John R. Sproat

The Applicant sought costs after the Respondent accepted her Offer to Settle, which included an equalization payment and payment for line of credit debt.

The court considered the reasonableness of the parties' conduct, particularly the Respondent's failure to make reasonable offers and his reliance on unsubstantiated allegations in costs submissions.

The court awarded the Applicant costs fixed at $33,000, plus $1,627 for reply submissions, finding this to be slightly more than 75% of full recovery costs, justified by the Respondent's conduct and the late settlement.

The court determined custody and access for the parties' child, Bodhi.

The applicant sought joint custody with alternating weeks, while the respondent sought sole custody with the existing access schedule.

The court considered the applicant's history of domestic abuse and poor judgment regarding the child's health and exposure to an unregulated "Mars unit" treatment.

The respondent was found to be a caring, competent, and diligent parent.

The court granted sole custody and primary care to the respondent, with an adjusted access schedule for the applicant, and prohibited the applicant from using the "Mars unit" on the child.

Mr. Caron appealed his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol level in excess of the legal limit.

The appeal raised four grounds: (1) "evidence to the contrary" regarding the expiry date of the alcohol standard solution, (2) delay in advising the right to counsel, (3) the fairness of a blended voir dire, and (4) whether Mr. Caron waived his right to counsel.

The court dismissed all grounds of appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings on the alcohol standard's expiry, the reasonableness of the delay in advising counsel due to officer safety, the informed consent to the blended voir dire procedure, and the voluntary waiver of the right to counsel.

Derek Crespy appealed his conviction for assault and the imposed sentence of 45 days imprisonment.

The appeal court reviewed the trial judge's findings of fact, credibility assessments, and sentencing decision.

The court found no error in principle regarding the conviction, the rejection of self-defence, the credibility assessment of witnesses, or the reliance on photographic evidence.

The court also found no reasonable apprehension of bias by the trial judge and no error in principle in the sentencing decision, noting the aggravating factor of an unprovoked assault involving kicking to the head.

Both the appeal against conviction and the appeal against sentence were dismissed.

The plaintiff claimed adverse possession of a disputed area of land.

The court analyzed the three requirements for adverse possession: actual possession, intention to exclude the owner (animus possidendi), and the true owner being out of possession.

The court found that the plaintiff's predecessor in title, Mr. Malfara, did not meet these requirements as he did not actually use the land and had no intention to exclude the true owner.

Consequently, the plaintiff's claim for adverse possession was dismissed.

The defendants' counterclaim for trespass was granted, awarding $500 in damages, and a permanent injunction was issued against the plaintiff.

Costs were awarded to the defendants.

The accused, charged with kidnapping, robbery, aggravated assault, forcible confinement, and attempted murder, applied for a review of a detention order.

The reviewing judge applied the deferential standard of review from St-Cloud, finding no error in the Justice of the Peace's admission of a co-accused's statement or the evaluation of the proposed sureties.

The court upheld the detention on both the secondary ground, citing concerns about the accused's stability following a random and inexplicable attack, and the tertiary ground, given the violent nature of the crime, overwhelming evidence, and vulnerability of the victim.

The bail review was dismissed.

This application concerned a dispute over the purchase of a "Farm Property" from an estate.

The applicant sought authorization to purchase the property, while one respondent claimed a first option to purchase under the deceased's will.

The court analyzed the will's provision for "express written notice" to trigger the 30-day option period and whether the respondent had effectively waived his entitlement.

The court concluded that the respondent had properly exercised his option, as the conditions for triggering the option period were not met until a later date, and no effective waiver occurred.

The plaintiff, a construction company, sued the defendant municipality after being disqualified from a Request for Proposals (RFP) process for a City Hall expansion.

The plaintiff alleged that the municipality acted in bad faith and with bias when it disqualified the plaintiff for refusing to sign a confidentiality agreement and for communicating directly with City Council.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the action, finding that the plaintiff had breached the clear terms of the RFP and that the municipality's decision to disqualify the plaintiff was fair, made in good faith, and based on the advice of an independent fairness advisor.

The court also held that even if the municipality had breached the RFP, the plaintiff would only be entitled to reliance damages, not expectation damages for lost profits.

The offender was convicted of manslaughter by a jury after stabbing a highly intoxicated neighbour who mistakenly arrived at his door late at night.

The offender, who had a history of being harassed by the victim's associates, reasonably but mistakenly believed his home was under attack, though his use of a lethal sword was found disproportionate.

The court assessed his moral culpability at the low end of the scale, sentencing him to 2 years' imprisonment, reduced to 7 months after crediting pre-trial custody and house arrest, followed by 2 years of probation.

The plaintiffs, former employees of CTS, brought a summary judgment motion in a class proceeding arising from a mass termination following a plant closure.

CTS provided employees with approximately 12 months' working notice but did not file the required Form 1 notice with the Director of Employment Standards until the final 8 weeks.

The court held that the ESA requires Form 1 notice on the first day of the notice period provided by the employer, not just the statutory minimum period.

Because CTS failed to provide timely Form 1 notice, the working notice provided prior to the Form 1 filing was deemed void for all purposes, depriving CTS of credit for that period.

The court also found that requiring employees to work excessive overtime during the notice period negated the working notice for those weeks.

However, the court dismissed the claim for bad faith damages.

The tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board order terminating his tenancy and ordering eviction for breaching a prior conditional order.

The prior order granted relief from eviction on the condition that the tenant not exhibit conduct substantially interfering with the landlord's reasonable enjoyment, such as making profane comments.

The Board found the tenant breached this condition by swearing at the superintendent and subsequently yelling at and insulting the superintendent.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision was reasonable and the tenant raised no questions of law.

The Director of the Independent Health Facilities Program appealed a decision of the Health Services Appeal and Review Board.

The Board had found that the Director lacked jurisdiction under s. 20.1(2)(c) of the Independent Health Facilities Act to amend the respondent's licence to eliminate mammography and fluoroscopy services because the respondent had never commenced providing them, and thus could not have 'ceased' to provide them.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the Board's literal interpretation of 'ceased' was unreasonable and ignored the statutory context and purpose, which is to allow the Director to control the provision of services.

The Director's decision to amend the licence was reinstated.

The applicant applied for judicial review of a decision by the Appeals Committee of the National Dental Examining Board of Canada, which dismissed his appeal after he failed the Assessment of Clinical Skills Examination for the third time.

The applicant argued he was denied procedural fairness due to inadequate reasons and the lack of an oral hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Appeals Committee provided adequate reasons addressing the applicant's specific concerns and that the appeal process did not require an oral hearing under the circumstances.

The applicants, charged with fraud over $5,000, sought a stay of proceedings based on an infringement of their s.11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay was 41.25 months, exceeding the presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The court analyzed the delay under both the Jordan framework and the pre-Jordan Morin framework, considering defence delay, Crown delay, institutional delay, and prejudice to the accused.

While acknowledging significant institutional delays in the Brampton courthouse, the court found that the case did not meet the "particularly complex" exceptional circumstance under Jordan.

However, applying the transitional exceptional circumstance, the court determined that the Crown's reliance on the previous Morin framework was reasonable, and under Morin, the delay was not unreasonable given the serious charges and minimal prejudice attributable to the delay itself.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The plaintiff purchased 50% of the shares in the corporate defendant for $400,000.

Following the purchase, the individual defendant denied the plaintiff access to banking records, paid illegal kickbacks to suppliers, and misappropriated corporate funds and assets.

The plaintiff brought an action for an oppression remedy under s. 248 of the Business Corporations Act.

The court found that the defendant's conduct was oppressive and unfairly disregarded the plaintiff's reasonable expectations from the outset.

The court ordered the defendants to pay the plaintiff $400,000, representing the original purchase price of the shares.

The accused Dhillon ordered the kidnapping of the victim over a suspected drug debt.

The victim was bound, beaten, and confined in Dhillon's garage, where he subsequently died.

The cause of death was undetermined but involved either asphyxiation or methamphetamine toxicity.

The court found that the stress and exertion of the kidnapping significantly contributed to the victim's death, satisfying the causation requirement for manslaughter.

Dhillon was found guilty of manslaughter, kidnapping, and interfering with a dead body.

The co-accused Johal was found guilty of being an accessory after the fact for providing the keys to the victim's vehicle to help dispose of the body.

Robert Must, a party previously declared mentally incapable and represented by the Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT), sought leave to bring a motion in a family law proceeding.

The PGT opposed, citing a prior order that required court leave for Mr. Must to bring motions and arguing the current motion was not in his interest.

The court, respecting previous findings of incapacity and noting Mr. Must's continued "bizarre" and "incomprehensible" conduct, dismissed the motion for leave, affirming that only the PGT could bring motions on his behalf.

The plaintiff, Claudine Benjamin, brought an action against Primerica Life Insurance Company of Canada, Masoud Movahedi, and Hooper-Holmes Canada Ltd. Primerica moved to strike the jury notice, arguing the plaintiff claimed declaratory relief or that a mixed jury/non-jury trial was impractical.

The plaintiff cross-moved to serve a jury notice in a previously consolidated action.

The court set aside the consolidation order, granted the plaintiff's unopposed motion to serve a jury notice in the second action, and dismissed Primerica's motion to strike the jury notice.

The court found that the plaintiff's claim, though framed as a "declaration," was in essence a claim for damages based on factual findings regarding insurance coverage, not purely declaratory relief under s. 108(2) of the Courts of Justice Act.

A minority shareholder application was brought under the Business Corporations Act seeking an order for the majority to purchase the minority interest.

The court found that the applicant was a legitimate shareholder and that a breakdown in the relationship of trust and confidence among the small shareholder group, coupled with some oppression, warranted a remedy.

The court ordered a process for the termination of the business relationship, giving the respondents the option to either pursue a sale of the company's assets or a court-ordered share valuation process to purchase the applicant's shares.

The valuation date was set, and the issue of a holdback for a separate lawsuit was deferred.

The court addressed three motions: the defendants' motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claims, the plaintiff's motion to strike portions of the statement of defence and counterclaim, and the plaintiff's motion for an interlocutory injunction.

The court denied the plaintiff's request for an adjournment, finding a breach of diligence.

The defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted, dismissing all of the plaintiff's claims, including those for defamation, domain name ownership, theft of trade secrets, corporate espionage, passing off, copyright, and trademark infringement.

The court found the plaintiff acted in bad faith regarding domain name registrations and meta-tag use.

The plaintiff's motions were dismissed.