Ian M. Hull

The plaintiff challenged the validity of two wills executed by her late father shortly after he was diagnosed with a terminal brain tumour.

The wills entirely disinherited the plaintiff and her children.

The court found that the testator lacked testamentary capacity when he executed both wills, as his cognitive functions were impaired by the tumour, poorly managed diabetes, and various medications, leading to insane delusions that affected his testamentary dispositions.

The wills were declared invalid.

The plaintiff's alternative claims for undue influence, proprietary estoppel, and dependant support under the Succession Law Reform Act were dismissed.

Following a four-day trial where the applicant was awarded a $450,000 lump sum from the estate, the court determined the issue of costs.

The applicant sought full or substantial indemnity costs, arguing the estate trustees' conduct was unreasonable.

The court found the respondents' conduct was aggressive but not reprehensible, and since the applicant had withdrawn all offers to settle before trial, partial indemnity costs were appropriate.

The court fixed fees at $125,000 and reduced the claimed disbursements, noting the expert's account was excessive, resulting in a total costs award of $125,000 for fees and $35,387.20 for disbursements, plus HST.

A common law spouse brought an application under Part V of the Succession Law Reform Act seeking dependant support from the estate of her deceased partner after his will left the estate entirely to his daughters.

The court determined that the applicant was a dependant spouse within the meaning of s. 57 and that the deceased had not made adequate provision for her proper support under s. 58.

Applying the factors in s. 62, including the parties’ 20‑year cohabiting relationship, the applicant’s age, health issues, limited retirement income, and contributions to the deceased’s household, the court found that she required significant support.

Evidence also established that the deceased intended that his RRSP/RRIF funds would benefit the applicant.

The court concluded that a lump sum payment representing the approximate value of those funds would provide fair and adequate support while allowing the applicant financial independence.

Following a successful motion by certain beneficiaries to strike a will challenge on the basis of estoppel, the court determined costs arising from the motion.

The unsuccessful parties argued that costs should be paid from the estate due to the alleged novelty of applying estoppel to bar a will challenge within the limitation period and contended the claimed costs were excessive.

The court rejected that position, emphasizing the modern principle that estate litigation costs are not automatically payable from the estate.

Applying the factors in Rule 57.01 and the Courts of Justice Act, the court fixed partial indemnity costs for the successful moving parties and reduced certain billed amounts for duplication and excess.

Costs were ordered payable personally by the unsuccessful challengers rather than from estate assets.

The moving parties sought to strike a will challenge brought by an estate trustee and her son concerning the validity of the deceased’s 2010 primary and secondary wills.

The estate trustee had administered aspects of the estate for over a year, including paying significant estate taxes, relying on the wills in dealings with third parties, and exercising authority as estate trustee.

The court held that her conduct created an assumption among the parties that the wills were valid and that others relied on that assumption to their detriment, particularly in relation to complex estate planning transactions and tax consequences arising from an estate freeze.

Applying the doctrines of estoppel by representation and estoppel by convention, the court concluded that the estate trustee was barred from challenging the wills.

The son’s parallel challenge was also struck because he lacked independent knowledge of the estate and acted as a proxy for the trustee.

Competing motions arose in estate litigation challenging the validity of a deceased's remarriage and seeking declarations affecting the validity of a prior will.

The plaintiffs sought to amend the statement of claim to abandon damages and pursue declaratory relief, add the estate as a defendant, replace the litigation guardian, obtain disclosure of medical and capacity records, and adjust the timetable.

The defendants opposed and moved for security for costs, arguing the litigation guardian had relocated outside Ontario and that substitution of another guardian was an attempt to avoid security obligations.

The court granted leave to amend the claim and add the estate, but imposed terms including payment of costs thrown away and substantial security for costs.

Security for costs of $100,000 and additional security for wasted costs were ordered before further steps could be taken.

The applicant and the deceased lived together as common-law spouses for 12 years.

The deceased, a wealthy car dealership owner, executed new wills shortly before her death that left her entire estate to her daughter and various trusts, making no provision for the applicant.

The applicant brought a claim for dependant's relief under the Succession Law Reform Act.

The court found that the deceased failed to make adequate provision for the applicant's proper support, noting her legal and moral obligations to him.

The court ordered the transfer of a $1.2 million home to the applicant, a tax-free capital payment of $100,000 per year for life, and $50,000 every five years for a vehicle.

The moving party, a local resident, brought a motion for leave to intervene as an added party or friend of the court in an application concerning the sale of a charitable property operated as a tennis and aquatic club.

The main parties to the application had reached a settlement to sell the property and divide the proceeds among charitable purposes.

The court dismissed the motion to intervene, finding that while the moving party had an interest in the subject matter, her intervention would not significantly enhance the court's ability to determine the issues, as her position mirrored that of the applicants and the Public Guardian and Trustee was already involved.

Furthermore, granting intervenor status would cause undue delay and prejudice to the parties who had already reached a settlement.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's refusal to add two parties and a new oppression remedy to their statement of claim in a dispute over a real estate joint venture.

The motion judge had dismissed the amendments on the basis that the appellants failed to produce evidence supporting the allegations against the proposed parties.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that on a motion to amend pleadings, the facts pleaded must be taken as true and provable, and the court should not look beyond the pleadings to require evidentiary proof at that stage.

The proposed amendments adequately disclosed causes of action for conspiracy, inducing breach of contract, and oppression.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's finding that the respondent did not engage in fraudulent concealment when it failed to distribute estate assets upon the death of a life tenant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that unconscionable conduct by the respondent was essential to the claim and had not been established.

The court noted the appellant knew of her entitlement in 1978 and could have discovered the estate assets with reasonable efforts.

The appellants appealed an order of the motion judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error by the motion judge and noting that the appellants' failure to appeal a prior order provided a complete answer to their position.

Costs of $5,000 were awarded to the respondents.

The appellant appealed a decision appointing the deceased's spouse and another individual as estate trustees.

The Divisional Court held that under s. 6(8) of the Family Law Act, a surviving spouse who elects to take their share under the Act rather than the will cannot act as an executor, as the will is interpreted as if they had predeceased the testator.

Furthermore, due to conflict between the parties, the court found it preferable to appoint an independent executor.

The appeal was allowed and the judgment varied to appoint an independent estate trustee.