Barry Reese

The plaintiff claimed adverse possession of a disputed area of land.

The court analyzed the three requirements for adverse possession: actual possession, intention to exclude the owner (animus possidendi), and the true owner being out of possession.

The court found that the plaintiff's predecessor in title, Mr. Malfara, did not meet these requirements as he did not actually use the land and had no intention to exclude the true owner.

Consequently, the plaintiff's claim for adverse possession was dismissed.

The defendants' counterclaim for trespass was granted, awarding $500 in damages, and a permanent injunction was issued against the plaintiff.

Costs were awarded to the defendants.

In a Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act s. 38 fraudulent conveyance action, the defendants sought to amend their statements of defence and to introduce a counterclaim alleging abuse of process, malicious prosecution, and intimidation.

The plaintiffs opposed the amendments and moved to strike several pleadings, particularly those raising a limitation period defence.

The court held that earlier Rule 21 proceedings had finally determined the limitations issue as a question of law, meaning the defendants were barred by res judicata from re‑pleading or reframing the defence.

The court also found that the proposed counterclaim was unrelated to the trustee’s cause of action pursued under s. 38 and constituted a collateral attack on the order granting leave to commence the proceeding.

Limited amendments were permitted, but most proposed amendments were refused and several pleaded paragraphs were struck.

The appellant appealed an order striking her statement of claim against the university and its officials for negligent advice.

The motion judge found the claim was in pith and substance an academic dispute.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the negligence claim regarding advice on deregistration was part and parcel of the academic dispute.

The court declined to transfer the proceeding to the Divisional Court for judicial review.

The respondents' cross-appeal was allowed to amend the motion judge's order, which had inappropriately fettered the Divisional Court's discretion to consider the defence of delay.