Ikdeep Singh

The defendant was arrested at a RIDE checkpoint after failing a roadside approved screening device test.

He was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol (over 80).

The defendant raised two Charter issues: (1) whether the officer's failure to ask when he last drank affected the reliability of the ASD test and reasonable grounds for arrest; and (2) whether a four-minute delay between arrest and being informed of the right to counsel breached s. 10(b).

On the trial proper, the defendant argued the Crown failed to prove the Intoxilyzer tests were administered as soon as practicable.

The court found the officer did ask about the last drink, establishing reasonable grounds.

Although there was a minor breach of s. 10(b)'s immediacy requirement, the evidence was not excluded under s. 24(2) after applying the Grant test.

The court found the tests were conducted as soon as practicable and the defendant was convicted.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol content exceeding the legal limit and while impaired by alcohol, following incidents on October 11, 2015.

The central issues involved Charter violations regarding warrantless entry into an underground parking garage, reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, and the right to counsel.

The court found that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to enter the garage based on hot pursuit and exigent circumstances, that the arrest was lawful, and that the right to counsel was not violated.

The Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt both excess alcohol and impairment.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol concentration.

The Crown's case relied on observations by McDonald's employees, police identification, and breath test results.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of evidence on Charter grounds, specifically alleging violations of section 10(b) rights regarding counsel of choice and language accessibility.

The court found breaches of the defendant's Charter rights due to inadequate facilitation of contact with chosen counsel and failure to provide meaningful interpretation assistance despite obvious language comprehension difficulties.

Evidence was excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

However, the court found the defendant guilty of impaired driving based on identification evidence, circumstantial evidence, and the visual record from the breath room video.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed for simple assault and assault with a weapon, arguing that the probation order was demonstrably unfit due to the omission of a condition prohibiting the respondent from residing in the same condominium building as the victim.

The original sentencing judge declined to impose this condition, citing concerns about the respondent's mental health and a reported suicide risk if his stable living arrangements with his mother were disrupted.

The appeal court, considering fresh evidence from both parties, upheld the original sentence, finding that the judge's conclusion was not unreasonable and did not result in a disposition that was clearly unfit, despite the victim's ongoing fear.

The accused was charged with stunt driving under the Highway Traffic Act for speeding 173 km/h in a posted 100 km/h zone.

The defence brought a section 7 Charter application seeking disclosure of the full operational manual for the radar device used and GPS records from the officer's vehicle.

The Crown and OPP argued these were third-party records not in their possession or control.

The court determined the records were third-party records subject to the O'Connor disclosure regime and dismissed the application, finding the defence failed to establish that the requested records were "likely relevant" to an issue at trial.