Sandra Lebrun

The applicant was injured in a bicycle accident and received income replacement benefits (IRBs) for 104 weeks.

The insurer terminated the benefits at the 104-week mark based on multidisciplinary assessments concluding she did not suffer a complete inability to engage in employment for which she was reasonably suited.

The applicant sought ongoing IRBs, arguing she could only work part-time.

The Tribunal dismissed the application, finding the applicant failed to provide compelling medical evidence to rebut the insurer's seven assessments.

The Tribunal noted the applicant's successful transition to part-time work as a baker and yoga instructor demonstrated an ability to engage in suitable employment.

Following a trial where the plaintiffs were awarded damages for a motor vehicle accident, the defendant brought a motion for a conditional assignment order of the plaintiff's Statutory Accident Benefits (SABS).

The parties disagreed on the effective date of the assignment.

The court held that the effective date of the assignment is the date of the reasons for judgment, but the assignment is conditional upon and triggered by the payment of the judgment in full.

The plaintiff pedestrian was struck by the defendant's vehicle while crossing a street.

The defendant was found 100% liable.

The plaintiff had a highly complex pre-existing medical history, including chronic pain, sarcoidosis, and melanoma.

The court found the plaintiff suffered a mild traumatic brain injury and other injuries from the collision, which exacerbated his pre-existing conditions and impaired his ability to manage them.

The court assessed damages for the plaintiff and his family members, but reduced the total awards by 25% applying the crumbling skull principle, as the plaintiff would have been detrimentally affected by his pre-existing conditions regardless of the accident.

The injuries were found to meet the statutory threshold.

During a personal injury trial arising from a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiffs objected to the admissibility of an expert report from the defendant's occupational therapist regarding the injured plaintiff's attendant care needs.

The plaintiffs argued the report did not comply with a previous court ruling that limited the expert's evidence to the practical delivery model of care rather than the quantum of hours required.

The court agreed with the plaintiffs, finding the report went beyond the permitted scope by critiquing the plaintiff's expert and opining on the number of hours needed.

The court ruled that only specific portions of the report addressing the cost and availability of personal support workers and handyman services were admissible.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment under Rule 20.01(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that the plaintiff’s claim had already been settled and therefore no genuine issue required a trial.

The court held that the defendant failed to establish on the evidentiary record that a binding settlement existed or that the alleged settlement was not unconscionable.

Outstanding factual issues included whether the parties had reached a meeting of the minds, whether a signed release was an essential condition, and whether the plaintiff had adequate information and advice when negotiating the settlement with the insurer’s adjuster.

Applying the unconscionability framework from Titus v. William F. Cooke Enterprises Inc., the court found that the record was insufficient to determine the fairness of the transaction or the balance of bargaining power.

The court concluded that genuine issues requiring a trial remained.