Joseph Youssef Obagi

The plaintiff pedestrian was struck by the defendant's vehicle while crossing a street.

The defendant was found 100% liable.

The plaintiff had a highly complex pre-existing medical history, including chronic pain, sarcoidosis, and melanoma.

The court found the plaintiff suffered a mild traumatic brain injury and other injuries from the collision, which exacerbated his pre-existing conditions and impaired his ability to manage them.

The court assessed damages for the plaintiff and his family members, but reduced the total awards by 25% applying the crumbling skull principle, as the plaintiff would have been detrimentally affected by his pre-existing conditions regardless of the accident.

The injuries were found to meet the statutory threshold.

The appellants sought to add three health care providers as defendants to a medical malpractice action more than two years after the original injury.

The motion judge dismissed the motion on the basis that the limitation period had expired.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge applied the wrong test under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court held that the motion judge failed to make proper findings of fact regarding when the appellants knew or ought reasonably to have known of their claims against the proposed defendants.

The court also found that the motion judge erred in treating lack of due diligence as a standalone ground for finding claims statute-barred.

The key distinction was that the claims against the proposed defendants differed from the claim against the original defendant, as they involved allegations that the health care providers failed to take immediate action once cauda equina syndrome was suspected, information that was only revealed during examinations for discovery in 2015.

The plaintiff was catastrophically injured in a motor vehicle accident and sued the defendants for damages.

The jury found the defendants 62% liable and awarded damages of approximately $2.6 million, including $2.2 million for future care costs.

The trial judge made a conditional assignment order of the plaintiff's future statutory accident benefits (SABs) to the defendants' insurers under section 267.8(12)(a)(ii) of the Insurance Act.

The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the assignment violated strict matching principles and was premature.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the conditional assignment order and rejecting the strict matching approach in favour of a "silo" approach.

The court also denied leave to appeal the trial judge's substantial reduction of the plaintiff's costs award, which was reduced from $795,616.09 to $375,000 due to the plaintiff's counsel's conduct regarding a settlement offer, the lack of material benefit in proceeding to trial, and conduct that unnecessarily extended the trial.

The applicant mother applied to be appointed as the guardian of property for her adult son, who sustained a brain injury as a child and received a significant personal injury settlement.

The court found the son incapable of managing property based on a capacity assessment.

However, the court declined to approve the proposed management plan at this time, finding that direct evidence from financial representatives was required to properly compare the proposed investment portfolio against structured settlement options, particularly regarding the son's future housing and attendant care expenses.

This endorsement addresses the costs of a prior motion where the defendant SCM Insurance Services Inc. successfully obtained an order prohibiting the plaintiff, Joanne Burwash, from using documents subject to the deemed undertaking rule.

SCM sought partial indemnity costs.

The plaintiff argued for costs to be in the cause or for a reduction based on proportionality and the potential future admissibility of the documents.

The court rejected the plaintiff's arguments, finding that the deemed undertaking ruling was a final determination on the use of the documents.

The court awarded SCM its full requested partial indemnity costs of $52,573, payable within 30 days.

The appellant appealed from a motion judge's order striking out claims against Maureen Harvey (superintendent of Ottawa-Carleton Detention Centre), John Doe, and Jane Doe.

The appellant sought damages for negligent investigation by Ontario Provincial Police officers and breach of duty of care by corrections officials during three years of custody.

The motion judge had struck the claims without leave to amend.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge failed to properly apply the generous reading standard for pleadings and set aside the striking order, allowing the appeal.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss two actions arising from a motor vehicle accident in Ontario.

The defendant argued that because the deceased and the defendant were residents of Quebec, Quebec's no-fault automobile insurance regime and Civil Code should apply, precluding the tort actions.

The court dismissed the motion, applying the lex loci delicti rule from Tolofson v. Jensen.

The court held that Ontario substantive law applies to torts committed in Ontario, allowing the plaintiffs, including derivative claimants under the Family Law Act, to proceed with their actions.

The plaintiff was injured in a car accident and awarded damages by a jury, including $125,000 for non-pecuniary damages and $600,000 for future income loss, subject to a 10% reduction for contributory negligence.

In this post-trial ruling, the court determined the applicable prejudgment interest rate for non-pecuniary damages and whether the defendant was entitled to an assignment of the plaintiff's long-term disability (LTD) benefits.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to depart from the default 1.3% prejudgment interest rate.

The court also granted the defendant's request for an assignment of the plaintiff's LTD benefits until age 65 or until the future income loss award is exhausted, to prevent double recovery.

The respondent brought an unsuccessful motion for reconsideration in writing.

The court awarded costs to the responding parties, rejecting the moving party's argument that costs should be modest because the motion was made in writing.

The court found that the 18.6 hours spent by counsel responding to the motion was reasonable, as the motion required a review of materials filed on the appeal and arguments made at the hearing.

Costs were fixed at $8,249, inclusive of disbursements and HST.

During a personal injury trial arising from a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiffs objected to the admissibility of an expert report from the defendant's occupational therapist regarding the injured plaintiff's attendant care needs.

The plaintiffs argued the report did not comply with a previous court ruling that limited the expert's evidence to the practical delivery model of care rather than the quantum of hours required.

The court agreed with the plaintiffs, finding the report went beyond the permitted scope by critiquing the plaintiff's expert and opining on the number of hours needed.

The court ruled that only specific portions of the report addressing the cost and availability of personal support workers and handyman services were admissible.

The moving party sought an order to withdraw the Court of Appeal's reasons for decision dated September 19, 2017, and to grant a rehearing before a five-judge panel, or alternatively, to stay the decision pending determination of related appeals.

The moving party argued that the Court had effectively overruled Bannon v. Hagerman Estate without notice and had addressed a new issue regarding the Ontario Drug Benefit Program that was not raised by the parties.

The Court dismissed the motion, finding that it had not overruled Bannon but rather distinguished it on its facts, and that the Ontario Drug Benefit Program issue had been squarely addressed by both parties during the appeal.

The defendants sought costs of a motion to dismiss or stay the action, which had been adjourned to allow the plaintiff to deliver a Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim.

The defendants argued they were forced to bring the motion because the original claim was overly broad and overlapped with a Solicitors Act assessment.

The court found that the defendants obtained the substantive relief they sought by forcing the amendment, and awarded them costs fixed at $2,500.

This is a costs endorsement following a successful appeal by the defendants.

The appellants sought partial indemnity costs of $56,676.40, which reflected their full indemnity rate.

The respondent argued for a significant reduction, contending that the court's decision had changed the legal landscape in personal injury litigation.

The court reduced the costs award to $30,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST, reflecting a partial indemnity rate and accounting for the complexity of the issues involved.

Appeal from a jury trial judgment in a catastrophic motor vehicle accident case.

The appellants challenged five rulings by the trial judge regarding prejudgment interest, assignment of statutory accident benefits (SABs), and treatment of collateral benefits.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, reducing the prejudgment interest rate from 5% to 2.5%, amending the retirement age for income replacement benefit assignment from age 60 to age 64, and ordering assignment of future SABs for medication, assistive devices, and professional services.

The court declined to order assignment of drug benefits after age 65 due to the Ontario Drug Benefit Program, but found the trial judge erred in treating this as a contingency rather than a certainty.

Michael Dawson sued Halpenny Insurance Brokers Ltd. (HIBL) and other related entities for financial losses stemming from changes to his mother's will, which he alleged were caused by the defendants' actions.

HIBL moved for summary judgment, asserting it had no involvement in financial management or estate planning and no partnership with Halpenny Insurance Benefit Partners Ltd. (BPL), the entity whose principal advised Dawson's mother.

The court found no actual partnership between HIBL and BPL and determined that Dawson failed to establish his mother subjectively believed in such a partnership or relied on it when dealing with the financial advisor.

Consequently, HIBL's motion for summary judgment was granted, dismissing Dawson's claim against HIBL.

Following a jury verdict, the plaintiff brought a motion for judgment to determine the pre-judgment interest (PJI) rate applicable to general non-pecuniary damages.

The plaintiff argued for a 5% PJI rate, asserting that amendments to the Insurance Act effective January 1, 2015, were not retroactive as PJI is a matter of substantive law, relying on the Divisional Court's decision in Carr v. Modi.

The defendant conceded the court was bound by Carr, despite believing the case law was wrongly decided, given a pending Court of Appeal decision in El-Khodr v. Lackie.

The parties agreed to issue judgment with a 5% PJI rate, with a mechanism to revisit the calculation if the El-Khodr appeal decision impacted it.

The court ordered judgment for the plaintiff in the agreed amount.

The defendant brought a threshold motion under section 267.5 of the Insurance Act, seeking a declaration that the plaintiff had not suffered a permanent and serious impairment of an important physical, mental, or psychological function as a result of a motor vehicle collision.

The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that her injuries, including PTSD and major depression, met the threshold criteria.

The court dismissed the defendant's motion, finding that the plaintiff had, on a balance of probabilities, suffered a permanent, serious impairment of an important physical, mental, or psychological function caused by the collision.

The court also made findings on the credibility and reliability of the defence medical expert.

The plaintiff in a motor vehicle collision action brought a motion to include the names of the parties' respective motor vehicle insurers (Belair Direct and Aviva) in the jury pre-screening process.

The plaintiff argued that public awareness of mandatory insurance mitigated prejudice and that broader "connections" beyond employment should be screened.

The defendant opposed, citing potential prejudice and increased complexity.

The court dismissed the motion, affirming that civil jury selection in Ontario does not permit challenges for cause based on unspecified partiality and that the presumption of juror impartiality is strong.

The court held that identifying insurers at the outset could mischaracterize the dispute as one between insurers rather than individuals and potentially mislead the jury regarding a defendant's personal exposure.

The plaintiff brought a motion to strike the defendant's jury notice and proceed before a judge alone, arguing that a 19.5-day delay between the conclusion of evidence and closing arguments would prejudice the jury's ability to recall and understand complex medical evidence regarding post-traumatic stress disorder.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the evidence was not overly complex, the actual delay was shorter than claimed, and the jury was capable of comprehending and weighing the evidence.

The court concluded that justice would be better served by retaining the jury.

The plaintiff sought a specific instruction to the jury regarding the defendant's in-court admissions concerning fault for a collision.

During cross-examination, the defendant stated she did not believe the plaintiff was responsible and that her decision to enter a lane ultimately caused the accident.

The court had previously given a general instruction that the jury are the triers of fact and the defendant's views on fault are merely her views.

The plaintiff argued these were in-court admissions warranting a specific instruction that the jury should rely on them unless contradicted.

The court ruled that the defendant's answers were her views, not admissions of fact based on all relevant evidence, and therefore did not warrant specific mention in the jury charge.