Jonathan L. Rosenstein

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her unjust enrichment claim against her deceased husband's mother.

The appellant and her husband had lived rent-free on the mother's farm and made extensive improvements to it.

After the husband's death, the appellant moved out and the mother sold the farm, keeping the proceeds.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the improvements were largely paid for by the husband's company, that the benefits of living rent-free offset the value of the improvements, and that the improvements were made voluntarily and in self-interest, providing a juristic reason for the mother to retain the benefit.

The appellant appealed a Master's order dismissing his motion to add himself, in his capacity as Estate Trustee, as a plaintiff in his personal action against the respondent.

The Master had ruled the claim was statute-barred.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the Master erred in calculating the limitation period.

The court held that the limitation period was extended because the parties had engaged in mediation and because the respondent had delayed renouncing her right to act as Estate Trustee, which prevented the appellant from being appointed earlier.

The plaintiff appealed a Master's decision dismissing her motion to amend her statement of claim and add a new party defendant.

The plaintiff originally pleaded and swore in an affidavit for a Certificate of Pending Litigation that she advanced $150,000 as a loan secured by a mortgage.

Five years later, she sought to amend her claim to allege the funds were an equity investment.

The Divisional Court upheld the Master's decision, finding that the proposed amendment was untenable at law and an abuse of process because it fundamentally contradicted the plaintiff's prior sworn evidence upon which she had obtained relief.

The appellants appealed the denial of their motion to set aside a noting in default.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by focusing solely on whether the appellants had formed an intent to defend before the deadline, failing to consider the full factual matrix, including the appellants' fear of attorning to the jurisdiction.

Finding no evidence of an intent to flout the rules, no inordinate delay, and no prejudice to the respondent, the Court allowed the appeal and set aside the noting in default.

The appellant appealed an order declaring an agreement of purchase and sale valid and granting the purchasers specific performance and damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the essential terms of the contract were clear and binding.

The court upheld the application judge's findings that the property was unique, justifying specific performance, and that it was reasonable to calculate damages as of the date of judgment rather than the date of breach to account for the property's enhanced value pending planning approval.

The appellant physician engaged in a sexual relationship with a patient starting in 1992 while continuing to treat her.

On January 1, 1994, a zero tolerance and mandatory revocation regime for sexual abuse of patients came into force under the Regulated Health Professions Act.

The appellant continued the sexual and professional relationship until 1998.

The Discipline Committee found him guilty of sexual abuse and revoked his certificate of registration.

The appellant appealed, arguing that by 1994 their relationship was 'spousal' and exempt from the regime.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Discipline Committee reasonably concluded the regime applied because there was a concurrent sexual and physician-patient relationship, and there is no categorical 'spousal exemption' under the legislation.

The plaintiff sued a doctor and an assessment company for bad faith, intentional interference with economic relations, and negligence arising from an independent medical examination report that led to the termination of her statutory accident benefits.

The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the report was protected by witness immunity and absolute privilege, and that they owed no duty of care to the plaintiff.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding genuine issues for trial regarding the scope of the duty of care in the context of the statutory scheme and whether immunity applied to allegations of intentional injury.

The Divisional Court dismissed the defendants' appeal, holding that the plaintiff's claims raised important policy issues and genuine issues of fact that required a full trial.

The appellants appealed from three orders: denying the corporate plaintiff the ability to be represented by its sole shareholder, ordering security for costs against the individual plaintiff personally, and dismissing the action for failing to pay the security.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in denying the sole shareholder the right to represent the corporation as the criteria appeared to be met.

The court also found an error in the security for costs order because the judge failed to consider whether the individual plaintiff's explanation was frivolous under rule 56.01(1)(c).

The three orders were set aside, and the dismissal of the application was reversed.