James W. Sloan

The defendant vendor brought a motion to strike the claim or, alternatively, for summary judgment dismissing an action alleging nondisclosure of a latent defect in a commercial property.

The purchaser relied on a newspaper article quoting a director of the vendor joking that the building was “haunted,” asserting that this indicated an undisclosed death or murder at the property.

The court held there was no evidence that a death had occurred and no evidence that the property suffered from any defect rendering it unfit or dangerous.

Allegations based on rumours of ghosts or property stigma did not constitute a latent defect requiring disclosure.

Summary judgment was granted as there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The defendants, representing 80% of the shareholders in a family business, brought a motion under section 248 of the Business Corporations Act seeking a compulsory buy-sell order to force the plaintiff, a 20% shareholder and widow of a deceased founder, to sell her shares.

The defendants argued that a deadlock existed because they did not want to share profits with a non-contributing shareholder.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the defendants' desire to avoid sharing profits equally with the plaintiff did not constitute oppressive conduct under the Act.

The plaintiff's cross-motion for a forensic accounting was also dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction to prevent the corporate defendant from dissipating the proceeds of the sale of three properties, fearing an inability to enforce a future judgment.

The plaintiff alleged that $400,000 from a promissory note was missing from the corporate defendant's accounts.

Applying the tests for interlocutory and Mareva injunctions, the court found a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm if the assets were dissipated, and that the balance of convenience favoured the plaintiff.

The court granted the injunction, subject to conditions allowing the corporate defendant to pay reasonable expenses related to the property sales.

The plaintiff moved for orders requiring a corporate defendant to disclose its intended use of proceeds from the sale of certain properties and for an interlocutory injunction preventing the dissipation of those proceeds pending trial.

The motion arose in the context of allegations that substantial funds from a promissory note owed to the corporation had disappeared from its accounts, raising concerns about potential asset dissipation and the plaintiff’s ability to enforce any future judgment.

Applying the principles governing Mareva-type injunctions and the interlocutory injunction framework from RJR‑MacDonald, the court found there was a serious issue to be tried and that irreparable harm could result if assets were dissipated.

The balance of convenience favoured preserving the funds.

The request for disclosure of intended use of the proceeds was denied, but an injunction restricting distribution of the sale proceeds was granted subject to limited permitted expenditures.

The defendant insurer brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s action for statutory accident benefits as statute‑barred.

The plaintiff sought non‑earner benefits following a motor vehicle accident but did not request mediation until several years after the insurer’s written refusal.

The court held that the insurer’s OCF‑9 form clearly denied the benefit and triggered the two‑year limitation period under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule and the Insurance Act.

Although the plaintiff argued the denial contained a misleading explanation and that she did not understand her entitlement, the court found that once she retained counsel in early 2006 she was deemed to know of the limitation period and her rights.

The mediation request and subsequent claim were therefore well outside the limitation period.

The action and the request to amend the claim to plead negligent misstatement were dismissed.

In a professional negligence action involving estate law advice, the plaintiff brought a refusals motion seeking answers to several undertakings and refusals arising from the examination for discovery of a senior lawyer at a defendant law firm.

The court held that questions seeking the lawyer’s legal opinion on the law were improper, as the applicable standard of care would be determined through expert evidence rather than the witness’s own interpretation.

However, certain questions concerning the witness’s personal interpretation of contractual language and matters central to the claim were ordered answered.

On the defendants’ cross‑motion, the court ordered production of all draft expert reports prepared by the plaintiff’s damages expert, preferring authority requiring disclosure of draft reports.

As success was divided, no order for costs was made.

The plaintiff moved for summary judgment to enforce a $500,000 promissory note and dismiss a counterclaim.

The defendants argued the claim was statute‑barred and asserted that the loan was actually an advance against partnership profits.

The court held that the promissory note constituted a demand obligation, such that the limitation period under the Limitation Act, 2002 began to run only when demand for payment was made.

The court rejected attempts to introduce parol evidence contradicting the clear written terms of the promissory note and found no genuine issue requiring a trial regarding the validity of the debt.

Summary judgment was granted on the promissory note, but the counterclaim was permitted to proceed.

The defendant subcontractor brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff general contractor’s action as statute‑barred under the Limitations Act.

The defendant argued the limitation period began when the plaintiff first learned of a roof leak after construction.

The court held that mere knowledge of damage was insufficient to trigger discoverability because the plaintiff did not yet know the cause or which subcontractor was responsible.

Given the need for investigation and conflicting expert reports regarding responsibility for the leakage, the court found the limitation period had not necessarily commenced on the date the defect was first reported.

The motion to dismiss the action as out of time was therefore denied.

Following the dismissal of an alleged emergency motion in a family proceeding, the responding party sought costs.

The court considered written submissions from both parties regarding entitlement and quantum.

Finding that the responding party was required to prepare materials and attend court to respond to the unsuccessful motion, the court held that costs were warranted.

Costs were fixed in a lump sum inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The applicant sought judicial review of two arbitration awards dealing with return to work grievances following a strike by academic staff.

The arbitration board had concluded that the collective agreement's workload provisions did not apply and developed its own principles to award additional compensation.

The Divisional Court found the board's decision unreasonable, as it ignored the language of the Return to Work Protocol and the collective agreement, which did not confer jurisdiction to create new compensation criteria.

The application for judicial review was granted, the awards were quashed, and the grievances were remitted to a different arbitration board.

The applicants sought judicial review to quash a decision by the City's General Manager of Parks, Forestry and Recreation to close an off-leash dog area in Ledbury Park.

The General Manager closed the area due to unresolved conflicts between park users and adjacent residents.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the decision was reasonable and that the General Manager appropriately balanced competing community interests.

The court also held that the applicants were accorded adequate procedural fairness given the policy nature of the decision.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision finding it had discriminated against a former employee on the basis of disability.

The employer argued the employee's shoulder injury was not a disability, the Tribunal made factual errors, and the Tribunal was biased.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the Tribunal's finding of disability was reasonable, the factual errors were immaterial, and the findings in favour of the employee did not raise a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appellant sought to appeal a final order declaring a solicitor-client relationship and remitting the matter to an assessment officer.

The Divisional Court quashed the appeal, holding that its jurisdiction under sections 19(1)(a) and 19(1.1) of the Courts of Justice Act is limited to appeals from monetary awards.

As the judgment appealed from was not a monetary award, the court lacked jurisdiction.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Board of the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario refusing its application for a liquor licence.

The Divisional Court found the Board's decision unreasonable because, although it correctly stated the onus was on the objectors to prove the licence was against the public interest, it failed to apply that test and balance the evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the decision set aside, and the matter remitted for a new hearing.

The applicant school board sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision finding that Human Resources Secretaries were not excluded from the bargaining unit under s. 1(3)(b) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995.

The Divisional Court held that the Board reasonably interpreted the provision as requiring the confidential capacity to relate to the specific bargaining unit in which the employee would be a member, to avoid a conflict of loyalty.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The applicant physician sought judicial review of two decisions by the Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario.

The Committee required the applicant to appear for a caution, complete a course on medical record keeping, and undergo an educational program and practice assessment.

The applicant argued the decisions were unreasonable and relied on an investigator who was not a true peer.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Committee's decisions were reasonable and within the range of acceptable outcomes given the concerns about the applicant's record keeping and complementary medicine practice.

The plaintiff brought an action seeking recovery of funds allegedly invested in two restaurant ventures with the defendant, asserting that the parties were equal partners and that the defendant retained proceeds and investments without accounting.

The defendant denied the existence of a partnership in the first venture and argued that the plaintiff was merely an investor in the second.

The court assessed conflicting evidence and found the defendant’s testimony unreliable, concluding that the plaintiff had invested substantial funds and that the defendant had been unjustly enriched.

The court held that the plaintiff was a partner or investor in both ventures and entitled to recover the invested amounts.

Judgment was granted for the plaintiff, subject to the Small Claims Court monetary jurisdictional limit.

The accused brought a motion to sever multiple drug trafficking and possession for the purpose of trafficking counts so that each would be tried separately before a jury.

The defence argued that the accused intended to testify on some counts but not others and that a joint trial would undermine the right to remain silent by exposing the accused to cross‑examination on all counts.

Applying the interests of justice framework from R. v. Last, the court considered both the accused’s fair trial rights and society’s interest in efficient proceedings.

The court concluded that trying the possession counts together with the earlier trafficking counts could create unfairness if the accused chose to testify on some counts but not others.

Counts 3 and 4 were severed from counts 1 and 2, while counts 1 and 2 remained joined for trial.

Following several days of motion proceedings in a civil action, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The judge found that both sides engaged in blameworthy conduct that wasted court time and caused unnecessary expense, including inadequate particularization of a motion and delayed production of a redacted response to a demand for particulars.

After the production of the redacted response, the majority of the hearing time was spent on the applicants’ motion to strike the entire action, which the court dismissed.

The court concluded that substantial indemnity costs were not appropriate but awarded the respondent partial indemnity costs for the motion.

Costs were fixed at $22,138.96, representing four-fifths of the amount requested, payable at the end of trial.

Following a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claim against landlord defendants, the court considered the issue of costs.

The plaintiffs had alleged that the defendants owed a statutory duty as landlords related to liquor licence liability insurance, but failed to identify supporting legislation and proceeded despite a settlement offer to dismiss the action without costs.

The court found the plaintiffs continued litigation despite the weakness of their position and the high likelihood of dismissal.

While expressing sympathy for the injuries alleged, the court held the moving parties were entitled to costs.

Costs were fixed at $10,000 plus disbursements.