Ivan S. Bloom

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding spousal support, child support, and section 7 expenses.

He argued the trial judge erred by imputing income based on his rental income without deducting the expenses incurred to earn that income, and by failing to apply the shared custody provisions of the Child Support Guidelines.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge's failure to address the rental expenses contained in the appellant's tax returns constituted a significant misapprehension of evidence and an error in principle.

The court ordered a new trial to determine the appellant's income, spousal support, child support, and section 7 expenses.

The accused was tried on a charge of sexual assault arising from allegations by his spouse shortly after she arrived in Canada through immigration sponsorship.

The case turned entirely on credibility and reliability.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court found weaknesses in the complainant's evidence, including evasiveness in cross-examination, lack of detail on central events, and the absence of any allegation of sexual assault when privately questioned by a police officer.

Although the accused's evidence contained contradictions that prevented outright acceptance, it nevertheless raised a reasonable doubt in the context of the whole record.

The accused was acquitted.

The appellants, former tenants, appealed a Small Claims Court judgment awarding the respondent landlord rental arrears, repair costs, and costs.

The appellants argued the Landlord and Tenant Board had exclusive jurisdiction because the landlord had served a Form N4 Notice to End a Tenancy.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that under section 87 of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006, the Board loses jurisdiction to hear an application for rental arrears once the tenants vacate the premises, thereby giving the Small Claims Court jurisdiction.

The court also upheld the trial judge's costs award.

The applicant brought an application seeking damages for wrongful dismissal and unpaid RRSP contributions, arguing he was terminated without cause and entitled to three months' severance under his employment contract.

The respondent employer argued the termination was for just cause due to the applicant's abusive behaviour towards subordinates, and sought to have the application converted to an action and dismissed via summary judgment.

The court found that material facts regarding the alleged misconduct were in dispute and required credibility assessments that could not be resolved on a paper record.

Consequently, the court ordered the entire application to proceed to trial.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set a timetable for trial, while the defendants sought to dismiss the action for delay.

The plaintiff's lawyer cited medical and practice issues to explain the delay, which the court found lacked particularity.

Furthermore, a key defendant who provided independent legal advice had suffered a stroke and severe memory loss during the delay, causing non-compensable prejudice.

The court applied the Faris test and dismissed the action for delay.

Sentencing decision following jury convictions for multiple serious sexual offences committed against three young complainants, including sexual assault, sexual exploitation, and sexual interference in a parental or trust context.

The court considered Gladue principles because the offender asserted Aboriginal ancestry, but found the evidentiary record insufficient to identify meaningful background factors or culturally appropriate sanctions.

Given the aggravated, repeated, and highly invasive nature of the offences, the court held that denunciation, deterrence, and separation from society predominated.

A total sentence of eight years was imposed, reduced by pre-sentence custody credit to 6 years and 326 days, together with multiple ancillary orders and victim surcharges.

The applicants sought declaratory and injunctive relief regarding an express right of way over the respondents' adjacent property.

The applicants were renovating their building, which required altering doors that accessed the right of way to comply with fire regulations.

The respondents blocked access to these doors and changed locks on the first floor.

The court found that the easement had not been abandoned and that the applicants' renovations fell within their ancillary rights under the easement.

The court granted a declaration that the easement was valid and ordered an injunction preventing the respondents from interfering with the applicants' use of the right of way.

The defendant moved to set aside a default judgment obtained by the plaintiff bank for a credit card debt.

The defendant argued he had an arguable defence of equitable set-off, alleging the plaintiff intentionally interfered with payments owed to him under a separate settlement agreement involving his company.

The court found that while the defendant did not move promptly or provide a plausible excuse for the default, he successfully established an arguable defence of equitable set-off.

The court concluded it was just to relieve the defendant from the consequences of his default and set aside the judgment.

The defendants brought a motion for security for costs.

The plaintiffs conceded entitlement but disputed the quantum and requested payment in instalments.

The court noted the plaintiffs' history of non-payment of prior costs awards and concerns about the merits of their case due to related proceedings.

The court ordered security for costs in the amount of $93,419.70, deducting anticipated trial and mediation costs, payable in three instalments.

The defendants and the plaintiff brought cross-motions regarding whether the plaintiff's daughter could attend the plaintiff's cross-examination as a moral support person.

The underlying action involved allegations of elder abuse and a disputed property transfer.

The court found that while a support person could be appropriate given the plaintiff's age and anxiety, the daughter was not an appropriate person.

Because the plaintiff lived with the daughter and might feel pressured to tailor her evidence to please her caregiver, the daughter's presence would create a danger of substantive unfairness.

The defendants' motion was granted and the plaintiff's cross-motion was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court judgment awarding the respondents $10,000 plus interest and costs based on a promissory note.

The appellant argued the note was unenforceable, the claim was statute-barred, and the corporate defendant should not be liable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusions that the promissory note was valid, the limitation period had not expired, and both appellants were liable as makers of the note.

The moving parties (Peel Housing Corporation and The Corporation of the Regional Municipality of Peel) sought summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's (Jacqueline Barrett) action for damages due to alleged arsenic fume exposure.

The plaintiff failed to provide admissible medical evidence to support her claim, specifically an affidavit from her family doctor despite court orders, leading to an adverse inference.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial and granted summary judgment, dismissing the action.

The alternative motion for security for costs was not addressed.

The defendants sought leave to appeal an order compelling them to answer questions refused during an examination in aid of execution.

They also requested an extension of time to file the notice of motion for leave to appeal and a stay of the order pending appeal.

The court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that neither branch of the test under Rule 62.02(4) was met.

There was no conflicting decision on a matter of principle, and no serious doubt about the correctness of the order, nor did the proposed appeal raise matters of general importance beyond the immediate parties.

Consequently, the requests for an extension of time and a stay were also dismissed.

The defendant moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action as statute-barred by the Limitations Act, 2002, concerning unpaid pension contributions.

The court found that the plaintiff ought to have known that litigation was an appropriate means to remedy her claim by October 27, 2011, given clear denials of liability from the defendant and the plaintiff's representation by counsel.

As the action was commenced on September 10, 2015, it was outside the two-year limitation period.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, and the action was dismissed.

The Superior Court of Justice issued a costs endorsement following the dismissal of an action challenging a will.

The defendant, Constance McCron, sought substantial indemnity costs from the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs argued for costs from the estate or that each party bear their own.

The court applied the modern approach to estate litigation costs, noting that while the plaintiffs had reasonable grounds to question the will's validity (suspicious circumstances, testator's susceptibility), their claim was ultimately statute-barred.

The defendant's request for costs was denied due to her misleading evidence regarding the testator's mental state.

Ultimately, the court ordered that each party bear their own costs.

The plaintiffs challenged the validity of Constantin Birtzu's 2006 will, alleging lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence by his daughter, Constance McCron, who was the sole beneficiary.

They also sought a constructive trust over property and an accounting of assets.

The court found the action statute-barred due to the expiration of the limitation period.

Despite this, the court proceeded to address the merits, finding that the defendants successfully proved testamentary capacity and that the plaintiffs failed to prove undue influence.

The court upheld the 2006 will and dismissed the action.

The accused was convicted by a jury of fraud over $5000 for his role in a scheme involving fake loans and unreturned due diligence fees totaling over $500,000 USD.

The court found the accused played a lesser role than his co-conspirator but still lied to victims, causing significant financial and personal harm.

Emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence for large-scale frauds, the court determined a fit sentence was 3 years' imprisonment, which was reduced to time served due to pre-sentence custody credit.

A restitution order for 50% of the loss ($341,263.04 CAD) was also imposed.

The applicant brought a family law proceeding which the respondent argued was statute-barred under s. 7(3)(b) of the Family Law Act.

The respondent claimed the parties separated in 2001, while the applicant claimed they separated in 2009.

The court examined the parties' living arrangements, travel, and communications to determine when they separated with no reasonable prospect of resuming cohabitation.

The court found the parties continued to cohabit until June 30, 2007, meaning the applicant's 2010 proceeding was commenced well within the six-year limitation period.

The plaintiff, as assignee of a trustee in bankruptcy, brought a motion for summary judgment to recover $217,500 from the bankrupt's spouse.

The bankrupt had used his share of the proceeds from the sale of a jointly owned property to pay down the mortgage on a property purchased solely by his spouse.

The court found that the transfer was a transfer at undervalue under s. 96 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The court rejected the spouse's argument that they were dealing at arm's length, noting that spouses are presumed not to act at arm's length and her self-serving affidavit lacked supporting detail to rebut the presumption.

Summary judgment was granted.

The applicant storage company sought a declaration that an initial certificate issued to the respondent insurer under s. 24 of the Repair and Storage Liens Act was null and void.

The applicant argued the insurer lacked standing because it had not yet indemnified the insured for the total loss of her vehicle.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the insurer had assumed liability for the storage fees under the insurance contract and was therefore subrogated to the insured's rights under s. 278(1) of the Insurance Act, giving it standing as a person lawfully entitled to the automobile.