John de Pencier Wright

The applicant brought a motion to change a temporary order that had previously eliminated child support due to the respondent’s unemployment and anticipated access transportation costs following the applicant’s relocation with the child.

The court found a material change in circumstances because the respondent had since obtained full-time employment with significantly increased income.

The court considered the allocation of access transportation costs, noting that while non-custodial parents often bear such costs, the law does not require this in every case.

Given that the relocation created substantial travel expenses and the parties had historically shared those costs, the court determined it remained equitable to continue sharing them.

A temporary child support order was made, adjusting table support by accounting for child care expenses and a contribution by the applicant toward access transportation costs.

Following earlier reasons concerning forfeiture of firearms and related items seized during a criminal investigation, defence counsel sought clarification and correction of the disposition of certain exhibits.

The issues included replacement of seized dynamite, correction of exhibit classifications in the forfeiture schedule, return of items characterized as silencers or flash suppressors, and return of auxiliary equipment and personal property.

The court held that although generally functus officio after issuing its reasons, it retained jurisdiction to correct accidental slips or omissions in the schedule.

The court amended the schedule to correct the classification of certain items held in trust but declined to order the return or replacement of dynamite or most silencers due to insufficient evidentiary foundation.

Orders were made confirming the return of auxiliary firearm accessories and other seized non‑forfeited property.

A trustee applied ex parte for an order permitting payment of residual trust funds into court where one charitable beneficiary could not be identified.

The trust instrument referred to a "Leukemia Fund," but the trustee asserted that the precise organization could not be determined.

The court held that paying the funds into court was inappropriate where further investigation into the intended beneficiary had not been undertaken.

The court emphasized the law’s reluctance to allow charitable gifts to fail and directed the trustee to undertake inquiries and, if necessary, propose a cy-près scheme reflecting the settlors’ general charitable intent.

The application was dismissed and the trustee was directed to return with a proposed distribution plan.

The court determined a forfeiture application under section 491(1)(b) of the Criminal Code following firearms convictions.

It held forfeiture was warranted for most seized firearms and for ammunition that was actually in improperly loaded firearms.

The court rejected a broad constitutional challenge to mandatory forfeiture on these facts, while recognizing that property-right concerns and due process principles can constrain application in proper cases.

It found no basis to forfeit ammunition that was merely readily available to unloaded firearms where both were stored in a locked room compliant with the storage regulation.

A disposition order issued in accordance with Schedule 1, with substantial forfeiture but targeted exemptions and transfers.

A bankrupt applied for discharge from bankruptcy where the majority of his unsecured debt consisted of personal income tax debt exceeding $200,000 and representing more than 75% of his liabilities.

The Crown opposed discharge, arguing that the bankrupt’s right to reside rent‑free in a home held in a discretionary trust should be treated as income when calculating surplus income under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The court held that a right of residence is not “revenue” or income for purposes of surplus income under s. 68 because it merely reduces an expense rather than generating income.

However, the court considered the benefit as a relevant factor when exercising discretion under s. 172.1 governing discharge of tax debtors.

A conditional discharge was ordered requiring monthly payments to creditors.

The successful plaintiff sought costs following judgment in an action for accounting services, requesting partial indemnity costs to the date of its Rule 49 offer to settle and substantial indemnity costs thereafter.

The defendant argued the offer was not a genuine settlement offer because it demanded the full amount claimed and that the case involved a substantive defence.

The court held that although an offer to settle need not contain an element of compromise, the claim was not a liquidated claim and the defendant had raised a defence of substance regarding whether it was liable as principal or agent.

Exercising its discretion under Rule 49.10(1), the court ordered otherwise and declined to award substantial indemnity costs.

Costs were awarded on a partial indemnity basis throughout.

The plaintiff alleged that he and another individual formed a partnership with a third person to develop a nightclub and microbrewery venture, and that the defendants diverted the opportunity by securing a lease and operating the business themselves.

The plaintiff also claimed standing as assignee of the co‑venturer’s alleged cause of action through security agreements relating to unrelated debts.

The court found that the plaintiff was not a partner in the venture, noting his absence from key negotiations and documentation such as the letter of intent to lease.

The court further held that the co‑venturer’s refusal or inability to provide financing effectively constituted withdrawal from the partnership, permitting the remaining participant to proceed independently.

As a result, neither the co‑venturer nor the plaintiff as alleged assignee had a viable cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty or diversion of opportunity.

The Municipal Property Assessment Corporation appealed a declaration that a non-profit apartment complex for recovering substance abusers was exempt from municipal taxation as a 'house of refuge' under s. 3(1)-11 of the Assessment Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the application judge made no palpable and overriding error in concluding that the facility's primary purpose was to provide a protected environment and sanctuary from the peril of recidivism into addiction, thus qualifying for the exemption.

The landlord brought a motion to transfer the tenants' appeal of an eviction order from Brampton to the Toronto Divisional Court.

The tenants had appealed the Ontario Rental Housing Tribunal's eviction order, which automatically stayed the eviction, but they failed to pay ongoing rent or arrears.

The court granted the motion to transfer the appeal.

Furthermore, the court ordered on its own motion that the tenants must pay rent arrears and ongoing rent within 15 days, failing which the stay of the eviction order would be lifted.

The landlord appealed a Small Claims Court judgment that dismissed its claim for unpaid rent and awarded the tenants $10,000 in damages for the landlord's unreasonable refusal to consent to an assignment of the lease.

The landlord argued the trial judge exceeded the monetary jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court by effectively granting a set-off of $10,000 against the rent claim plus a $10,000 judgment.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly concluded that the landlord's breach terminated the right to rent after May and separately gave rise to a cause of action for damages.

The appellant physician appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, which found him guilty of professional misconduct and revoked his certificate of registration.

The charges related to his conduct during a patient's unsuccessful resuscitation, his use of heavy sedation for nerve blocks, and his prescription of high-dose opioids for chronic pain patients.

The Divisional Court upheld the Committee's findings regarding the resuscitation and the use of sedation, finding them reasonable based on the evidence.

However, the Court set aside the findings related to opioid prescriptions and a toxic dose of Marcaine, concluding the Committee ignored crucial defence expert testimony and relied on a charting error.

The penalty of revocation was set aside as excessive and the matter was remitted to a differently constituted Committee.

The appellant investors appealed an order disqualifying their counsel and his merged law firm from continuing to represent them in a complex litigation against the respondent promoters.

The disqualification arose after the investors' law firm merged with another firm that had previously acted for the promoters in preparing the offering memorandum at the heart of the dispute.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the merged firm failed to implement an ethical wall at the time the merger became effective, creating an irreconcilable conflict of interest and a risk of sharing confidential information.

The Registrar of the Motor Vehicle Dealers Act appealed a decision of the Licence Registration Appeal Tribunal, which directed the Registrar not to revoke the respondents' registration despite convictions for odometer tampering.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Tribunal applied the correct test from Brenner and that its findings of fact and credibility were supported by the evidence.

The appellant appealed the Assessment Review Board's decision regarding the assessment of its commercial office building, arguing the Board failed to consider the assessed value of similar lands in the vicinity as required by s. 44(2) of the Assessment Act.

The Divisional Court held that while s. 44(2) mandates consideration of similar properties' assessments, the appellant failed to adduce sufficient evidence of such assessments before the Board.

Due to the inadequate evidentiary record, the appeal was dismissed.

The applicant, an Employment Standards Officer, sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision setting aside an order that the employer pay an employee for constructive dismissal.

The employee, after 16 years, was moved to a lower-paying, more physically demanding job due to downsizing.

After six days, he quit due to back problems caused by the new work.

The OLRB found he quit and was therefore not constructively dismissed.

The Divisional Court held this decision was unreasonable, as the employee was clearly constructively dismissed and did not waive his rights by attempting the new job for six days.

The OLRB decision was set aside.

The plaintiffs, comprising Canadian citizens and Yugoslavian residents, sued the Government of Canada for damages in tort and under the Charter relating to Canada's participation in the 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia.

The Crown brought a motion to strike the statement of claim, which was initially dismissed.

On appeal to the Divisional Court, the court allowed the appeal and struck the statement of claim in its entirety.

The court held that the executive decision to participate in the bombing was a matter of high policy and Crown prerogative, making the tort claims non-justiciable.

Furthermore, the Crown is immune from tort liability for military actions and pure policy decisions.

While the Charter claims were justiciable, the court found that state-to-state military action does not engage section 7 or section 15 of the Charter.

The appellant, a corrections officer who was severely injured by an inmate, appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board.

The Board had awarded the maximum amount for pain and suffering but deducted a $12,000 Non-Economic Loss (NEL) award received from the Workers' Compensation Board, pursuant to s. 17(3) of the Compensation for Victims of Crime Act.

The appellant argued this resulted in a double deduction because his long-term disability insurance also deducted the NEL award.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board properly exercised its discretion and that any dispute regarding insurance deductions was a matter between the appellant and his insurer.