Jamie Joseph William Spotswood

The appellant, a licensed motorized ice cream vendor, was convicted and fined $2,000 for selling ice cream from his truck parked inside a school parking lot, contrary to a municipal by-law prohibiting sales within 30 metres of a school entrance.

On appeal, he argued the by-law only applied to the area outside the entrance and did not apply on private property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, applying the modern approach to statutory interpretation to find that 'within' creates a boundary that includes the area inside the entrance, and noting that the by-law regulates the vendor's licence conditions rather than the property itself.

In a receivership-related motion arising from alleged fraudulent investment activities, the receiver sought authorization to utilize frozen funds held by entities subject to prior court orders to pay ongoing investigation costs.

The court held that the circumstances differed from typical insolvency proceedings because many affected entities were not parties and no specific allegations had been pleaded against them.

Exercising discretion under the prior freezing order, the court declined to allow prepayment of the receiver’s investigative expenses from the frozen funds.

The court also rejected a request for a sealing order due to the strong presumption of open courts but granted a confidentiality order restricting the receiver from voluntarily providing information to tax or criminal authorities.

Costs were not awarded due to divided success.

The plaintiffs brought a motion under Rule 31.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking leave to examine a representative of the Royal Bank of Canada, a non-party, for discovery.

The action involved allegations that the defendant lender made representations regarding financing arrangements for hotel development projects, including construction financing to be provided by the bank.

The court held that the plaintiffs established that the bank likely possessed information relevant to material issues in the action, particularly regarding the financing proposal process and representations made by the defendant.

The court further found that the plaintiffs could not obtain the information from the defendants and that fairness required allowing the examination prior to trial.

Leave was granted to conduct a limited four-hour examination of the bank’s representative.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to set aside a registrar’s order dismissing a medical malpractice action as abandoned under Rule 48.15 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and to extend time for service of the statement of claim.

The action alleged negligent misdiagnosis and treatment resulting in severe brain damage following whole brain radiation administered on the basis of an incorrect MRI interpretation.

Applying the contextual analysis and the Reid factors, the court found the delay was attributable to inadvertence arising during a transition between counsel rather than solicitor negligence.

The defendants failed to demonstrate actual prejudice and presumptive prejudice was minimal given the short interval between the limitation expiry and notice of the claim.

The dismissal order was therefore set aside and the time for service extended.

Following a complex insurance dispute involving alleged arson and the destruction of artwork, the court determined the appropriate costs payable by the insurer to the plaintiff after two trials.

The court reviewed legal fees from multiple law firms and reduced several claimed amounts where work was unrelated to the litigation or where hourly rates were excessive for counsel’s level of experience.

Expert witness fees for an appraisal report valuing destroyed artwork were also scrutinized, with the court reducing the claimed preparation time and attributing only two‑thirds of the report’s cost to the litigation because part of the work related to the insurance proof of loss requirement.

The court rejected a claim for contractual interest of 2% per month on the expert’s fees but awarded prejudgment interest at the average annual statutory rate.

The defendant’s partial success on a punitive damages claim did not justify a reduction in the plaintiff’s costs.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice regarding the interpretation of an agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the application judge's analysis that Sections 8 and 2 of the agreement must be read together.

The court found the application judge's reasoning sufficient to dispose of the interpretative issue in favour of the respondents.