Jeff G. Cowan

The Municipal Property Assessment Corporation and the City of Toronto appealed a decision of the Assessment Review Board regarding the property tax assessments of six large office complexes in Toronto.

The Board had accepted the property owners' argument that the statutory phrase 'fee simple, if unencumbered' required the properties to be valued as if they were vacant, ignoring existing leases.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Board's interpretation was wrong in law.

The Court held that the whole of the land must be assessed, and in the context of income-producing properties, 'fee simple, if unencumbered' means value calculated using market rents rather than actual rents, ensuring all interests in the land are valued.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Assessment Review Board regarding the property tax assessments of six large office complexes.

The Board had accepted the respondents' argument that the statutory definition of 'current value' as 'fee simple, if unencumbered' required the properties to be valued as if vacant, ignoring existing leases.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the Board's interpretation was wrong in law.

The Court found that the entire ownership interest, including both the landlord's and tenants' interests, must be valued, and that the 1997 amendment to the Assessment Act was intended to ensure consistency in valuation by requiring the use of market rents rather than actual rents.

The appellant owns a former cruise ship, the Jadran, which operates as a floating restaurant berthed in Lake Ontario.

The Municipal Property Assessment Corporation assessed the ship as a 'structure' and the lakebed it occupies as 'land' for taxation purposes.

The appellant appealed the application judge's decision upholding the assessment.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's conclusions that the ship is a structure, that it occupies land owned by the Port Authority, and that the appellant is in possession of that land.

The applicants, Municipal Property Assessment Corporation and the City of Toronto, brought motions for leave to appeal an interim decision of the Assessment Review Board concerning the property tax assessments of several large office complexes.

The central issue was the Board's interpretation of 'current value' and 'fee simple, if unencumbered' under the Assessment Act, which led the Board to value the properties as if vacant and untenanted.

The Divisional Court found there was reason to doubt the correctness of the Board's interpretation, noting it may be inconsistent with the statutory scheme and prior case law.

Leave to appeal was granted.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Racing Commission approving a reduced number of race days for two racetracks in 2007.

The applicant alleged a breach of procedural fairness and an error in denying it party status.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application on the ground of undue delay, noting the applicant waited five months into the racing season to bring the application, which would cause substantial prejudice to the racetracks if the calendar were overturned.

The applicant, Geranium Corporation, sought judicial review of a decision by the Information and Privacy Commissioner exempting a letter submitted by a resident to the Town of Innisfil from disclosure under s. 14(1) of the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (MFIPPA).

The applicant argued that the non-disclosure deprived it of knowing allegations made against it prior to a town council decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Commissioner's interpretation of MFIPPA reasonable.

The court noted that the Commissioner's decision did not prevent the Ontario Municipal Board from ordering production of the document in related proceedings.

The appellants sought a refund of business taxes for the years 1994 to 1996 under s. 443 of the Municipal Act, arguing they were overcharged due to an error of fact in their assessment classification.

The City denied the application, and the Divisional Court dismissed the subsequent application for judicial review.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the incorrect categorization of the business was an error of fact, not an error in judgment, as the Assessment Commissioner was not aware of the full facts at the time of the original assessment.

The Court also found that a letter from the acting Regional Assessment Commissioner constituted valid confirmation of the error and that the City was the proper respondent.

The appeal was allowed and the City was ordered to consider the refund application.

The appellant tenant appealed a decision interpreting a commercial lease provision regarding the reimbursement of realty taxes.

Following 1997 amendments to the Assessment Act, separate tax assessments for individual businesses in the shopping plaza were abolished, resulting in an 'en bloc' assessment for the entire property.

The landlord applied a formula in the lease designed for such an eventuality to allocate taxes.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the clear language of the lease anticipated this scenario, and the formula was correctly applied since the tenant had not obtained a separate assessment.

Following the release of reasons disposing of the appeals regarding an Indigenous land claim, the Court of Appeal determined the costs of the proceedings.

The court ordered the appellant to pay 50% of the federal and provincial crowns' costs of the appeals on a party and party basis, noting the federal crown's unsuccessful arguments regarding the validity of the land surrender.

The class representatives, including the railway company, were awarded 100% of their costs for both the summary judgment motions and the appeals on a party and party basis.

The court directed that all costs be assessed rather than fixed.

An Indigenous band appealed from a summary judgment disposition concerning reserve lands sold in the 19th century without a lawful formal surrender.

The Court of Appeal held that there had been no surrender and that the claim was not barred by statutory limitation periods, but concluded that declaratory and possessory relief should nevertheless be refused.

The court applied public law discretion and equitable doctrines, emphasizing the band's historical acquiescence, the extraordinary delay in asserting the land claim, and the reliance of innocent third-party landowners who had held and developed the properties for generations.

The band was left to pursue its damages claims against the Crown.

Several Indigenous moving parties sought leave to intervene in multiple appeals concerning Aboriginal rights and title issues.

The court held that three of the moving parties had a sufficient interest in the outcome and could usefully add to the issues, and granted intervention on strict conditions, including that the existing record would stand and a single factum be delivered.

A separate moving party seeking intervention primarily to challenge portions of Ontario's factum was refused leave because the court was not persuaded it would add anything materially new to the arguments already to be made by existing parties.

No costs were ordered.

In a complex Indigenous land claim involving multiple summary judgment motions and overlapping appeals, the moving party sought to quash an appeal by one Crown respondent and a cross-appeal by another.

The court held that, because the motions below were heard together on a single record and the issues were interrelated, the provincial Crown had standing to appeal despite not bringing its own motion below.

The court also held that the federal Crown had standing to cross-appeal and that any complaint that it was advancing a new argument went to the merits, not to the validity of the cross-appeal.

Both motions to quash were dismissed with costs.

The appellant First Nation appealed a decision upholding the validity of a land surrender.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal in a brief oral judgment, stating that the sole question was the validity of the surrender and expressing agreement with the reasons of the Court of Appeal.