Howard W. Reininger

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment on a series of mortgages granted to the defendants.

The defendants counterclaimed, alleging an oral agreement that the plaintiff would pay out all outstanding executions against them, and argued the mortgages charged a criminal rate of interest.

The court found no evidence of the alleged oral agreement.

While the initial discharge statements contained illegal interest rates, the court applied notional severance to enforce the principal amounts advanced and the stipulated interest rates (18% and 24%).

Summary judgment was granted to the plaintiff for the principal amounts and possession of the properties, while the defendants' counterclaim regarding the discharge statements was allowed to proceed.

The Appellant, Anthony Falasca, brought a motion appealing the wording of a formal Order settled before Master Jean, arguing it was inconsistent with its preamble by omitting the word "advanced" in relation to document production, leading to ambiguity.

Alternatively, Falasca sought to vary the Order pursuant to s. 187(5) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The creditor, Goldcourt Developments Inc., brought a cross-motion to quash the appeal on the grounds that it was out of time.

The court dismissed Goldcourt's cross-motion, finding that while an appeal on the merits would be out of time, the motion to vary the order was properly brought under s. 187(5) due to subsequently discovered facts, specifically Goldcourt's counsel misinterpreting the order's scope.

The court granted Falasca's motion, ordering the amendment of Master Jean's Order to ensure clarity regarding document production obligations.

This endorsement addresses costs following a motion to strike claims.

The defendants, Anthony Volpini, Linda Aceti, and Mary Ann Ley, sought to strike claims against them for disclosing no cause of action.

The plaintiffs, Anthony Falasca and Aryle Developments Inc., successfully defended the motion against Volpini and Aceti, though they conceded the claim against Ley in their reply factum.

The court found the plaintiffs were the most successful party and entitled to partial indemnity costs.

However, the claimed hourly rates and time spent by plaintiff's counsel were deemed excessive, and the plaintiffs' late concession regarding Ley was noted.

Consequently, the court reduced the requested costs.

The defendants Anthony Volpini, Linda Aceti, and Mary Ann Ley brought a motion under Rule 21 to strike the plaintiffs' claims against them for disclosing no cause of action.

The court applied the "plain and obvious" test, assuming pleaded facts to be true unless patently ridiculous, and reading the statement of claim generously.

The motion to strike was dismissed for Volpini and Aceti, as the pleadings provided sufficient factual matrix for a cause of action.

The claim against Ley was struck as the plaintiffs did not oppose it.

The plaintiff mortgagee sought to recover over $1.3 million from the defendant guarantor.

The court previously determined that the mortgage amount could not be increased by payments made by the plaintiff's corporation.

This decision addresses the final judgment amount, post-trial interest adjustments, and costs.

The court calculated the amount owing under the mortgage to be $1,897.89.

It declined to suspend interest, finding no legal basis for it.

Regarding costs, the plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs, while the defendant sought costs against the plaintiff.

The court applied Rule 57.05(1) and exercised its discretion to deny costs to the plaintiff, given the minimal recovery compared to the amount claimed and the plaintiff's knowledge regarding the legal basis of her claim.

The court also found no legal basis to award costs to the defendant.

The plaintiff, Janet Louise Hilson, sought to recover amounts from the defendant, Carole Evans, as guarantor of a second mortgage.

Hilson claimed her initial investment in the mortgage, payments made to keep a first mortgage in good standing, and amounts for repairs and renovations.

The court dismissed Hilson's claims for equitable subrogation for pre-purchase payments and for payments made by her corporation (177), finding these were not secured by the mortgage or properly proven.

Claims for repairs and renovations were also dismissed due to insufficient evidence.

The court found Hilson was entitled to recover her initial $170,000 investment plus simple interest, subject to credits from the power of sale of the mortgaged units.

Evans was not entitled to a credit for Hilson's settlement with her former lawyer, Reiber, as there was no evidentiary basis to link that recovery to the guaranteed debt.

Further submissions were invited for final calculations, interest adjustments, and costs.

Appeal from trial judgment finding defendants liable on personal guarantees for 25 mortgages.

The appellants challenged the limitation period applicable to claims on stand-alone guarantees, arguing the two-year period under the Limitations Act, 2002 applied rather than the ten-year period under the Real Property Limitations Act.

The trial judge had also reduced the amount owing by 50 per cent to account for settlement proceeds from a negligence action against the plaintiff's solicitor.

The appellants appealed the limitation period determination and the 50 per cent reduction; the plaintiff cross-appealed arguing no reduction should apply.

The court dismissed the appeal on the limitation period issue, finding stand-alone guarantees fall within "any other instrument to repay whole or part of any money secured by a mortgage" under the Real Property Limitations Act.

The court allowed the cross-appeal on the double recovery issue, finding no basis to reduce the guaranteed debt by the settlement proceeds.

The respondent sought an order for security for costs from the appellants under Rule 61.06(1)(a) and (c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellants had been ordered to pay judgment in the amount of $723,479.66 plus interest at 12 percent per annum following a trial decision.

The motion judge considered whether the appeal was frivolous and vexatious and whether the appellants had insufficient assets in Ontario to pay costs.

While the motion judge found that the respondent had made out a reason for the order based on the appellants' apparent lack of Ontario assets and evidence of asset disposition, the motion was dismissed due to the respondent's delay in bringing the motion and the fact that most appeal costs had already been incurred.

A judgment released on May 27, 2019 in this appeal was withdrawn due to a procedural error.

One member of the three-judge panel that heard the appeal, Justice Huscroft, was not provided with either the draft or final judgment for review or signature.

The judgment was signed in error by a justice who was not a member of the hearing panel.

The court determined that the judgment was of no force or effect and that the appeal must be re-heard by a differently constituted panel.

This is an appeal from a Registrar in Bankruptcy's decision to transfer a bankruptcy application from Toronto to Hamilton, based on the debtor's residence.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the Registrar erred in law by concluding the Toronto court lacked jurisdiction.

The court clarified that Hamilton falls under Bankruptcy Division 32, which is administered by the Toronto bankruptcy court, making Toronto the proper jurisdiction for such applications under s. 43(5) of the BIA.

The appeal was allowed, setting aside the Registrar's decision.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal where the appellants were successful in overturning orders from the Superior Court of Justice.

The respondents had been successful on the main issue regarding whether a possible third party claim constituted a chose in action that vested in the Trustee in Bankruptcy.

However, the appellants were successful in obtaining the right to have the issue of whether they should be allowed to advance third party claims heard and determined within the section 37 application.

The court found divided success on the appeal.

Two consolidated appeals concerning whether a claim for contribution and indemnity represents property of a bankrupt that vests in the Trustee under section 71 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, and whether a bankrupt can advance such a claim when the Trustee refuses to do so and a creditor has obtained a lifting of the stay of proceedings.

The appellants sought to issue third party claims for contribution and indemnity against a co-defendant.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding that the claim constituted property vested in the Trustee and that the undischarged bankrupt lacked capacity to deal with it.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that a claim for contribution and indemnity is property under the BIA and that the motion judge erred in failing to consider relief under section 37 of the BIA.

The defendants brought a motion to transfer the action from Hamilton to Toronto under Rule 13.1.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The action had already been ordered to be tried together with a companion action in Hamilton, and the motion was brought on the eve of trial.

The defendants argued they could not arrange for their expert to testify remotely in Hamilton.

The court found insufficient evidence to support this claim and concluded the defendants failed to establish that Toronto was a significantly better venue.

The motion was dismissed to avoid unfairly delaying the trial.

The moving parties (defendants) sought a temporary stay of the Ontario action on the basis that another proceeding regarding the same subject matter was pending in Florida.

The Florida action had been dismissed on the basis of forum non conveniens, but an appeal was pending.

The court declined to grant the stay, finding that it would be unjust to the responding party (plaintiff) because it was unclear whether the moving parties intended to raise a statute of limitations defence for the period prior to May 5, 2015.

The court held that requiring the moving parties to deliver a statement of defence would clarify the limitations issue without imposing an onerous burden, and dismissed the motion without prejudice to bringing a further motion to stay after the statement of defence was delivered.

The plaintiffs sought leave to amend their Statement of Claim to add numerous corporate and individual defendants in an action alleging oppression and wrongful dismissal related to a restaurant business.

The motion was brought under Rule 5.04(2) to add parties and rectify an improperly filed amended statement of claim.

The court allowed the addition of some proposed defendants, including individuals connected to the directing minds of the business and certain corporate entities, finding that the 'litigating finger' pointed towards them.

However, the court dismissed the request to add a second group of 'New Franchisees,' determining that the pleading did not disclose a tenable cause of action against them and that their addition would lead to unnecessary expense and delay.

Costs were awarded to both partially successful parties.

The appellant wife appealed a trial judgment dismissing her claims for equalization of net family property and a beneficial interest in the former matrimonial home.

The parties had separated in 2006, settled all matters through a Minutes of Settlement in 2007, and reconciled at the end of May 2007.

Upon reconciliation, the wife received a disability payment which was deposited into the husband's account and used to pay household bills and mortgage.

The husband later transferred the home to his mother.

The trial judge upheld the validity of the Minutes of Settlement and dismissed the wife's claims.

The appellate court affirmed, finding that the Minutes of Settlement clearly expressed the parties' intention to exclude future property from equalization upon reconciliation, and that the wife failed to establish a resulting trust claim.

The respondent mother-in-law was successful at trial in defending against the applicant's claim of a resulting or constructive trust over the former matrimonial home.

The respondent sought substantial indemnity costs of approximately $47,000 or partial indemnity costs of approximately $32,000.

The court considered the Family Law Rules factors, noting the applicant's reasonable behaviour, the lack of complexity of the claim against the mother-in-law, and the applicant's limited ability to pay as a self-represented custodial parent of three children.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs fixed at $30,000, inclusive of prior costs orders, disbursements, and HST.

This family law application proceeded to trial regarding equalization of net family property, a trust claim over the matrimonial home, and a restraining order.

The court upheld a 2007 separation agreement as valid and binding, which explicitly precluded further equalization upon reconciliation and subsequent separation.

The applicant's claim for a resulting, implied, or constructive trust over the Rutherford Road property against her former husband and mother-in-law was dismissed, as she had legally transferred her interest in 2007, and the former husband had subsequently transferred it to his mother in 2010.

The request for a restraining order was denied due to lack of evidence.

The court ordered the discharge of a certificate of pending litigation and that the applicant vacate the property.

The plaintiff, Equitable Bank, sought summary judgment for the outstanding balance of a mortgage after the defendant defaulted on monthly payments.

The defendant opposed, arguing he had substantially paid what was owed and wished to reinstate the mortgage.

The court found that the defendant had demonstrated a willingness and ability to make payments, having paid more than the total monthly payments due since the default.

Exercising its equitable discretion under the Mortgages Act, the court declined to grant summary judgment and instead ordered the plaintiff to provide a statement of amounts required to bring the mortgage into good standing, allowing the defendant 60 days to pay.

The defendant was also ordered to resume regular payments and pay reduced costs to the plaintiff.

The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff's construction lien actions or, alternatively, to stay them, arguing the liens had expired due to the plaintiff's corporate dissolution and the actions being struck from or not added to the trial list.

The court found that the liens had not expired because the actions were properly 'set down for trial' as per the Construction Lien Act, distinguishing this from being placed on a trial list.

However, the court granted the alternative relief, staying the actions until the plaintiff corporation was revived or obtained leave to proceed under the Corporations Information Act, as it lacked standing due to dissolution.