Ikdeep Singh

The accused was charged with three counts of breach of probation for allegedly contacting his wife and children in violation of probation orders.

The first allegation occurred on July 7, 2014, but the information was not sworn until July 21, 2017.

The accused was arrested on March 11, 2017.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter motion arguing his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been violated.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while the total delay exceeded the Jordan presumptive ceiling of 18 months, the pre-arrest delay qualified as a discrete event attributable to exceptional circumstances, as the police acted with reasonable diligence in attempting to locate the accused.

Additionally, the accused's failure to appear at trial demonstrated he was not genuinely exercising his 11(b) rights.

The accused was charged with perjury for allegedly falsely testifying during a previous trial that he did not speak to a co-accused in a courthouse washroom.

The Crown relied on the eyewitness identification evidence of two jurors from the previous trial.

The court found significant frailties in the eyewitness identification evidence, including the fleeting nature of the observation, cross-racial identification issues, and inconsistencies.

The court also found that the statutory corroboration requirement under s. 133 of the Criminal Code was not met.

The accused was found not guilty.

The accused was charged with driving with excess alcohol in his system and impaired operation of a motor vehicle following a motor vehicle collision at 2 a.m. on July 4, 2016.

The accused sought Charter relief on two grounds: first, that police lacked sufficient grounds for detention in violation of s. 9 Charter rights, and second, that police breached s. 10(a) and (b) Charter rights by delaying the provision of rights to counsel.

The court found that the initial arrest was lawful based on objective grounds including the smell of alcohol, red eyes, and the context of a severe collision.

The court found a breach of s. 10(b) rights due to a five-minute delay in providing rights to counsel after a second officer arrived on scene, but found the breath demand was lawful and the evidence admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was found guilty of both charges.

The defendant was charged with driving with excess alcohol following a traffic stop in a parking lot.

The Crown's case relied on breath test results.

The defendant, self-represented, raised a Charter breach under section 10(b) regarding the right to counsel.

The court found that the defendant had clearly requested to speak to his counsel of choice, Reid Rusonik of the Reid Pinkofsky firm, but the officer failed to adequately facilitate this request.

Although the defendant eventually spoke to duty counsel, the officer's failure to make reasonable efforts to contact the defendant's counsel of choice constituted a serious Charter violation.

The court excluded the breath test evidence as a remedy and acquitted the defendant.

The defendant was arrested at a RIDE checkpoint after failing a roadside approved screening device test.

He was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol (over 80).

The defendant raised two Charter issues: (1) whether the officer's failure to ask when he last drank affected the reliability of the ASD test and reasonable grounds for arrest; and (2) whether a four-minute delay between arrest and being informed of the right to counsel breached s. 10(b).

On the trial proper, the defendant argued the Crown failed to prove the Intoxilyzer tests were administered as soon as practicable.

The court found the officer did ask about the last drink, establishing reasonable grounds.

Although there was a minor breach of s. 10(b)'s immediacy requirement, the evidence was not excluded under s. 24(2) after applying the Grant test.

The court found the tests were conducted as soon as practicable and the defendant was convicted.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol content exceeding the legal limit and while impaired by alcohol, following incidents on October 11, 2015.

The central issues involved Charter violations regarding warrantless entry into an underground parking garage, reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, and the right to counsel.

The court found that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to enter the garage based on hot pursuit and exigent circumstances, that the arrest was lawful, and that the right to counsel was not violated.

The Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt both excess alcohol and impairment.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol concentration.

The Crown's case relied on observations by McDonald's employees, police identification, and breath test results.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of evidence on Charter grounds, specifically alleging violations of section 10(b) rights regarding counsel of choice and language accessibility.

The court found breaches of the defendant's Charter rights due to inadequate facilitation of contact with chosen counsel and failure to provide meaningful interpretation assistance despite obvious language comprehension difficulties.

Evidence was excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

However, the court found the defendant guilty of impaired driving based on identification evidence, circumstantial evidence, and the visual record from the breath room video.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed for simple assault and assault with a weapon, arguing that the probation order was demonstrably unfit due to the omission of a condition prohibiting the respondent from residing in the same condominium building as the victim.

The original sentencing judge declined to impose this condition, citing concerns about the respondent's mental health and a reported suicide risk if his stable living arrangements with his mother were disrupted.

The appeal court, considering fresh evidence from both parties, upheld the original sentence, finding that the judge's conclusion was not unreasonable and did not result in a disposition that was clearly unfit, despite the victim's ongoing fear.

The accused was charged with stunt driving under the Highway Traffic Act for speeding 173 km/h in a posted 100 km/h zone.

The defence brought a section 7 Charter application seeking disclosure of the full operational manual for the radar device used and GPS records from the officer's vehicle.

The Crown and OPP argued these were third-party records not in their possession or control.

The court determined the records were third-party records subject to the O'Connor disclosure regime and dismissed the application, finding the defence failed to establish that the requested records were "likely relevant" to an issue at trial.