Jill M. Copeland

The appellant tenant appealed an order granting relief from forfeiture of a commercial lease, challenging findings regarding its use of the premises, the landlord's refusal to consent to a lease assignment, an order to remove an abandoned truck, and an allegation of judicial bias.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's findings that the tenant breached the lease's use provisions by constructing kitchen cabinets, that the landlord was entitled to refuse the assignment due to the breach, and that the truck removal order was valid.

The court also dismissed the bias allegation, interpreting the motion judge's comments as an attempt to minimize future acrimony.

The appeal on costs was denied as leave was not sought and the award was within the motion judge's discretion.

The appeal was dismissed in its entirety.

The appellant, F.C., appealed convictions for 12 sex-related offences, raising two grounds: the trial judge's denial of a severance motion and an alleged improper jury charge on the human trafficking offence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's holistic application of the R. v. Last factors for severance, nor in the jury instruction on human trafficking, which was deemed sufficient given the factual context and absence of trial counsel objection.

The appellant wife appealed a trial judge's order requiring her to make an equalization payment to the husband.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred by ordering such a payment in an uncontested trial where the respondent husband provided no financial disclosure and never requested equalization.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge made a palpable and overriding error by ordering an equalization payment without an adequate factual basis due to the respondent's complete failure to disclose financial information.

The court emphasized the fundamental duty of financial disclosure in family law proceedings and set aside the equalization order, directing that no equalization payment was owing and the appellant was entitled to the full proceeds of the matrimonial home sale.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order granting leave to amend a statement of claim.

The respondents moved to quash the appeal, arguing the order was interlocutory and thus the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction.

The court found the order to be interlocutory, confirming that appeals of such orders lie with the Divisional Court with leave, not the Court of Appeal.

The motion to quash was granted.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto appealed a Superior Court decision that upheld an Ontario Court of Justice order concerning monthly access to children.

The Society argued that the OCJ lacked jurisdiction to entertain an enforcement motion under Rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules after a final order had been made, contending that the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 was a complete code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the OCJ retained jurisdiction to enforce its orders, as the definition of "case" in the Family Law Rules explicitly includes "enforcements," and requiring a new proceeding for enforcement would contradict the principle of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings.

The court also found no reasonable apprehension of bias by the Superior Court judge and addressed procedural fairness concerns.

The appellants appealed their convictions for offences under the Fish and Wildlife Conservation Act and Fishing Licensing Regulation, specifically concerning the interpretation of an exemption related to buying baitfish for commercial purposes without a license.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding that the exemption in s. 32(1) of the Regulation applies only to the general prohibition in s. 51(1) of the FWCA, not to the specific commercial baitfish prohibition in s. 31.3(1)(b) of the Regulation.

The court also rejected a due diligence/mistake of fact defence, reiterating that misinterpretation of law is not a valid defence.

The appellant, convicted of second-degree murder, appealed his conviction and sentence.

The conviction appeal challenged the trial judge's jury instructions on the defence of a third party and accident, arguing there was no air of reality to the former and the latter was inadequate, thereby undermining his primary defence of identity.

The sentence appeal challenged the 12-year parole ineligibility period, alleging misapprehension of evidence regarding aggravating factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding that the trial judge correctly instructed the jury on the defences, which had an air of reality and did not prejudice the appellant's primary defence.

The court also found no reversible error in the parole ineligibility period, concluding that the trial judge's factual findings were supported by evidence and the sentence was proportionate.

The appellant, Oro-Medonte Property Owners’ Association, appealed a summary judgment dismissing its action to quash a by-law imposing water system fees and to declare the water system municipal.

The by-law was passed by the respondent, The Corporation of the Township of Oro-Medonte, to fund upgrades to the Zone 1 water system.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the Zone 1 system was not assumed by the municipality and that the by-law was within the municipality's statutory authority under the Municipal Act, 2001.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) for manslaughter and robbery, appealed his designation as a high-risk accused (HRA) under s. 672.64(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the trial judge's discretionary decision, considering the appellant's extensive history of severe mental disorder, repetitive violent behaviour against strangers, and treatment resistance.

The court found the trial judge's conclusion that there was a substantial likelihood of the appellant using violence that could endanger the life or safety of another person was reasonable and supported by the evidence, and therefore dismissed the appeal.

The appellant, a young person, appealed convictions for sexual assault and uttering death threats, arguing the trial judge's reasons were insufficient due to a failure to address material inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence and a potential motive to fabricate.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the trial judge's reasons did not permit meaningful appellate review as they failed to grapple with critical credibility issues.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial ordered.

The Patient Ombudsman appealed a Divisional Court decision that quashed its proposed investigation into long-term care homes, which the Divisional Court found was prohibited by s. 13.3(5) of the Excellent Care for All Act, 2010, due to existing proceedings on the matter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the Divisional Court's application of the reasonableness standard and its broad interpretation of "in connection with" in s. 13.3(5).

The court found no error in the Divisional Court's conclusion that the Patient Ombudsman's investigation was unreasonably commenced given the extant proceedings and the clear overlap of subject matter.

The appellant appealed a divorce order, arguing improper service of the Notice of Application and alleging the divorce was fraudulent, relying on a signature comparison and postage irregularities.

The Court of Appeal found no credible evidence to support the appellant's claims of fraud or service issues, noting the signatures appeared similar and there was no support for postage irregularities.

The court also considered that the parties had been separated since 2014 and a prior order granted the respondent sole decision-making responsibility for the children.

The appeal was dismissed.

Downing Street Financial Inc. sought leave to appeal an order dismissing its motion for summary judgment and granting summary judgment to the responding parties, which dismissed an action related to a co-tenancy agreement and alleged fraudulent conveyances/preferences under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and other provincial statutes.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the proposed appeal was not prima facie meritorious and did not raise issues of significance to insolvency practice.

The court upheld the motion judge's findings that the parties dealt at arm's length and that deadlocked shareholders do not have de jure control for the purposes of the BIA, and that there was no intent to defeat creditors.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment that found them jointly and severally liable for $120,000 plus prejudgment interest to the respondent.

The appeal primarily focused on the personal liability of one appellant under a personal guarantee related to a joint venture agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's decision that the case was suitable for summary judgment despite being a simplified procedure action, and upholding the validity and enforceability of the personal guarantee, which imposed personal liability.

The appellants, purchasers of a residential property, appealed a Superior Court order granting summary judgment to the respondent vendor.

The action, commenced under Simplified Procedure, alleged breaches of warranties in the Agreement of Purchase and Sale concerning the pool, hot tub, and heating systems.

The motion judge found no genuine issue for trial, concluding the appellants failed to establish liability based on warranty wording and lacked admissible evidence of damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's findings on liability and damages, and upholding the decision that examinations conducted were inadmissible under Rule 76.04 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The respondent was awarded costs on appeal.

This is an appeal from a motion judge's decision dismissing a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) motion.

The appellants (defendants in the original action) sought to dismiss Canadian Tire's fraud action, arguing it arose from their expressions related to public interest (complaints about privacy violations and defective products).

The motion judge found the action did not arise from an expression and that the plaintiff's motive was irrelevant at the threshold stage of a SLAPP analysis under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal affirmed this, holding that a plaintiff's motive is not a relevant factor at the first stage of the SLAPP analysis, which is restricted to determining if the action arises from an expression related to a matter of public interest.

The appeal on costs was also dismissed, as the motion judge properly exercised discretion.

The appellant, a speech language pathologist, appealed a summary judgment dismissing her action against Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada as statute-barred.

The action sought damages for intentional infliction of economic harm, interference with economic relations, PHIPA retaliation, and conspiracy, stemming from Sun Life's delisting of her services after an audit dispute.

The motion judge found the claim statute-barred under the Limitations Act, rejecting arguments for a rolling limitation period and that the discovery of the claim was contingent on a College investigation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, agreeing with the motion judge's analysis on the limitation period and the appropriateness of summary judgment.

The appellant, Johnathan Impey, appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The appeal raised two grounds: the trial judge's response to a jury question regarding the definition of reasonable doubt, and the alleged failure to instruct the jury on how to deal with the complainant's motivation to fabricate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's response to the jury's question was appropriate, especially given counsel's joint submission, and that the general instructions on witness credibility were sufficient to address the issue of motive to fabricate.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual interference and sexual exploitation, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility and reliability of child witnesses (his daughter S.R. and step-granddaughter S.R.D.) by improperly discounting inconsistencies and compartmentalizing evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of inconsistencies or his distinction between intentional and inadvertent tainting of evidence.

The court affirmed that the trial judge correctly applied the law regarding child witnesses and that his credibility findings were entitled to deference.

The appellants, Roslyn Blake and Claire Graham, appealed their convictions, seeking a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Charter, relying on the framework established in *R. v. Jordan*.

The Court of Appeal assumed, without deciding, that Ms. Graham's net delay could exceed 30 months.

However, the court upheld the trial judge's finding in Ms. Blake's case that the complexity of the matter justified the delay beyond the presumptive ceiling, noting that this assessment was equally applicable to both co-accused appellants.

The court emphasized the deference owed to the trial judge's expertise in assessing case complexity.

The appeals were dismissed.