Jamie Joseph William Spotswood

The applicants, Distillery Parties and Rite-Air, sought declarations that their insurers, Temple Insurance Company and Aviva Insurance Company of Canada, had a duty to defend them under a Specific Project Wrap-Up Liability Insurance Policy.

The insurers denied the duty to defend, arguing that the alleged property damage was below the policy's $10,000 deductible, and thus no coverage was triggered.

The court held that the duty to defend is triggered by the mere possibility of a covered claim, regardless of whether the alleged damages exceed the deductible.

The court also rejected the insurers' request for an ex ante allocation of defence costs, stating that such allocation is premature and must be determined ex post facto based on actual legal expenses for exclusively uncovered claims.

The defendants brought a motion for an order requiring the plaintiffs to serve a further and better affidavit of documents, specifically seeking financial documents relevant to the plaintiffs' damages claims.

The plaintiffs argued that the defendants were precluded from seeking these documents because they had agreed to a Discovery Plan that excluded them.

The court found that the defendants had explicitly reserved their right to pursue the financial information when agreeing to the Discovery Plan.

The court ordered the plaintiffs to produce their financial statements and tax returns, as they were relevant to the claims for business losses, but declined to order production of other speculative documents at this stage.

The applicants, an IT services company and its sole director, sought a declaration that their errors and omissions insurer had a duty to defend them against a copyright infringement action commenced in the U.S. The insurer denied coverage, citing material misrepresentations in the insurance application and various policy exclusions, relying heavily on extrinsic evidence.

The court ruled that the duty to defend is governed by the pleadings in the underlying action and the policy language, not by extrinsic evidence that would convert the motion into a "trial within a trial." Finding that the U.S. claims, on their face, fell within the policy's coverage for a "wrongful act" in connection with "professional business" and within the coverage period, and that the insurer failed to meet its onus to prove exclusions without the inadmissible extrinsic evidence, the application was allowed.

This decision addresses costs following a complex summary judgment regarding the sale of counterfeit headphones.

Computron Systems International Inc. (Computron) and Husain Ladhani et al. (Ladhani) both achieved partial success in their respective summary judgment motions against Techlogics Canada Inc. and Faisal Rashid (Techlogics), while Techlogics was largely unsuccessful.

The court considered factors under Rule 57.01(1) and Rule 49.10 (offers to settle), declining to impose Rule 49.10 sanctions due to the conditional nature of the offers involving multiple parties.

The court also addressed the applicability of the Rule 76 simplified procedure and the conduct of the parties.

Ultimately, Computron was awarded $18,000 in costs, apportioned equally between Ladhani and Techlogics.

Ladhani was awarded $16,000 in costs from Techlogics.

The plaintiff, Computron, purchased wholesale quantities of Beats headphones from the defendant Ladhani, who had sourced them from the defendant Techlogics.

Computron later ordered more headphones directly from Techlogics.

Upon discovering the headphones were counterfeit, Computron sought refunds.

Computron and Ladhani brought motions for summary judgment against Techlogics, arguing they were duped into believing the goods were authentic.

The court found the sales were 'sales by description' under the Sale of Goods Act, implying a condition of authenticity.

The court rejected Techlogics' defence that the buyers knew the goods were inauthentic 'OEM' products.

Summary judgment was granted to Computron against Ladhani and Techlogics, and to Ladhani against Techlogics for breach of contract.

The plaintiff sought default judgment against the defendants for misappropriation of partnership funds and improper diversion of business.

The court granted default judgment against the individual defendant for breach of fiduciary duty, awarding compensatory, aggravated, and punitive damages totaling $317,720.35.

The claim for intentional infliction of mental distress was dismissed.

The claim against the corporate defendant for an accounting and disgorgement of profits was also dismissed, as the plaintiff failed to establish that the competing business operated concurrently with the partnership.

Costs were awarded on a substantial indemnity basis.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them unjustly enriched by the transfer of two valuable licenses without payment.

The appellants argued that where contract negotiations have failed, courts cannot use unjust enrichment to impose a contract on the parties.

The Court of Appeal rejected this submission, distinguishing the case from Skibinski v. Community Living British Columbia.

The trial judge had found as a fact that the appellants had no reasonable expectation of receiving the licenses for nothing.

The appellants also challenged the damages award, but the Court of Appeal found the trial judge's assessment entitled to deference.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

An appeal from a trial judgment in which the trial judge found that an employee, who held the position of Assistant Vice President of Campus Services and Building Operations, had misappropriated nearly one million dollars from York University through various fraudulent schemes between 2007 and 2009.

The employee was terminated without cause and paid a severance package of $696,166 with mutual releases after vehemently denying any wrongdoing.

York subsequently discovered the full extent of the misconduct and sued to rescind the severance agreement and recover the stolen funds.

The trial judge found that the employee had fraudulently misrepresented his innocence and that the claim was not barred by the limitations period.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendants, TVM Sault Inc. and TVM Construction Management Inc., sought leave to bring a motion compelling the plaintiff, Focal Elements Ltd., to post security for costs under Rules 56.01(1)(d) and (e) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court granted leave, finding that TVM had established a good reason to believe Focal had insufficient assets in Ontario to pay costs.

While Focal's claim was not deemed frivolous or vexatious, Focal failed to demonstrate impecuniosity or sufficient assets to satisfy a cost order.

The court ordered Focal to pay $10,350 as security for costs for the period up to and including examinations for discovery, applying a "rough justice" discount to the quantum requested by TVM due to lack of particulars and overlap with a counterclaim.

The defendant Focal Elements Ltd. brought a motion seeking a declaration that the plaintiff 9448616 Canada Ltd.'s construction lien had expired, an order discharging the lien, and dismissal of 944's action in its entirety.

Focal also sought the return of funds posted as security.

The grounds for the motion included 944's failure to set the action down for trial or obtain a trial order within two years of commencing the action, as required by the Construction Lien Act, and non-compliance with a prior court order to appoint new counsel or obtain leave to be self-represented.

The court granted Focal's motion, finding that the lien had expired due to non-perfection and that 944 had failed to comply with the prior order.

The action was dismissed, and the security funds were ordered to be returned to Focal.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment on a contractual refund claim after the CRA disallowed SR&ED tax credits prepared by the defendant tax consultants.

The defendants brought a cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing the claim based on the limitation period, and the personal defendant sought to dismiss the claim against him.

The court dismissed all motions, finding that the refund claim was inextricably linked with the defendants' counterclaim for breach of contract, making partial summary judgment inappropriate.

The court also found sufficient evidence to require a trial on the personal claim against the individual defendant.

The applicant and respondent, corporate entities controlled by a son and father respectively, jointly owned a commercial property.

The applicant sought an order for the sale of the property under the Partition Act, which the respondent opposed, citing malicious conduct and a contractual right of first refusal.

The respondent also claimed unpaid rental income.

The court held that the applicant had a prima facie right to sell the property and had not acted maliciously, but was bound by the right of first refusal.

The court ordered that the applicant's prior offer to sell its interest to the respondent remain open for an additional 60 days, after which the property could be sold on the open market if no agreement was reached.

The court also ordered the applicant to pay the respondent its share of outstanding rental payments.

York University sought security for costs of an appeal brought by Michael Markicevic, who was found at trial to have defrauded York of over $1.8 million and made fraudulent conveyances of property.

Markicevic appealed on two grounds: the validity of a mutual release signed upon his termination and whether York's claims were statute-barred.

The motion judge ordered security for costs of $75,000 under Rule 61.06(1)(c), finding that while the appeal was not frivolous and vexatious, the unchallenged findings of fraud and asset dissipation constituted compelling "other good reason" to order security despite Markicevic's impecuniosity.

The applicants, engineering consultants, sought a declaration that they were entitled to a defence and indemnity from the respondent insurer under a construction insurance policy for underlying actions alleging negligence and nuisance arising from a shoring system design.

The insurer denied coverage based on a professional services exclusion.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the nuisance claims were based on acts arising out of the rendering of professional services, and therefore the exclusion clause clearly and unambiguously applied to preclude the duty to defend.

The self-represented appellant commenced a dental malpractice action against the respondent dentists.

The respondents moved for summary judgment on the basis that the appellant had not delivered an expert report supporting her claim, but the respondents themselves did not file any expert evidence regarding the standard of care.

The motion judge granted summary judgment and dismissed the action.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the moving party defendants failed to discharge their evidentiary burden under Rule 20 to put their best foot forward by adducing evidence on the merits of their defence.

Over Z LLC brought a motion for contempt against N-Krypt International Corp. for failing to comply with a consent order requiring the production of audited financial statements, an accounting of investment, and other documents by specific deadlines.

N-Krypt admitted non-compliance but argued good faith, citing auditor delays due to tax season and an interpretation dispute regarding the accounting.

The court, applying the principles from Carey v. Laiken, found that N-Krypt acted in good faith and exercised its discretion to dismiss the contempt motion.

N-Krypt's cross-motion for directions to extend deadlines and schedule a new shareholders' meeting was allowed.

Costs were deferred pending N-Krypt's compliance with the new order.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their claims against the respondent in his personal capacity and as estate trustee for their parents' estates.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred in finding no secret trust existed, in concluding the respondent did not hold a property in trust, and by intervening during testimony in a way that created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence and credibility, and concluding the single intervention did not meet the threshold for bias.

Livent Inc., through its special receiver, sued its former auditor, Deloitte & Touche, for negligence and breach of contract in failing to detect a massive fraud perpetrated by Livent's senior management.

The trial judge found Deloitte negligent in its conduct of the 1997 audit and awarded Livent $118 million in damages.

Deloitte appealed, arguing that the ex turpi causa and corporate identification doctrines barred the claim, and that its negligence did not cause the losses.

Livent cross-appealed the trial judge's refusal to award damages for the 1996 audit and the 25% reduction for contingencies.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, holding that the ex turpi causa doctrine could not shield an auditor from liability for failing to detect the very fraud it was engaged to uncover, and that Deloitte's negligence was the proximate cause of Livent's increased liabilities.

The applicant obtained a default judgment for fraud against the respondents regarding a tax loss allocation scheme.

He subsequently obtained an ex parte order under s. 101 of the Courts of Justice Act appointing a receiver over the respondents' assets.

Through further ex parte applications, the receivership was expanded into a broad investigative receivership freezing the assets of 43 additional non-party individuals and entities to protect the interests of thousands of other investors.

The Court of Appeal set aside the orders, holding that while s. 101 permits investigative receiverships in appropriate circumstances, the orders here were unjustifiably overreaching and went beyond protecting the applicant's judgment recovery.

The appellant sub-tenant appealed a trial judgment ordering him to pay $18,060.42 in realty tax arrears to the respondent Township.

The appellant argued that the sublease did not permit retroactive tax collection, that the Township lacked authority to sue for the arrears, and that the claim was barred by the doctrine of laches.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sublease clearly made the appellant responsible for all applicable realty taxes, the Township sued properly under the contract, and the delay in assessment was caused by the Municipal Property Assessment Corporation rather than the Township.