Judith Hupe

The children's aid society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a final order of Crown wardship for an 11-year-old child who had been in care for over two years.

The mother opposed the motion but filed no responding materials, while the father was noted in default.

The court applied the summary judgment framework and found no genuine issue requiring a trial, noting the mother's ongoing struggles with alcohol addiction and failure to complete recommended treatment programs.

The motion was granted, and Crown wardship was ordered with access provided to the mother on a regular basis, including attendance at cultural events.

The Children's Aid Society moved for summary judgment seeking Crown wardship of two young children.

The parents were facing criminal charges based on allegations by an older sibling, which led to the children's apprehension.

The Society relied heavily on hearsay evidence from the older siblings and a foster parent.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that summary judgment was not appropriate given the evidentiary deficiencies, the parents' inability to cross-examine the adult complainant, and the upcoming criminal trial.

The court ordered peremptory trial dates to be scheduled near the expiration of the statutory timeline for the children to be in care.

Child protection motion concerning the temporary care and custody of five children under the Child and Family Services Act.

The child protection agency sought an order placing the children in its temporary care for six months following allegations of domestic violence, physical discipline, and instability in the parental home.

The father opposed the motion and sought immediate placement of the children with him.

The court found reasonable grounds to believe the children would likely suffer physical or psychological harm if returned to the father and concluded that supervision orders would not sufficiently protect them.

The court maintained the children in the agency’s temporary care and appointed an independent psychologist to conduct a parental capacity assessment under s. 54 of the Act.

In a child protection status review, the Society sought summary judgment for Crown wardship with access in its discretion, while the mother sought a further Society wardship order.

Applying the Hryniak summary judgment framework and the best-interests analysis under the Child and Family Services Act, the court held there was no issue requiring a trial on continuing need of protection, but there was a genuine issue requiring a trial on whether Crown wardship versus Society wardship was in the child's best interests.

The court emphasized the statutory permanency timeline in s. 70, but found it was still too early to foreclose rehabilitation given the parent's longstanding relationship with the child, cultural connection, and some evidence of commitment to treatment.

The request for summary judgment was therefore dismissed except for the protection finding, the application was adjourned, the existing order continued, and no costs were awarded.

In this child protection matter involving a newborn, the Society sought temporary care while pursuing Crown wardship for adoption.

The mother opposed and moved for temporary placement with a maternal aunt, with the father consenting to that proposal.

The court declined to change the child’s existing temporary placement before the kinship assessment of the aunt was completed, citing unresolved questions about the proposed plan and the risk of multiple placement changes.

Temporary care was therefore ordered to remain with the Society, without prejudice, with parental access at the Society’s discretion subject to existing visit terms.

Dans ce dossier de protection de l’enfance, la société requérante demandait l’autorisation de retirer une requête en protection fondée sur le refus parental de consentir à des examens diagnostiques et à une chirurgie recommandée pour un enfant présentant une tumeur rénale possiblement maligne.

La preuve démontrait qu’après des ordonnances de supervision et une seconde opinion, l’enfant avait été évalué comme apte à consentir au traitement et continuait de refuser la chirurgie, préférant des traitements alternatifs compatibles avec ses traditions et son héritage autochtones.

Le tribunal a conclu que, même si la chirurgie paraissait l’option médicale la plus convaincante, l’intervention de la société n’était plus nécessaire ni utile dans l’intérêt véritable de l’enfant puisque les médecins ne procéderaient vraisemblablement pas sans son consentement personnel.

Le retrait de la requête a donc été permis.

Parents sought costs against a child protection agency after the agency withdrew its protection application and entered into a voluntary agreement with the family.

The parents argued the agency acted unfairly by apprehending the children without a sufficient investigation and relying on uncorroborated allegations.

The court held that costs against a children’s aid society are awarded only in exceptional circumstances where conduct is patently unfair or indefensible.

Given the agency’s reliance on multiple police reports, the family’s prior history with the agency, and the existence of a warrant authorizing the apprehension, the court found the investigation and apprehension were reasonable.

The court concluded the agency had fulfilled its statutory duty and that an ordinary observer would not view its conduct as unfair.

Child protection motion concerning whether an individual previously declared the father of a child should be removed as a party after DNA testing established he was not the biological father.

The child protection agency sought to revoke the prior declaration of paternity and strike the individual from the proceeding under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Although the court accepted that the individual was not the biological father, it held he had been granted and exercised access to the child and therefore qualified as a “parent” within the meaning of s. 37(1)(e) of the Child and Family Services Act.

The evidence did not demonstrate that removing him from the proceeding would serve the child’s best interests or that any prejudice would arise from his continued participation.

The motion to strike him as a party was therefore dismissed.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for summary judgment to make a four-year-old child a permanent ward of the Crown.

The child's mother and father did not oppose the motion or present viable plans of care.

The paternal grandmother opposed the motion and presented a plan of care.

The court found that the grandmother had a long history of child protection involvement, lacked a relationship with the child, and failed to demonstrate an ability to meet the child's needs.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial, and ordered that the child be made a permanent Crown ward.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination by the Children's Aid Society of Ottawa regarding the apprehension of her newborn child.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing to determine if the application had a reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal found that while the Society's actions constituted 'services' under the Human Rights Code, the applicant failed to provide any evidence linking the Society's conduct to the prohibited grounds of discrimination.

The application was dismissed as having no reasonable prospect of success.

On a motion for summary judgment in a child protection proceeding under the Child and Family Services Act, the moving child protection agency sought permanent Crown wardship of two children who had been in foster care for an extended period.

The mother consented to the wardship, while the father sought custody or access and argued that factual disputes regarding his past involvement with the children required a trial.

The court held that there was no genuine issue requiring a trial because the father had been largely absent from the children’s lives for several years and had not advanced a viable plan of care.

Considering the statutory time limits, the children’s need for permanency, and the father’s lack of meaningful involvement, the court determined the children were in need of protection and that Crown wardship was in their best interests.

Summary judgment was granted.

A child protection motion under the Child and Family Services Act sought temporary care and custody of three children following their apprehension from the maternal grandmother’s home.

The society relied on concerns regarding unsafe home conditions, the continued presence of the grandmother’s adult son contrary to prior warnings, and developmental progress observed while the children were in foster care.

The court found the society met the statutory burden under s. 64(8) of the CFSA only in relation to the youngest child, whose health and developmental improvements and attachment in foster care demonstrated that remaining in care was in her best interests.

The evidence did not establish that the two older children’s best interests required continued placement in care, particularly given their lengthy residence with the grandmother and improvements to the home environment.

The court therefore ordered temporary care and custody of the youngest child to the society, while placing the two older children with the grandmother subject to supervision and conditions.

The parents, who are Jehovah's Witnesses, sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order granting temporary care and custody of their premature child to the children's aid society.

The order was made to facilitate an emergency blood transfusion which the parents had refused on religious grounds.

The parents argued they were denied procedural fairness and their Charter rights were violated due to short notice and lack of counsel at the emergency teleconference hearing.

The Divisional Court denied leave to appeal, finding that the parents received a fair hearing attenuated to the urgent medical circumstances, and that the issues were highly fact-specific rather than of general public importance.