Esra Samli

The applicant, W.G., brought a motion to change spousal support, seeking its termination after 14 years of payments to the respondent, K.G. W.G. argued a material change in circumstances due to K.G.'s improved earning capacity and the extended duration of support.

K.G. opposed termination, arguing her health had not significantly improved and her income was insufficient.

The court found material changes in circumstances, including substantial income increases for both parties, K.G.'s improved health and earning capacity, and the termination of child support.

The court concluded that K.G. remained entitled to spousal support, particularly given the compensatory nature of the original award and W.G.'s significantly increased income.

However, the court determined it was appropriate to limit the support's duration and step down the quantum, exceeding the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines' global maximum due to K.G.'s ongoing partial disability and the causal connection between W.G.'s income increase and the marriage.

This was an uncontested trial where the Applicant sought sole decision-making, primary residence, child support (including arrears and section 7 expenses), and a claim for unjust enrichment related to the matrimonial home.

The Respondent failed to participate in the trial and had not complied with previous financial disclosure orders.

The court granted all relief sought by the Applicant, finding that the Respondent had been unjustly enriched by the sale of the matrimonial home and ordering a monetary award to the Applicant.

This costs endorsement followed a six-day trial concerning custody and access, where the respondent, Jessica Mary Baran, was largely successful in maintaining the status quo of alternating weekend and mid-week access and securing sole custody.

The court found the applicant's position on shared week-about custody unreasonable, which prolonged the trial.

Despite offers made by both parties not being fully bettered in all aspects, the court determined that the applicant should pay costs somewhat greater than partial indemnity due to his unreasonable stance on custody and access.

The respondent was awarded costs totaling $28,251 plus applicable HST.

The court determined custody and access for the parties' child, Bodhi.

The applicant sought joint custody with alternating weeks, while the respondent sought sole custody with the existing access schedule.

The court considered the applicant's history of domestic abuse and poor judgment regarding the child's health and exposure to an unregulated "Mars unit" treatment.

The respondent was found to be a caring, competent, and diligent parent.

The court granted sole custody and primary care to the respondent, with an adjusted access schedule for the applicant, and prohibited the applicant from using the "Mars unit" on the child.

Accused charged with multiple assaults against their children sought disclosure of third‑party records held by a child protection agency.

The defence argued the records were likely relevant to the credibility and reliability of the child complainants because they contained allegations made by the children against other individuals.

Applying the likely relevance test from O’Connor and related authorities, the court held that speculative requests for third‑party records are impermissible but found sufficient case‑specific evidence that similar allegations had been made and at least partially recanted or determined unfounded.

The court concluded the threshold for stage‑one production was met and ordered the records unsealed for judicial review before determining whether disclosure to the defence should occur.

The Crown applied to summarily dismiss the defence's pretrial applications for a stay of proceedings and for third-party records.

The accused, charged with assaulting their children, sought a stay based on alleged warrantless police attendances at their property and sought records from the Children's Aid Society.

The court allowed the third-party records application to proceed in part, despite service issues, but summarily dismissed the stay application as frivolous under Rule 6.11(2), finding it had no reasonable prospect of success even if the alleged facts were true.