Jonathan L. Rosenstein

The defendants brought a motion to transfer the action from Hamilton to Toronto under Rule 13.1.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The action had already been ordered to be tried together with a companion action in Hamilton, and the motion was brought on the eve of trial.

The defendants argued they could not arrange for their expert to testify remotely in Hamilton.

The court found insufficient evidence to support this claim and concluded the defendants failed to establish that Toronto was a significantly better venue.

The motion was dismissed to avoid unfairly delaying the trial.

This decision addresses a motion for security for costs arising from an aborted real estate transaction involving a gasoline station.

The plaintiff (899) had initiated an action for a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) after the vendor (465) re-sold the property to another defendant (929), who obtained an indemnity.

The court found it premature to determine the ultimate disposition of the plaintiff's $100,000 deposit for the main action.

However, it allocated portions of the deposit ($40,000 for 929 and $25,000 for 465) as security for costs related to the pending CPL motion and other stages already encountered.

The plaintiff was deemed the more successful party on this security for costs motion and was awarded partial indemnity costs.

The plaintiff's action for $25 million in damages was dismissed in full against all defendants.

This endorsement addresses the defendants' claims for costs.

The court found the plaintiff's principal, Mr. Lagani, engaged in blameworthy conduct, including misleading the court, intimidating witnesses, and making unsubstantiated allegations of fraud, warranting substantial indemnity costs.

The court declined to award costs against Mr. Lagani personally due to lack of jurisdiction and insufficient notice.

The court also rejected the Berczy Group's claim for equitable set-off against funds owed to the plaintiff, stating set-off cannot be used as a "sword" to proactively claim funds.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded to all defendants.

The Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment against Ashok and Usha Badhwar on a written guarantee secured by a mortgage, and for default judgment against Rochak Badhwar for an unpaid debt of $938,919.12.

The Badhwars raised the defence of non est factum, claiming they did not know what they were signing and that there was no consideration for the guarantee.

The court found no misrepresentation to support the non est factum defence, as conceded by Badhwar on cross-examination.

The defence of no consideration due to the guarantee being signed after loan monies were advanced was not considered because it was not properly pleaded.

Applying the principles from Hryniak v. Mauldin, the court found no genuine issue requiring a trial and granted judgment against Rochak and the Badhwars, allowing enforcement of the mortgage.

The defendants moved to set aside a default judgment in a mortgage enforcement action.

The court, on its own motion, stayed the entire proceeding pursuant to s. 106 of the Courts of Justice Act, finding that the plaintiff had initiated a second action for the same debt while an earlier, defended action was still pending.

The court deemed this an abuse of process, setting aside the default judgment and staying the current action in favour of the earlier one, reserving costs to be dealt with in the 2011 action.

The moving party law firm sought permission to withdraw as counsel of record for the plaintiffs mid-trial due to non-payment of legal fees and an alleged breakdown of the solicitor-client relationship.

The clients opposed the motion, arguing that withdrawal would cause significant prejudice.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that despite a prior consent agreement, the court retained discretion to refuse withdrawal.

The court held that the clients would suffer serious prejudice as it was not feasible for them to self-represent in complex commercial litigation, they had already paid substantial fees, and the law firm held security on the clients' properties.

Following a consent order dismissing the action against several defendants and striking the plaintiff's fresh as amended statement of claim, the successful defendants sought costs.

The court awarded full indemnity costs to a defendant lawyer due to unfounded allegations of fraud and breach of fiduciary duty.

Other defendants were awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that costs should be limited or denied due to procedural steps or prior cost awards.

The plaintiff was ordered to pay substantial costs to the moving parties.

The plaintiffs invested $1.25 million USD in the defendants' rehabilitative shoe insert business, Barefoot Science, based on representations that the company owned its intellectual property.

The plaintiffs later discovered the principal defendant secretly owned the patents and had forged documents to protect his reversionary interest.

The court found the defendants liable for deceit, fraudulent misrepresentation, and oppression.

The court awarded the plaintiffs $2.2 million USD, varied the security agreements to capture the intellectual property, and declared the forged agreements void.

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking an order that the parties jointly pay for the transcripts of a first trial, and that those transcripts be used at a new trial ordered by the Court of Appeal due to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The defendants opposed the motion, arguing it was premature and reversed the evidentiary onus.

The court ordered the parties to jointly order and equally pay for the transcripts, but dismissed the balance of the motion, finding it premature to determine how the evidence should be tendered before the trial judge has reviewed the transcripts.

The plaintiff sought an order staying or adjourning a scheduled trial pending the outcome of an appeal from an earlier interlocutory order dismissing an application related to enforcement of debt acknowledgments.

The plaintiff argued that Rule 63.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure automatically stayed the proceeding, or alternatively that the court should exercise discretion under Rule 63.02(1) to stay the trial.

The court held that Rule 63.01(1) applies only to orders for the payment of money and therefore did not mandate a stay.

Considering the procedural history, repeated adjournments, and the age of the action, the court concluded that the interests of justice favored allowing the trial to proceed despite the pending appeal.

The moving party sought an order at the commencement of trial declaring entitlement to enforce notarized debt acknowledgments against the respondents as if judgments had already been obtained, and requiring payment of the amounts stated in those instruments.

The motion relied on a prior decision determining that the applicable limitation period for enforcement of German Submissions for Compulsory Enforcement was 30 years and argued that the earlier ruling created issue estoppel preventing the respondents from contesting certain matters at trial.

The court held that the prior motion addressed only the applicable limitation period and did not finally determine questions regarding the identity of the holder of the acknowledgments, the validity of their assignment, or the amount owing.

Because those issues were not essential to the earlier decision and were not conclusively determined, the doctrine of issue estoppel did not apply.

The respondents were therefore entitled to raise those issues at trial.

The plaintiff advanced funds to a partnership operated by relatives pursuant to promissory notes and personal guarantees, including a $1,000,000 loan with an option to convert to equity.

The defendants asserted that the plaintiff elected to convert the loan to equity through a signed authorization, while the plaintiff alleged the document was forged.

The court found the authorization document to be a forgery and held that the plaintiff remained a lender entitled to repayment under the promissory note and guarantees.

The plaintiff also sued a bank for releasing funds from his account without authorization.

The court held that the plaintiff was bound by verification provisions in the bank’s Financial Services Agreement, which relieved the bank of liability due to the plaintiff’s failure to review and report account discrepancies.

The applicant brought an application for directions under Rule 75.06(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to challenge the validity of a will and codicils based on undue influence and lack of capacity.

The respondents moved for summary judgment to dismiss the application, arguing the underlying claims were statute-barred.

The court dismissed the motion for summary judgment, holding that such a motion is generally not available in an application unless specifically authorized by a procedural order, and that the court could not achieve a full appreciation of the evidence at this early stage.

The defendants brought a partial summary judgment motion arguing that claims seeking enforcement in Ontario of German “Notarized Debt Acknowledgments” were barred by limitation periods.

The court characterized the acknowledgments as foreign agreements creating unilateral covenants permitting enforcement without a prior German court judgment, rather than foreign judgments.

Applying conflict-of-laws principles, the court held that German limitation law governed.

Under the German Civil Code, enforceable documents such as the acknowledgments are subject to a 30‑year limitation period.

As a result, the claims were not statute‑barred and the motion was dismissed.

The applicant brought a motion for partial summary judgment in an estates application seeking declarations that a will and codicils were invalid due to undue influence and that certain joint assets formed part of the estate.

The motion sought a determination that any claims against the respondents regarding their handling of assets received by right of survivorship or as designated beneficiaries were barred by operation of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The respondents argued that the application implicitly sought relief against them, including declarations of breach of fiduciary duty and an order requiring remedy.

The court expressed concerns regarding the appropriateness of the motion in the context of the relief sought in the application.

The court directed the parties to appear at a further hearing to address those concerns before determining the motion.

At a Commercial List case conference in a civil action involving debt obligations and guarantees, the court addressed procedural scheduling and evidentiary issues relating to an upcoming summary judgment motion.

The principal issue on the anticipated motion was whether the plaintiff’s claims were statute‑barred under applicable limitation laws, potentially governed by German law.

The court directed the parties to produce supplementary expert reports addressing the applicable foreign law and its limitation periods, particularly in light of allegations of fraudulent concealment that might affect discoverability.

The court also addressed potential hearsay objections to affidavit evidence and ordered preservation and production of relevant documents for the period 1996–2004.

The plaintiff sought interim and interlocutory injunctions restraining the defendant from continuing an alleged trespass and requiring removal of construction equipment, fencing, refuse bins, and a large stockpile of topsoil from its property.

The dispute arose from a development arrangement where the defendant was permitted under a letter agreement to operate a sales or construction trailer on a commercial block pending reconveyance.

The defendant argued the provision created a lease granting broader rights of occupation, or alternatively that any misuse constituted only a breach of contract.

The court held the agreement granted only a limited licence to place and operate a trailer and did not confer exclusive possession or a leasehold interest.

The defendant’s additional uses constituted deliberate and continuing trespass warranting injunctive relief, and the RJR‑MacDonald test was satisfied in any event.