Ram Shankar

The parties separated following a tumultuous marriage marked by allegations of intimate partner violence.

The respondent was criminally charged and repeatedly breached bail conditions by contacting the applicant, leading to a 60-day jail sentence.

The respondent brought a motion for supervised parenting time, while the applicant sought a section 30 assessment before any parenting time occurred.

The court ordered a section 30 assessment to be conducted by a psychologist, funded initially from the parties' joint line of credit.

The court dismissed the respondent's motion for supervised parenting time, finding it contrary to the children's best interests given the respondent's ongoing coercive conduct, indirect attempts to contact the applicant, and the children's current behavioral challenges.

The offender, Taran Hibma, was found guilty of criminal negligence causing death after inserting lit sparklers into a sleeping cabin, causing a fire that killed Genesis Young, 17.

The court considered principles of sentencing, including denunciation, general deterrence, and rehabilitation, particularly given the offender's youth and substance abuse issues.

Despite arguments for a conditional sentence, the court determined that a custodial sentence was necessary to adequately address denunciation and general deterrence, while also considering rehabilitation.

Hibma was sentenced to 18 months in custody followed by 18 months of probation with conditions aimed at addressing his substance abuse.

This trial concerned a motion to change a 2006 final order regarding child and spousal support.

The Father sought to terminate child and spousal support and obtain reimbursement for overpayments.

The Mother sought continuation of support, retroactive s.7 expenses, and other reimbursements.

The court found the Father owed significant retroactive child support due to non-disclosure of income, but terminated ongoing child and spousal support.

The Mother was granted retroactive s.7 expenses from October 2018, but was ordered to reimburse the Father for spousal support overpayments.

The Mother's claims for tax penalty reimbursement and missed parenting time compensation were dismissed.

The accused, H.S., brought a motion for a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a breach of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b).

The total delay from charge to anticipated trial conclusion was 43.14 months, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

The court found 5 months of defence delay (due to waffling on a s. 276/278 Criminal Code application and preliminary inquiry availability) and 14 months of exceptional circumstances attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic and resulting court backlog.

After deductions, the net delay was calculated at 24.14 months, falling below the Jordan ceiling.

The court dismissed the application, finding no Charter breach.

This is a sentencing decision for R.H., who pleaded guilty to sexual interference against his biological daughter, aged 7-11, between 2017 and 2021.

The incidents involved repeated sexual abuse and a significant breach of trust by the father.

Aggravating factors included the victim's young age, the egregious breach of trust, the repeated nature of the offending, and the profound impact on the victim.

Mitigating factors included the offender's guilty plea, genuine remorse, lack of a proven criminal record (treated as a first offender), good post-offence conduct, a personal history of depression and childhood sexual abuse, collateral consequences, and significant rehabilitative efforts, including therapy and a low risk of re-offending assessment.

The Crown sought a three-year penitentiary sentence, while the defence proposed a conditional sentence or intermittent jail.

The court, applying principles from R. v. Friesen (emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for child sexual offences) and R. v. C.B. (allowing for consideration of mitigating factors and rehabilitation), determined that a conditional or intermittent sentence was unfit.

The judge imposed a two-year penitentiary sentence, noting it was a significant departure from typical sentences for such offences but justified by the numerous mitigating factors and the offender's rehabilitative progress.

The parties resolved all issues in their divorce except for the choice of school for their four-year-old child.

The applicant father proposed a school in Kincardine, while the respondent mother proposed a school in Port Elgin.

The court weighed several factors, including commute times, religious instruction, and the ability to walk to school.

The court found that the mother's proposal offered significantly less overall transit time for the child and avoided potential conflicts regarding religious instruction.

The court ordered that the child be enrolled in the school proposed by the mother.

The applicant, Tracie L. Galbraith, brought a trust claim against the respondent, Jeremy M. Kinsley, seeking a share of the home he purchased, following their 10-year cohabitation and the birth of three children.

The court found that the parties engaged in a joint family venture and that the respondent was unjustly enriched by the applicant's contributions, which included domestic services and financial support that enabled the respondent to build equity in the property.

A monetary award of $191,000 was granted to the applicant, representing one-half of the adjusted increase in the property's equity, applying a "value-survived" approach.

The respondent father was successful in obtaining a temporary order for equal parenting time and sought costs of the motion.

The father had made an offer to settle for equal parenting time, while the applicant mother's offers were premised on unequal parenting time.

The court awarded the father costs of $3,400, representing approximately 70% of his actual costs, noting his reasonable offers to settle.

The court also ordered that the mother's payment of costs be deferred pending the determination of her claim for child support arrears.

The parties separated after living together for 17 years.

The applicant advanced a constructive trust and unjust enrichment claim regarding a 100-acre property owned by the respondent, which she was in the process of selling.

The applicant brought a motion under Rule 45.01 requesting that 50% of the net proceeds of the sale be held in trust.

The court found the balance of convenience favoured granting an order, but instead of holding funds in trust, ordered the respondent not to encumber her newly purchased property or dissipate the net proceeds of the sale.

The applicant mother brought a motion to change a final consent order regarding parenting time.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the mother unilaterally reduced the respondent father's parenting time to weekends.

The father sought a temporary order returning to the pre-pandemic equal parenting schedule.

The mother opposed, citing the children's special needs and their recent progress at school.

The court granted the father's request for equal parenting time, finding it in the children's best interests, but granted the mother temporary sole responsibility for educational and health care decisions to reduce conflict.

The parties brought cross-motions regarding interim parenting time, child support, the sale of the matrimonial home, and mobility.

The mother sought supervised parenting time for the father, alleging family violence and COVID-19 concerns, and requested permission to relocate.

The father sought unsupervised parenting time and an order for the immediate sale of the matrimonial home.

The court dismissed the mother's request for supervised access, finding insufficient evidence of risk to the children, and ordered gradual unsupervised parenting time.

The court also ordered the pre-trial sale of the matrimonial home due to financial necessity and dismissed the mother's motion to relocate due to a lack of evidence supporting the move.

The applicant father brought an urgent motion seeking sole care of the parties' three-year-old child, alleging child protection concerns regarding the respondent mother.

The child had been in the applicant's care since December 2019 after a CAS worker found the respondent's home unfit.

The court found that the respondent had since rectified the home conditions and CAS had closed its file with no verified protection concerns.

Concluding there was no material change in circumstances under section 29 of the Children's Law Reform Act, the court dismissed the motion and ordered the child returned to the respondent in accordance with the existing final order.