James F. Diamond

The plaintiff, Antonio Marques, was terminated without cause by the defendant, Delmar International Inc., after 7.5 months of employment.

The parties brought a motion for summary judgment to determine three issues: whether a monthly car allowance was part of the plaintiff's remuneration, whether the plaintiff was entitled to a guaranteed bonus payment as part of wrongful dismissal damages, and the amount of common law reasonable notice.

The court found the car allowance was part of remuneration.

The bonus was conditional on the notice period extending to the one-year anniversary of employment.

The court awarded 4 months' reasonable notice, which did not extend to the one-year anniversary, thus disentitling the plaintiff to the bonus.

The appellant, who has a long history of schizophrenia, appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming her treating physician's finding that she was incapable of consenting to anti-psychotic medication.

The appellant argued the Board failed to consider her preference for homeopathic treatments and her views on the traditional medical model.

The Superior Court of Justice applied a reasonableness standard of review and upheld the Board's decision, finding ample evidence that the appellant's mental illness prevented her from recognizing her condition and appreciating the reasonably foreseeable consequences of refusing treatment.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion to strike portions of the plaintiffs' Amended Statement of Claim, which alleged defamation, injurious falsehood, and intentional interference with economic relations.

The court struck the paragraphs alleging a 'campaign of defamation' because the plaintiffs failed to plead a coherent body of fact regarding the defamatory statements.

The court declined to strike the pleadings of malice and injurious falsehood, finding they did not necessarily encroach upon solicitor-client privilege.

The court struck the claim for intentional interference with economic relations, as no duty of care was owed to the third parties, but granted leave to amend.

This action was referred to the court under Rule 2.1.01(7) following a request by the Children's Aid Society of London and Middlesex under Rule 2.1.01(6) to dismiss the proceeding as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The court had previously stayed the proceeding pending a response from the plaintiffs regarding the contemplated dismissal.

Upon reviewing the plaintiffs' written response, the court found the action to be without merit.

The claims appeared identical to those previously dismissed and some defendants were legally protected from civil lawsuits.

Consequently, the court dismissed the action as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The defendants brought a motion to strike portions of the plaintiff's original and amended statements of claim, arguing that the human rights damages claim was defective and that amendments constituted a new cause of action barred by the Limitations Act.

The court found that the human rights claim was sufficiently pleaded and that it was not plain and obvious that the limitation period had expired for the human rights damages claim.

The court also declined to strike allegations of bad faith damages.

The motion was dismissed.

The plaintiffs appealed a Master's order compelling them to answer questions during an examination in aid of execution.

The questions related to the plaintiffs' financial affairs, including the Marhaban Trust and proceeds from a quota sale, and the business affairs of non-parties.

The appeal argued that there was insufficient evidence to link the plaintiffs to the non-parties' property and that the Master's reasons were inadequate.

The court upheld the Master's decision, finding sufficient evidence of a connection between the plaintiffs and the Marhaban Trust and other associated companies, and that the Master's reasons were adequate.

A minor amendment was made to the scope of one question.

Lixo Investments Limited applied for relief concerning demolition work by FCHT Holdings on an adjacent property, particularly regarding a shared party wall damaged by a prior fire.

The application sought damages for loss of use and reconstruction costs, alleging FCHT was responsible for pre-acquisition fire effects and negligent demolition.

The court dismissed claims related to pre-acquisition events, finding FCHT did not inherit prior tortious conduct.

For claims regarding FCHT's demolition work and its impact on the party wall, the court found material facts in dispute requiring viva voce evidence and expert testimony.

Consequently, the balance of the application was converted into an expedited action for trial.

The plaintiff, Mancini Associates LLP, obtained a judgment against the defendant Anthony Guido for $29,413.15 plus prejudgment interest.

This decision concerns the subsequent costs award.

The court found that the plaintiff was entitled to costs on a partial indemnity basis up to the date of its offer to settle and on a substantial indemnity basis thereafter, as the defendant failed to accept an offer to settle for the judgment amount.

Applying Rule 57.01 factors, the court awarded the plaintiff $40,000 in all-inclusive costs, deeming the plaintiff's requested amount of $64,537.28 to be partially excessive, particularly regarding hours claimed and non-recoverable expenses related to other defendants.

At a case conference, the court addressed the self-represented plaintiff's failure to deliver a Fresh As Amended Statement of Claim combining allegations from three separate proceedings by the previously ordered deadline.

The plaintiff delivered a 130-page draft just prior to the conference that merely expanded one proceeding rather than combining them.

The court granted a final extension to May 6, 2016, to deliver the combined pleading, after which the defendants may bring motions for summary judgment or to strike.

Costs of the attendance were awarded to the defendants in the cause due to the plaintiff's delay.

The defendant brought a motion to preclude the plaintiff's expert witness, W. Steve Prince, from testifying regarding the commercial viability of an insurance policy.

The defendant argued Prince's opinion evidence was unnecessary and irrelevant, particularly concerning policy interpretation and profitability assumptions.

The court dismissed the motion, finding Prince's evidence potentially relevant to counter the defendant's assertion that such a policy was "absurd" in 1982, and also relevant if the legal remedy of rectification were required to assess the potential unconscionability of allowing the policy to remain in place.

The court initiated a review under Rule 2.1.01 to consider dismissing an action for damages, totaling over $970 million, against multiple defendants including a Children's Aid Society, a judge, and legal services.

The action was deemed potentially frivolous, vexatious, and an an abuse of process, given its similarity to previously dismissed claims and the immunity of some defendants.

The court directed the registrar to issue a notice of intent to dismiss and stayed the action pending a written hearing.

The plaintiff brought a motion requesting an order to transfer the proceeding into case management, which the defendants opposed.

The court considered the factors under Rule 77.05(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including the complexity of issues, public importance, number of parties, anticipated court intervention, discovery time, and any substantial delay.

Despite the proceeding being over two years old and ongoing disagreements between the parties regarding discovery and amendments, the court found no substantial delay or demonstrated need for court intervention to warrant case management at that time.

The plaintiff's request for case management was dismissed, but the court ordered all parties to deliver sworn affidavits of documents and Schedule "A" productions by a specific date to facilitate the progression of discovery.

The plaintiff law firm, Mancini Associates LLP, sued its former clients, Perpetual Income Producing Enterprises Inc. (PIPE), Armando Orefice, and Anthony Guido, for unpaid legal invoices totaling $29,413.15.

Default judgment was obtained against PIPE and Orefice.

The trial proceeded against Guido, who had signed a retainer agreement and verbally agreed to be jointly and severally liable for the fees.

Guido defended by alleging breach of solicitor-client relationship"sharp practices" and that he signed the retainer under duress.

The court found Guido's retainer agreement valid and enforceable, rejecting the duress claim and his assertion that his obligations ceased when the plaintiff threatened to terminate its retainer with PIPE/Orefice.

The court also found no failure to mitigate by the plaintiff in not pursuing a charging order for a $10,000 costs award against a third party (TD Bank).

Judgment was granted in favor of the plaintiff against Guido for the full amount plus pre-judgment interest.

The defendant bank successfully brought a motion for summary judgment and sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, relying on two offers to settle.

The court found that the defendant's second offer, which required the plaintiff to resign and forfeit ongoing long-term disability benefits, superseded the first offer.

Because the value of the ongoing benefits was unknown, the defendant could not prove the summary judgment dismissal was more favourable than the second offer.

The court awarded the defendant costs of the motion and the action on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $57,500 inclusive.

The applicant, Covanta, brought an application to set aside an arbitrator's decision to join two subcontractors to an ongoing arbitration between Covanta and the general contractor.

The arbitrator had joined the subcontractors under Article 17(5) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.

Covanta argued the arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction because the subcontractors were not parties to the arbitration agreement.

The Superior Court of Justice held that the arbitrator's decision was jurisdictional in nature and subject to review on a standard of correctness.

The Court found that the subcontractors were not parties to the arbitration agreement, as the subcontract did not properly incorporate the arbitration clause by reference.

The Court set aside the arbitrator's ruling and awarded costs of $50,000 to the applicant.

The self-represented plaintiff failed to comply with a court order to deliver a Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim by the specified deadline.

The defendants subsequently sought to schedule a motion to strike the pleadings.

The case management judge scheduled an in-person case conference to address the breach.

The plaintiff requested an adjournment due to a newly discovered scheduling conflict in Small Claims Court.

The court denied the adjournment, ordering the case conference to proceed as scheduled and noting that the Superior Court proceedings should take priority.

The applicant condominium corporation sought a compliance order against a unit owner who carried out extensive, unauthorized renovations that altered the common elements.

The respondent argued the application was barred because the applicant failed to mediate or arbitrate the dispute first.

The court held that mediation is not required for disputes regarding initial compliance with section 98 of the Condominium Act.

The court granted the compliance order, allowing the applicant to inspect the unit and restore the common elements, but found insufficient evidence to order a full repair of the unit under section 92.

The statutory third party, Economical Mutual Insurance Company, brought a motion for leave to serve and file a jury notice after the close of pleadings.

The parties had previously entered into a consent judgment settling the plaintiffs' damages and agreeing that the remaining insurance coverage issues would be tried by a judge.

The court found that the third party's motion was a tactical attempt to avoid the consequences of the consent judgment and have the issue of the defendant's intent tried by a jury.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that granting leave would rewrite the terms of the consent judgment and cause substantive prejudice to the responding insurer.

The defendants brought an urgent motion to set aside a default judgment and writ of possession obtained by the plaintiffs after the defendants defaulted on their mortgage.

The court applied the five-part test for setting aside a default judgment.

While the defendants had a plausible excuse for their delay, the court found they had no arguable defence on the merits, as the interest calculations were standard and the three-month interest penalty was valid.

The motion was dismissed, though the default judgment was varied on consent to remove $1,875 in administrative fees.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming his involuntary admission to a hospital.

Prior to the appeal hearing, the certificate of involuntary admission expired and the appellant was discharged.

The respondent brought a preliminary motion to declare the appeal moot.

The court granted the motion, finding no live controversy existed and declining to exercise its discretion to hear the case, as future proceedings based on the Board's findings were too speculative.