter breaches, affirmed the lawfulness of the ASD demand based on the officer's reasonable suspicion, and concluded there was no language barrier requiring an interpreter.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss a construction lien action and discharge the lien, arguing no contract existed with the plaintiff corporation.

Alternatively, she sought an order for the plaintiff to post security for costs due to its alleged impecuniosity.

The court dismissed the summary judgment motion, finding a genuine issue for trial regarding the existence of a contract between the plaintiff corporation and the defendant, and declined to void the contract despite the plaintiff's breach of the Business Names Act.

The motion for security for costs was also dismissed, as the plaintiff established impecuniosity and had a legitimate claim, balancing the defendant's right to costs with the plaintiff's access to justice.

Lucas John Ridgeway pleaded guilty to seven offences, including aggravated assault and assault with a weapon, arising from incidents of domestic violence between 2009 and 2012.

The Crown sought a dangerous offender designation and an indeterminate sentence, while the defence conceded dangerous offender status but argued for a fixed sentence followed by a long-term supervision order.

The court found Ridgeway to be a dangerous offender, citing a pattern of escalating violence and persistent aggressive behaviour towards his domestic partners.

Applying the three-part test from R. v. McCallum, the court determined that there was no reasonable expectation that a lesser measure would adequately protect the public, particularly given the unavailability of recommended therapy (DBT) in federal facilities and Ridgeway's history of re-offending immediately upon release.

An indeterminate sentence was imposed, along with ancillary orders including a DNA order and lifetime prohibitions on firearms and victim contact.

The accused was charged with refusing to provide a breath sample and obstructing police following a traffic stop on January 7, 2012.

The trial commenced on June 20, 2013, and continued on December 23, 2013, with a further continuation scheduled for September 3, 2014.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings based on unreasonable delay, arguing that approximately 31.5 months had passed from the swearing of the Information to the scheduled completion of trial.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the delay was significant, it did not constitute unreasonable delay under the Morin framework.

The court apportioned the delay among inherent time requirements, defence actions, Crown actions, and institutional constraints, concluding that the majority of delay was attributable to inherent case requirements and defence preparation rather than Crown or institutional failures.