Ian M. Hull

The four Libfeld brothers, equal owners of The Conservatory Group (a multi-billion dollar real estate development business), experienced a complete and irreparable breakdown of their personal and professional relationships.

The applicants sought various remedies including a restructuring protocol or a restricted wind-up, while the respondents sought a buy-sell process or a structured buyout.

The court found no actionable oppression by any party, attributing the disputes to extreme mutual dysfunction.

Concluding that the brothers could no longer work together and that none of their proposed remedies were workable or fair, the court ordered a court-supervised wind-up and sale of the business under the OBCA and Partnerships Act, permitting all brothers to participate as bidders.

The appellant, Brian Boese, appealed a trial judge's decision that his brother Bruce's will was formally valid under the Succession Law Reform Act.

The central issue was whether the respondent, Brenda Bayford, had proven the formal validity of a 2013 will (Version 2), which she claimed to have found after Bruce's death.

The appellant argued that the trial judge misapprehended expert handwriting evidence, which indicated that Bruce's signatures on two versions of the will (one unwitnessed, one witnessed) were identical copies, suggesting one was reproduced from the other.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made a palpable and overriding error by misunderstanding the significance of the expert evidence and its implications for the appellant's theory of the case, particularly regarding the missing original unwitnessed will and inconsistencies in the respondent's testimony.

The court also rejected the respondent's motion to admit fresh evidence.

In a will challenge action, the defendant estate trustees moved under Rule 21(1)(a) to dismiss the plaintiffs' claim that the deceased's wills were void for violating public policy on the basis of gender discrimination.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the defendants could not resile from a prior consent order directing a trial on that issue.

On the issue of disclosure, the court limited the plaintiffs' broad requests for financial and corporate records, ordering production only of documents relevant to the will challenge between 1998 and 2003.

The plaintiffs' cross-motion for costs thrown away was dismissed, but they were awarded $5,000 in costs for responding to the reconstituted motion.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal three interlocutory orders made by the case management judge.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal the order for production of documents, awarding costs to the responding parties.

The court granted leave to appeal the order requiring an assessment of capacity to instruct counsel and stayed that order pending the appeal.

The motion for leave to appeal the suspension of counsel's appointment pending the assessment was dismissed.

The applicant, a trustee and settlor of a family trust, sought to recover over $1 million from the trust for the 1993 transfer of a farm property, construction costs, and maintenance expenses.

The respondent beneficiaries opposed the claims and sought the removal of the trustees.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the applicant's financial claims, finding them to be either undocumented gifts or barred by the expired limitation periods.

The court ordered two beneficiaries to pay arrears for rent and utilities, and ordered one to vacate the property due to serious breaches of her tenancy agreement.

Finally, the court removed all three trustees for failing to properly administer the trust and protect the beneficiaries' interests, ordering their replacement by a professional third-party trustee.

In an ongoing estate dispute between a widow and her children, the applicant widow brought a motion to add two corporate parties, admit a late affidavit regarding her health, substitute written interrogatories for oral cross-examination, and determine the scope of cross-examination.

The court added the corporate parties, finding one to be a necessary party.

The court admitted the late affidavit but excluded the attached medical reports as inadmissible hearsay.

The court declined to dispense with oral cross-examination, finding insufficient evidence of serious harm, but ordered specific accommodations for the 93-year-old applicant.

Finally, the court limited the scope of cross-examination to the three issues previously deemed urgent to conserve judicial resources.

Appeal from a trial judge's costs order denying costs to the successful defendant in a will challenge.

The defendant's father left his entire estate to her.

The plaintiffs (her brothers) sued to set aside the will, alleging suspicious circumstances, lack of testamentary capacity, and undue influence.

The trial judge dismissed all claims as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, and alternatively found the will valid based on established testamentary capacity and absence of undue influence.

Despite the defendant's complete success, the trial judge awarded no costs, citing the defendant's misleading evidence regarding conversations with her father's doctor.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in law by focusing almost exclusively on one aspect of misleading evidence while ignoring the defendant's complete success on all substantive issues and failing to consider relevant factors such as settlement offers and trial complexity.

The appellant sought life insurance proceeds after paying premiums under an oral separation agreement that required maintenance of her beneficiary designation.

The insured later redesignated a new spouse as irrevocable beneficiary, and the proceeds were paid accordingly.

The majority held the respondent was unjustly enriched at the appellant’s expense and found no juristic reason under the Insurance Act to defeat restitution.

A remedial constructive trust over the full proceeds was imposed because a personal remedy was inadequate in the circumstances.

The dissent would have dismissed the appeal on the basis that statutory beneficiary protections supplied a juristic reason and that corresponding deprivation was not established.

Following a motion for interim support where the applicant was ordered to pay costs in the cause, the respondent Estate Trustee sought to vary the costs order based on a previously undisclosed offer to settle.

The court found the offer was more favourable to the applicant than the motion's outcome.

The court amended the costs order, directing that the $40,000 in partial indemnity costs be payable by the applicant in any event of the cause at the conclusion of the application.

The applicant, the common-law spouse of the deceased, brought a motion for interim support under the Succession Law Reform Act pending the final determination of her dependant's support application.

The deceased was a wealthy real estate developer who left his entire estate to his estranged wife and daughters.

The court rejected the applicant's budget of over $93,000 per month as unsubstantiated and overstated, instead awarding $30,000 per month in interim support.

The court dismissed the applicant's requests for interim legal fees, HST indemnification, and production of the deceased's estate planning files.

The court also granted the estate's cross-motion in part, imposing restrictions on the applicant's use of the estate-owned condominium, including a 15-person guest limit and a ban on posting interior photos on social media.

The defendant estate trustee brought a motion for partial summary judgment to dismiss specific allegations of breach of a settlement agreement, arguing they were statute-barred and estopped.

The plaintiffs, beneficiaries of the estate, alleged breach of fiduciary duty, self-dealing, and fraudulent concealment.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the issues were deeply intertwined with the broader claims, involved significant credibility disputes, and were not appropriate for partial summary judgment as they could lead to inconsistent findings at trial.

Following a decision in an estate litigation matter regarding the ownership of a painting, the successful respondent sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis against the applicant co-estate trustees personally.

The court found that the applicants had acted unreasonably by commencing the application instead of accepting the respondent's pre-litigation offer to pay the appraised value of the painting.

The court awarded the respondent costs on a substantial indemnity basis, fixed at $203,589 for fees and $12,493 for disbursements, and ordered the applicants to pay these costs personally rather than out of the estate.

The appellants, estate trustees of the testator's estate, appealed the trial judge's finding that the testator lacked testamentary capacity when executing two wills dated August 16, 2010 and September 8, 2010.

The trial judge found the testator was unaware of the nature and extent of his assets, did not remember persons he might be expected to benefit, and did not understand claims that could be made by excluded persons.

The appellants also sought leave to appeal the costs award, which required the estate trustees personally to pay costs rather than having them borne by the estate.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable errors of fact and upheld the trial judge's findings on capacity and costs.

The applicants, co-estate trustees, brought an application against the respondent, their brother and co-estate trustee, claiming a painting worth $30,000 was an asset of their late father's estate.

The respondent argued he had an oral agreement with his father before his death to keep the painting and pay the estate its appraised value.

The court reviewed extensive email correspondence and found corroborating evidence of the agreement.

The court dismissed the application, finding the painting was not an estate asset provided the respondent paid the $30,000, and noted the parties had spent nearly $500,000 in legal fees fighting over the painting.

The Superior Court of Justice issued a costs endorsement following the dismissal of an action challenging a will.

The defendant, Constance McCron, sought substantial indemnity costs from the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs argued for costs from the estate or that each party bear their own.

The court applied the modern approach to estate litigation costs, noting that while the plaintiffs had reasonable grounds to question the will's validity (suspicious circumstances, testator's susceptibility), their claim was ultimately statute-barred.

The defendant's request for costs was denied due to her misleading evidence regarding the testator's mental state.

Ultimately, the court ordered that each party bear their own costs.

The appellant, a grandchild of the deceased, appealed the dismissal of her application to remove the named executors and trustees of the deceased's estate.

The executors were the deceased's two sons.

The appellant claimed the executors would not treat her fairly and had breached their fiduciary duties.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence supporting the appellant's claims.

The court noted that the key property at issue had been sold, the executors had honored the deceased's non-binding request regarding the cottage, and the mere existence of friction between the executors and the appellant's mother did not justify removal.

The deceased was aware of existing tensions but nonetheless named the respondents as executors.

Gail Evans died intestate in 1992, survived by her husband, Carlton Fray (respondent), and two sons, Richard Evans (applicant) and Donald.

Gail held a 90% interest in a house as a tenant in common with Fray (10%).

Fray continued to live in the house, paying expenses.

The Court of Appeal previously directed a reference to determine the residue of the estate and the quantum of Richard Evans' share.

This decision on reference found that Gail's 90% interest vested equally in Fray and her two sons in 1995 by operation of the Estates Administration Act, resulting in Fray owning 40% and each son 30%.

The court determined that the estate's residue was zero as of the vesting date.

It ordered the house to be sold, with Fray receiving credits for mortgage, insurance, property taxes, and capital expenditures made since 1995, as well as his $75,000 preferential share.

Fray's claim for monthly living expenses was offset by a notional occupation rent for his exclusive use of the sons' 60% share of the property, effectively cancelling each other out.

The remaining proceeds are to be divided equally among the three, with prior payments from Fray to the sons deducted from their respective shares.

The plaintiffs challenged the validity of Constantin Birtzu's 2006 will, alleging lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence by his daughter, Constance McCron, who was the sole beneficiary.

They also sought a constructive trust over property and an accounting of assets.

The court found the action statute-barred due to the expiration of the limitation period.

Despite this, the court proceeded to address the merits, finding that the defendants successfully proved testamentary capacity and that the plaintiffs failed to prove undue influence.

The court upheld the 2006 will and dismissed the action.

This costs endorsement followed a judgment where two wills were declared invalid, resulting in an intestacy where the plaintiff, Star Sweetnam, inherited the entire estate.

Sweetnam sought substantial indemnity costs, while the defendant estate trustees, Dianne Lesage and Terry Dooley, sought their own costs from the estate.

The court applied the modern "loser pays" principle in estate litigation, finding that the estate trustees acted unreasonably by rejecting two settlement offers from Sweetnam, particularly an early, modest offer.

The court also found Lesage's conduct adversarial and her claimed costs excessive.

Sweetnam's costs were fixed at $311,679.56 (after a 20% reduction for time spent on moot issues).

The court ordered Lesage and Dooley to pay Sweetnam's costs jointly and severally and denied their claims for costs from the estate, preventing Sweetnam from effectively paying the unsuccessful parties' costs.

The plaintiff challenged the validity of two wills executed by her late father shortly after he was diagnosed with a terminal brain tumour.

The wills entirely disinherited the plaintiff and her children.

The court found that the testator lacked testamentary capacity when he executed both wills, as his cognitive functions were impaired by the tumour, poorly managed diabetes, and various medications, leading to insane delusions that affected his testamentary dispositions.

The wills were declared invalid.

The plaintiff's alternative claims for undue influence, proprietary estoppel, and dependant support under the Succession Law Reform Act were dismissed.