Ikdeep Singh

The applicants, Mahmoud Al-Ramahi and Atour Paul, sought a stay of proceedings or exclusion of evidence under ss. 24(1) and 24(2) of the Charter, alleging improper interception and handling of solicitor-client privileged communications during a wiretap investigation ("Project Siphon").

Al-Ramahi claimed widespread violations of his ss. 7 and 8 Charter rights due to intercepted audio calls and text messages with his lawyers.

Paul joined the application, arguing the overbroad search and "unfair advantage" to police affected him.

The court found that Al-Ramahi failed to prove improper interception or handling of audio calls but succeeded in demonstrating that his privileged text messages were improperly accessed and handled, breaching his ss. 7 and 8 rights.

The court dismissed the request for a stay of proceedings, finding it too drastic, but ordered the exclusion of all of Al-Ramahi's text messages intercepted after May 29, 2020.

Paul's application was dismissed as he did not suffer a breach of his own Charter rights and lacked standing to claim a remedy based on breaches of another's rights.

The accused, Japdeep Randhawa, brought an application under sections 123 and 119(2) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) seeking access to the complainant M.S.S.'s youth records.

The court ruled that access was governed by section 123(1) of the YCJA.

The application was granted, as the court found that Randhawa had a valid and substantial interest in the records to make full answer and defence, particularly given the serious charges involving a handgun and M.S.S.'s prior youth convictions related to an imitation firearm and threats.

The court balanced M.S.S.'s privacy interests against Randhawa's constitutional right to full answer and defence, concluding that the latter prevailed.

Specific redactions were ordered for personal information and references to other non-witness young persons.

The Crown brought an application to admit evidence of the accused's other discreditable conduct in a criminal trial for extortion, uttering threats, assault, sexual assault, and distributing an intimate image.

The proposed evidence included the accused's marital status, gambling problem, reputation for violence, and suicidal threats/attempts.

The court ruled on the admissibility of this evidence, applying the test for discreditable conduct.

The court found all proposed evidence admissible, including the suicide-related conduct, determining its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect, subject to appropriate jury instructions against propensity reasoning.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation of a conveyance and having an excess blood alcohol concentration (BAC) within two hours of ceasing to operate a vehicle.

The defendant brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b).

The court found no violations of sections 8 and 9, concluding that the police had reasonable grounds for arrest and breath demand.

However, the court found an impermissible delay in providing the defendant's section 10(b) right to counsel, but ultimately decided not to exclude the breath sample results under section 24(2) of the Charter, weighing the minor nature of the breach against society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

On the merits, the court acquitted the defendant of impaired operation but found him guilty of having an excess BAC, rejecting the "bolus drinking" defence under s. 320.14(5) of the Criminal Code due to lack of expert evidence.

The Peel Regional Police Service applied for a stay of a disclosure order pending an application for leave to appeal directly to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The disclosure order required the Crown to provide the investigative files of a police officer, who was charged with unrelated offences, to the accused as first-party disclosure.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and found that there was a serious question to be determined, the applicant would suffer irreparable harm if the appeal became moot, and the balance of convenience favoured granting the stay.

The stay was granted, subject to terms regarding its expiration.

The applicants, Dyllan Ali and Diquan Taylor, facing firearms and drug trafficking charges, brought a motion for disclosure of the full contents of disciplinary and criminal investigation files relating to Constable Sean Osborne, a key police witness.

The court dismissed the request for disclosure of files related to past disciplinary findings, citing principles of finality and lack of demonstrated likely relevance.

However, the court granted the request for disclosure of investigative files related to Constable Osborne's outstanding criminal charges for assault and obstruction of justice, finding them "obviously relevant" to the applicants' Charter application and trial, particularly concerning the officer's credibility and potential propensity for misconduct.

Ms. Blake sought a stay of proceedings under sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter, alleging pre-charge delay and lost evidence prejudiced her right to a fair trial.

The court found no evidence of egregious Crown conduct or bad faith.

It determined that Ms. Blake failed to prove actual prejudice, as the lost evidence (cell phone communications, business documentation, and an initial police statement from Mr. Ocran) did not prevent her from presenting a defence, even if it made it more difficult.

The court also noted that some evidence was never in state possession and that police are not obligated to pursue specific defence-directed investigations.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The Crown brought an application for summary dismissal of the accused's application for a stay of proceedings, which alleged breaches of Charter ss. 7 and 11(d).

The Crown argued that the accused had failed to comply with the Criminal Proceedings Rules by filing a revised factum and new book of authorities late, expanding her arguments, and intending to call a new witness without sufficient notice.

The court dismissed the Crown's application for summary dismissal, finding that the accused's application had merit and that it was in the interests of justice to allow the accused to rely on her revised materials and call the witness, provided the Crown was given adequate time to respond.

The court balanced the accused's right to present her case with the Crown's right to respond and the need for an expeditious trial.

During a criminal trial for fraud, the accused, Claire Graham and Roslyn Blake, moved for a mistrial and the discharge of two jurors (Juror 1 and Juror 4) due to alleged misconduct involving outside research.

The Crown opposed the motion.

The court found that while Jurors 1 and 4 technically breached instructions by researching the lawyers involved, their conduct was not egregious enough to compromise trial fairness or cause actual prejudice.

The court distinguished their actions from a previously discharged juror (Juror 12) who had researched an accused and was found to be less than candid.

The requests for discharge and a mistrial were dismissed, with the court determining that a strong mid-trial instruction to the jury was the appropriate remedy.

The offender was convicted of five counts of impaired driving causing bodily harm and one count each of impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol.

On July 22, 2018, while driving at excessive speed (157-159 km/h) on the QEW with a blood alcohol concentration between 100-155 mg/100mL, the offender struck a vehicle containing five occupants, causing serious and lasting injuries to all victims.

The Crown sought a three-year penitentiary sentence, while the defence sought a 90-day intermittent sentence.

The court imposed a two-year penitentiary sentence, finding that while the offender had mitigating factors including genuine remorse and rehabilitation prospects, the gravity of the offence, the severity of victims' injuries, and the paramount sentencing objectives of deterrence and denunciation required a substantial custodial sentence.

The defendant, Leonard Boucher, was charged with sexual assault, unlawful confinement, and uttering a threat to kill D.A. The trial involved conflicting testimonies from D.A. and Mr. Boucher regarding consensual sexual activity, payment, and alleged threats.

The court found D.A.'s evidence lacked credibility due to inconsistencies and the absence of crucial phone records.

Mr. Boucher's evidence also presented serious credibility issues due to prior convictions for dishonesty and inconsistencies in his police statement.

Ultimately, the court concluded that the Crown failed to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to Mr. Boucher's acquittal on all counts.

The accused was charged with 18 driving-related offences arising from a rear-end collision on the Queen Elizabeth Way in which five occupants of the struck vehicle suffered bodily harm.

The Crown alleged dangerous driving, impaired driving, and driving with excess blood alcohol.

The court found the accused not guilty of dangerous driving but guilty of all counts of impaired operation and driving with excess blood alcohol.

The court rejected the defence theory that the struck vehicle moved into the accused's path, finding instead that the accused misjudged the distance while attempting to pass and that his impairment caused the collision.

The offender was found guilty of simple assault after initiating a brawl outside a nightclub.

Although the victim suffered severe stab wounds, the court found that another individual inflicted those injuries while the offender was pinned to the ground.

The Crown sought 30 days incarceration or a 60-day conditional sentence, while the defence sought a conditional discharge.

Emphasizing the offender's positive pre-sentence report, lack of prior record, and the principle of proportionality, the court granted a conditional discharge with six months of probation and 50 hours of community service.

The applicants sought a stay of fraud charges due to the loss of a video-taped complainant statement, arguing a breach of their Charter rights to full answer and defence.

The court found the Crown breached section 7 of the Charter due to unacceptable police negligence in preserving the evidence, as a clear policy for making copies was not followed and no explanation was provided for the loss.

However, the court determined that the applicants failed to demonstrate substantial or material prejudice, or an inability to put forward their defence, given the availability of other extensive disclosure.

Consequently, the application for a stay was dismissed, but the court deemed an adverse inference instruction to the jury appropriate as a lesser remedy.

Michael Sapiano was charged with aggravated assault against Kenneth Kotzan, claiming self-defence.

The court heard testimony from the complainant, an independent witness (Maxine Kidd), and the accused.

The court found the accused's testimony lacked credibility due to animosity towards the complainant, a criminal record for dishonesty, and direct contradictions by the independent witness.

Despite some inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence, it was largely corroborated by the independent witness on critical issues.

The court concluded that the Crown proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, rejecting the self-defence claim, and found the accused guilty of aggravated assault.

The applicant brought a motion to stay proceedings based on an alleged breach of the right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The applicant argued that the net delay exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown argued that the net delay fell below the ceiling once defence delay and judicial deliberation time were subtracted, and alternatively that discrete events should be excluded.

The court found that after subtracting defence delay and judicial deliberation time, the remaining delay was approximately 20 months, exceeding the presumptive ceiling.

However, the court found that the trial continuation periods constituted discrete exceptional events that should be excluded, bringing the remaining delay below the ceiling.

The applicant failed to demonstrate defence initiative or that the delay was unreasonable.

The application to stay proceedings was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol (over 80 mg/100 mL).

Following a traffic stop for speeding, the defendant failed an approved screening device test and was arrested.

At the police station, the defendant requested to speak with his lawyer of choice.

After multiple unsuccessful attempts by the officer to contact the lawyer, the officer proceeded with Intoxilyzer testing without offering the defendant the option to contact duty counsel or another lawyer.

The defendant did not speak with counsel before providing breath samples.

The court found that the defendant's Charter right to counsel under section 10(b) was violated and excluded the breath test evidence under section 24(2), resulting in an acquittal.

The accused was charged with three counts of breach of probation for allegedly contacting his wife and children in violation of probation orders.

The first allegation occurred on July 7, 2014, but the information was not sworn until July 21, 2017.

The accused was arrested on March 11, 2017.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter motion arguing his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been violated.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while the total delay exceeded the Jordan presumptive ceiling of 18 months, the pre-arrest delay qualified as a discrete event attributable to exceptional circumstances, as the police acted with reasonable diligence in attempting to locate the accused.

Additionally, the accused's failure to appear at trial demonstrated he was not genuinely exercising his 11(b) rights.

The accused was charged with driving with excess alcohol in his system and impaired operation of a motor vehicle following a motor vehicle collision at 2 a.m. on July 4, 2016.

The accused sought Charter relief on two grounds: first, that police lacked sufficient grounds for detention in violation of s. 9 Charter rights, and second, that police breached s. 10(a) and (b) Charter rights by delaying the provision of rights to counsel.

The court found that the initial arrest was lawful based on objective grounds including the smell of alcohol, red eyes, and the context of a severe collision.

The court found a breach of s. 10(b) rights due to a five-minute delay in providing rights to counsel after a second officer arrived on scene, but found the breath demand was lawful and the evidence admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was found guilty of both charges.

The defendant was charged with driving with excess alcohol following a traffic stop in a parking lot.

The Crown's case relied on breath test results.

The defendant, self-represented, raised a Charter breach under section 10(b) regarding the right to counsel.

The court found that the defendant had clearly requested to speak to his counsel of choice, Reid Rusonik of the Reid Pinkofsky firm, but the officer failed to adequately facilitate this request.

Although the defendant eventually spoke to duty counsel, the officer's failure to make reasonable efforts to contact the defendant's counsel of choice constituted a serious Charter violation.

The court excluded the breath test evidence as a remedy and acquitted the defendant.