Howard W. Reininger

The plaintiff credit union sought judgment against the defendant spouse for the net sale proceeds of a condominium previously owned by her former husband.

The husband's mortgage with the plaintiff had been mistakenly deleted from title, and upon the sale of the property, the proceeds were transferred to the defendant spouse's bank account.

The court found the transfer was a fraudulent conveyance made with the intent to defeat creditors, as there was no good consideration and the purported matrimonial settlement was not bona fide.

The court declared the transfer void and granted a tracing order under the Assignments and Preferences Act, awarding judgment to the plaintiff.

The moving parties sought to re-open a dismissed appeal more than three years after this court dismissed their appeal from a summary judgment order enforcing four mortgages.

The court considered the motion under r. 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and found it frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The moving parties failed to meet the high threshold for re-opening, having raised unsustainable allegations of fraud and misconduct that were or could have been previously advanced.

The motion to re-open was dismissed.

The appellants appealed an order declaring them vexatious litigants under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The application judge found the respondent had standing and applied the Lang Michener test, noting the appellants' history of meritless litigation against a former client who is a party under a disability.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error and dismissed the appeal, confirming the vexatious litigant order applies to the appellants in their personal capacity.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment requiring payment of $2,428,476.51 plus interest and delivery of possession of mortgaged property.

The appellant's sole defence was that the respondent mortgagee failed to provide a discharge statement as required by s. 22(2) of the Mortgages Act.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the motion judge's factual findings that the respondent had complied with the statutory requirement, noting no particular form of statement was required and the substance of the information had been provided.

Fresh evidence was refused as irrelevant.

The court considered a motion for summary judgment in a civil action arising from a criminal prosecution for fraud against Anthony Falasca.

The plaintiffs alleged malicious prosecution, negligent investigation, misfeasance, failure to withdraw the charge, and abuse of process.

The court found that the claims relating to the criminal prosecution, including abuse of process, were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, as the action was commenced after the expiry of the limitation period.

The court declined to consider the separate abuse of process claim relating to a bankruptcy proceeding, as it was not properly before the court on this motion.

The decision provides a detailed analysis of discoverability and the application of limitation periods in prosecutorial torts.

The appellants appealed an associate judge's order dismissing their motion to withdraw admissions from their statement of defence regarding the existence of two holographic agreements in a property dispute.

The court found the order was interlocutory and properly belonged in the Superior Court of Justice, but the judge exercised jurisdiction to hear it.

The court held the motion judge made no palpable and overriding error in relying on cross-examination transcripts or in finding the appellants failed to meet the test for withdrawing admissions.

The appeal was dismissed.

This appeal concerned the reinstatement of a mortgage charge (FO Charge) on a property title after it was mistakenly deleted by the Land Registry Office.

The applicant, FirstOntario Credit Union, appealed the Director of Titles' decision to delete the reinstated charge, arguing for rectification of the register or that the respondents had constructive notice of its interest.

The court dismissed the appeal, affirming the doctrine of indefeasibility of title for bona fide purchasers and mortgagees for value without actual notice.

It held that constructive notice is insufficient to defeat registered interests and that the Land Titles Assurance Fund is the appropriate remedy for losses due to registry errors.

The plaintiff and third-party father sued the defendant sons for repayment of alleged oral loans totaling $248,000 used to purchase a condominium.

The sons counterclaimed for unpaid wages, alleging the payments were actually 'banked' wages from their employment at the father's companies, and sought punitive damages for the father's conduct.

The court dismissed the loan claims, finding the payments were indeed banked wages.

The court allowed the sons' counterclaim for unpaid wages, finding the father personally liable as a common employer.

The court also awarded $75,000 in punitive damages to each son due to the father's reprehensible conduct, including withholding wages, spoliation of employment records, and maintaining a false narrative throughout the litigation.

The applicants brought a motion for leave to deliver a further affidavit in their application seeking reinstatement of their membership in the respondent centre.

The applicants had already cross-examined the respondent's deponent but sought to introduce evidence addressing a new ground for termination allegedly raised during the cross-examination.

The court granted leave, finding the evidence potentially relevant to the applicants' claim that false information was provided to the membership, that there was no non-compensable prejudice to the respondent, and that there was a reasonable explanation for the evidence not being included initially.

The respondent sought substantial indemnity costs following the dismissal of the appellants' appeal from a summary judgment on mortgage defaults.

The respondent relied on standard charge terms in the mortgages providing for substantial indemnity costs.

The appellants argued the costs were excessive and alleged improper conduct by the respondent.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to depart from the contractual terms and awarded the respondent its claimed costs of $27,289.50.

The court also ordered that the funds previously paid into court as security for costs be paid out to the respondent to satisfy the appeal costs and partially satisfy the unpaid trial costs.

The appellant appealed an order discharging a Claim for Lien and vacating a Certificate of Action registered against a property.

The motions judge had found that the appellant was a partner in the property development, making him an 'owner' under the Construction Lien Act rather than a 'contractor', and therefore ineligible to register a lien against his own property.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the motions judge correctly applied the test for partnership and relied on relevant evidence.

This appeal arose from the appellants' default under several mortgages and guarantees.

The appellants challenged the motion judge's decision to grant interest despite the respondent's concession of charging a criminal interest rate and failing to provide timely discharge statements, and disputed the calculation of amounts owing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, affirming the motion judge's discretionary application of notional severance for the criminal interest rate and upholding the factual findings regarding the amounts advanced.

The court found no reversible error or basis for claims of Charter violations or judicial bias.

The plaintiff, whose construction lien was previously vacated by a different judge, brought a motion seeking a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) or, alternatively, an order for sale proceeds to be paid into court, pending an appeal of the lien vacation order.

The court denied the CPL, agreeing with the defendants that it was not available and constituted a collateral attack on the prior order.

However, recognizing the potential merit of the appeal and the risk to the plaintiff if the property was sold, the court exercised its jurisdiction under Rule 63.01(a) to order that if the property is sold, $500,000 of the proceeds must be paid into court by the defendants as interim protection pending the Divisional Court's final determination.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment that awarded her only $1,897.89 on a claim of over $880,000 against the respondent, who was a guarantor of a second mortgage.

The appellant sought to add various payments she allegedly made for repairs, renovations, and to keep a first mortgage in good standing to the principal of the second mortgage.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's factual findings and no errors of law in rejecting the appellant's claims, including her late assertion of equitable subrogation.

The cross-appeal regarding the trial judge's decision to award no costs was also dismissed.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of MacNeil J. dated November 16, 2021.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party in the fixed amount of $7,217.88.

The defendants brought a motion to discharge a claim for lien and vacate a certificate of action, arguing the plaintiff was an owner, not a contractor, under the Construction Act.

The plaintiff claimed he was a contractor who provided labour and materials for a house construction.

The court found that the plaintiff and defendants had a partnership agreement to build and sell the house for profit, making the plaintiff an owner.

As an owner cannot lien their own property, the motion was granted, and the claim for lien was discharged.

The appellant brought a motion to transfer her appeal, which had previously been quashed by the Court of Appeal, to the Divisional Court.

The motions judge considered whether there was jurisdiction to transfer an appeal weeks after it had been quashed.

More critically, the judge found that the appellant had already requested and been denied this transfer by the original panel that quashed the appeal.

A single motions judge lacks the jurisdiction to reverse a panel's decision or to grant relief that could have been, but was not, sought from the panel.

The motion was dismissed, and the appellant was advised that her only remedy was to initiate a new appeal in the Divisional Court.

The appellant appealed a judgment of less than $50,000 to the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, holding that it was properly brought to the Divisional Court due to the monetary amount.

No costs were awarded.

Following a successful summary judgment motion to enforce four mortgages, the plaintiff mortgagee sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis as provided in the standard charge terms.

The defendants argued for partial indemnity costs, noting the plaintiff initially claimed interest exceeding the criminal rate and provided inaccurate discharge statements.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs for the steps up to the summary judgment motion due to the plaintiff's improper conduct, but awarded substantial indemnity costs for the motion itself because the defendants persisted in an unsuccessful misrepresentation defence.

Total costs were fixed at $63,772.65.

The appellants moved to stay orders granting the respondent mortgagee possession of two investment properties pending appeal.

The mortgage loans had been in default for over three years with no payments made.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court found no serious question to be determined regarding the respondent's right to possession, no irreparable harm to the appellants, and that the balance of convenience favoured the respondent.

The motion for a stay was dismissed.