Kate Findlay

The respondent, Financial Services Commission of Ontario (FSCO), brought a motion to strike the applicant's application for declaratory relief, arguing that as a non-corporate statutory entity, it lacked the capacity to be sued.

The court dismissed the motion, distinguishing prior case law that barred actions for damages against FSCO.

The court held that because the applicant sought declaratory relief rather than damages, the application could proceed.

The self-represented appellant appealed an order dismissing his action against multiple defendants under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as frivolous and vexatious.

The Court of Appeal issued a notice under Rule 2.1 indicating the appeal itself may be dismissed on similar grounds.

The Court found the appellant's pleading contained no intelligible claims against the respondents and sought non-justiciable relief regarding the redesign of Ontario's social welfare and legal services systems.

The appeal was dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

Summary conviction appeal arising from a road rage incident involving convictions for dangerous operation of a motor vehicle and assault with intent to resist arrest.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in the findings of guilt and in refusing to stay the charges after finding a s. 7 Charter breach based on excessive force by an off-duty police officer.

The appeal court held that the trial judge misstated and misapplied the W.(D.) framework and failed to properly address the Crown's burden to disprove self-defence on the assault count.

Because the appellant's roadside state of mind was linked to the driving conduct, the court ordered a new trial on both counts rather than a limited retrial.

The stay issue was left to the trial judge if the Crown proceeds on the new trial.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his claim against the Bank defendants for wrongful termination of his loan facilities and granting the defendants' counterclaim for the outstanding balance.

The Bank defendants cross-appealed the awards of pre-judgment interest and costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal, finding the Bank had broad contractual powers to cancel the facilities based on credit risk.

The Court allowed the cross-appeal regarding pre-judgment interest, varying the judgment to provide for interest at the contractual rate of 7.5% per annum, but denied leave to appeal costs.

The Bank defendants were awarded substantial indemnity costs of the appeal.

The plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action alleging that a paediatrician breached the standard of care by failing to conduct follow‑up glucose testing and refer a child to an endocrinologist after a hypoglycaemic episode.

They argued that earlier investigation would have led to a diagnosis of panhypopituitarism and prevented a later hypoglycaemic seizure causing permanent brain injury.

The court considered conflicting expert evidence regarding the appropriate standard of care for paediatricians and whether a single episode of hypoglycaemia required referral or further testing.

The court preferred the evidence of defence experts that the episode was transient and that further investigation was not required absent recurring symptoms.

It also found the plaintiffs failed to establish causation, as it was speculative whether earlier referral would have prevented the later seizure.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing a negligence action arising from the cancellation of a line of credit and credit card.

The plaintiff alleged the bank negligently cancelled the facilities after receiving a credit bureau report, causing financial loss, stress, and credit damage.

The court held the parties were in a standard creditor–debtor relationship with no special duty of care beyond contractual obligations.

It found the bank acted reasonably in requesting updated financial disclosure and in cancelling the facilities after the plaintiff refused disclosure and withdrew large sums during the review.

Summary judgment was granted dismissing the claim and awarding judgment to the bank on its counterclaim, though the court reduced interest and costs due to aspects of the bank’s conduct.

The applicant physician sought judicial review of two decisions by the Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario.

The Committee required the applicant to appear for a caution, complete a course on medical record keeping, and undergo an educational program and practice assessment.

The applicant argued the decisions were unreasonable and relied on an investigator who was not a true peer.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Committee's decisions were reasonable and within the range of acceptable outcomes given the concerns about the applicant's record keeping and complementary medicine practice.

In a medical malpractice and conspiracy action, a defendant physician moved for summary judgment and to strike claims under Rules 20, 21.01(3)(d), and 25.11.

The court held that the conspiracy allegations required the forensic machinery of a trial and declined to apply the best-foot-forward principle on this record.

On the malpractice claim, the court found the existing anesthesiologist report insufficient on the general practitioner standard of care but concluded a treating physician was not categorically disqualified from providing qualifying opinion evidence.

The motion was made conditional on service of a compliant report within 30 days, failing which the action against the moving physician would be dismissed with costs.

The appellant underwent a laparoscopically assisted vaginal hysterectomy and subsequently developed a severe infection and an ileovaginal fistula.

She sued her gynecologist and the general surgeon who performed a subsequent exploratory laparotomy for medical malpractice, alleging a burn injury to her small bowel caused the fistula.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding no breach of the standard of care and that the fistula was caused by infection, not a burn.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings of fact and concluding that the 'but for' test for causation was correctly applied.