Herman J. Wilton-Siegel

The appellant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board denying her claim for compensation following an alleged sexual assault.

The Board had rejected the appellant's direct evidence and the expert evidence of two sexual assault nurses, relying instead on hearsay evidence from a police officer who concluded the acts were consensual.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and remitted the matter for a new hearing, finding that the Board failed to provide adequate reasons for its decision, thereby breaching procedural fairness.

The Court also held that the Board's decision was unreasonable, as it relied heavily on flawed hearsay evidence while failing to explain its rejection of the appellant's and the medical experts' evidence.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment awarding her $47,500 in damages and costs against her former husband for spousal abuse.

She sought a new trial or an increased award of $276,000, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing damages, rejecting expert psychiatric evidence, and denying her claims for lost income.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of damages or his conclusion that the appellant's inability to work was unrelated to the abuse.

The appellant utility company appealed a decision of the Ontario Energy Board that reclassified $22 million in earnings from a transportation risk alleviation mechanism as 'gas transportation costs' rather than 'utilities revenue'.

The appellant argued this constituted impermissible retroactive ratemaking.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the standard of review was reasonableness and that the Board had the authority under section 36 of the Ontario Energy Board Act to ensure rates were just and reasonable, particularly given the appellant's lack of disclosure regarding the nature of the revenues.

The defendants appealed a Small Claims Court decision awarding the plaintiff damages for constructive dismissal and unpaid invoices, and finding the individual defendant personally liable.

The Divisional Court upheld the finding of constructive dismissal but set aside the wrongful dismissal damages because the plaintiff failed to adduce any evidence of lost income following his termination.

The court also set aside the finding of personal liability against the individual defendant, as it was not pleaded and the plaintiff had the onus to establish he contracted with the individual rather than the corporation.

The appeal was allowed in part.

The appellants, private electrical contractors, appealed a decision of the Ontario Energy Board which held that affiliates of municipally-owned electricity distributors are permitted to provide street lighting services under section 73(1) of the Ontario Energy Board Act, 1998, without geographic restriction.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review, finding that the Board's interpretation of its home statute was justified, transparent, and intelligible.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicants brought a motion for the production of documents subject to solicitor-client privilege relating to the negotiation of a tax indemnification provision in an agreement.

The applicants sought rectification of the agreement, arguing the parties had a common understanding that was mistakenly omitted.

The respondent relied on affidavits from its principal and its former legal counsel to assert its intention regarding the provision.

The court held that by relying on these affidavits, which implicitly put the respondent's state of mind and legal advice in issue, the respondent had waived solicitor-client privilege.

The court ordered reciprocal disclosure of all solicitor-client communications relating to the negotiation of the agreement.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner order requiring the disclosure of certain schedules to a project agreement between the applicant and Infrastructure Ontario.

The applicant argued the information was exempt from disclosure under the third party information exemption in s. 17(1) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the IPC adjudicator reasonably concluded that the disputed information was the product of a negotiation process and was not 'supplied' by the applicant in confidence.

The appellants appealed a Small Claims Court judgment ordering them to pay $25,000 to the respondents.

The respondents had loaned $35,000 to a deceased family member, and the appellants had signed a written acknowledgment to repay the loan from the proceeds of a house sale.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the action was not statute-barred due to the written acknowledgment and the date of discovery.

The court also upheld the trial judge's finding of a constructive trust over the sale proceeds and concluded that the trial judge's interventions during the self-represented trial did not amount to bias.

The appellant municipality appealed the dismissal of its motion for summary judgment.

The municipality argued the plaintiffs' action was statute-barred under s. 44(8)(b) of the Municipal Act, 2001, claiming the vehicle collided with a pole on an 'untravelled portion of a highway' (a median).

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that determining whether the median was an untravelled portion of the highway required a trial to fully appreciate the evidence regarding reasonably foreseeable vehicular and pedestrian use.

The appellant physician appealed the dismissal of his summary judgment motion in a defamation action brought by the respondent physician.

The action arose from an email sent by the appellant to the Minister of Health and the College of Physicians and Surgeons criticizing the respondent's medical practices regarding multiple sclerosis treatments.

The appellant argued the email was protected by absolute or qualified privilege.

The Divisional Court upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the application of absolute and qualified privilege, as well as the presence of malice, raised genuine issues requiring a full factual record at trial.

The appeal was dismissed.

A former director and investor brought a motion for summary judgment alleging negligent misrepresentation by corporate directors, the chief financial officer, and an engineering consultant arising from a private placement investment that later became worthless after the corporation entered receivership.

The plaintiff alleged misrepresentations concerning reserve reports, a bank borrowing base notice, and the intended use of proceeds of the financing.

The court held that many alleged representations were made to the plaintiff in his capacity as a director rather than as an investor, raising significant duty of care issues and rendering reliance problematic.

The court also found genuine issues requiring a trial regarding whether misrepresentations occurred, whether they were negligent, and whether reliance was established.

In addition, most claims were found to be statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The defendant sought leave to appeal an order dismissing its motion for partial summary judgment.

The motion judge had found a genuine issue for trial regarding whether the plaintiff's claim for unpaid bonuses was statute-barred, applying the discoverability principles under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision, particularly given the fact-specific nature of the discoverability issue in the employment context.

The respondent physicians brought a motion to restrain the appellant from bringing further appeals or motions in the Divisional Court without leave, pending the determination of an application to declare her a vexatious litigant.

The appellant had commenced multiple actions arising from the same events, filed lengthy and incomprehensible documents, made scandalous allegations against judges and counsel, and failed to pay over $34,000 in outstanding costs awards.

The Divisional Court granted the motion, invoking its inherent jurisdiction and statutory powers to prevent an abuse of process, and stayed all related proceedings by the appellant unless leave is obtained.

The moving party brought a motion to the Divisional Court to set aside an order of a single judge that had dismissed her appeal for failing to obtain leave.

The underlying proceeding involved an application by the respondent physicians to declare the moving party a vexatious litigant.

The Divisional Court found no error in the single judge's decision and dismissed the motion, awarding costs to the respondents.

The applicants sought leave to appeal an order that continued existing banking and management arrangements for joint venture properties, rather than ordering a court-appointed sales officer to distribute sales proceeds directly to the ultimate owners.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's highly discretionary decision and concluding the proposed appeal did not involve a matter of general importance.

A costs decision following an application in bankruptcy proceedings concerning the continuing validity of an absolute discharge order under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The successful party sought substantial indemnity costs, while the respondents argued that the conduct of opposing counsel warranted costs in their favour or that the claimed costs were excessive.

The court rejected allegations that counsel had improperly accused opposing counsel of fraud on the court and found no basis to deny costs to the successful party.

Although the applicant was entitled to costs, the court declined to award substantial indemnity costs given the novel circumstances and the sympathetic position of the respondent.

The court fixed partial indemnity costs at $14,000 on an all-inclusive basis.

The applicant moved for a stay of enforcement pending her appeal of an order dismissing her motion to set aside a default judgment for possession of her property.

The respondent mortgagee had claimed possession based on mortgage default.

The court applied the three-part test for a stay.

While the applicant established irreparable harm, she failed to demonstrate a serious issue to be tried, as her proposed defences—including that dishonoured cheques discharged her debt and demands for the original 'inked' mortgage—lacked legal merit.

The motion for a stay was dismissed.

The plaintiff, York University, sought leave to appeal an order discharging a certificate of pending litigation on a property and authorizing its sale or mortgage to fund the defendants' legal representation.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's assessment of the equities, particularly the consideration of the personal circumstances of a non-owner defendant in a fraudulent conveyance claim.

The court also noted the importance of clarifying the legal principles for discharging such certificates to guide future cases.

The landlord appealed an order of the Landlord and Tenant Board finding that he gave a notice of termination for personal use in bad faith, and a review order refusing to admit new evidence regarding the tenant's damages.

The Divisional Court upheld the finding of bad faith, concluding there was a reasonable basis in the evidence for the Member's decision.

However, the Court found the Reviewing Member erred in excluding new evidence about the tenant vacating her new premises, as the evidence was not reasonably discoverable prior to the hearing.

The appeal was allowed in part, and the issue of damages was remitted to a differently constituted panel.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision finding him jointly and severally liable for a corporate debt owed to the respondent.

The trial judge had imposed personal liability on the appellant because he signed a false certificate under the Bulk Sales Act during the sale of the corporation's business.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in law.

The Bulk Sales Act imposes liability on the buyer, not the seller's officers, for non-compliance, and there was no evidence to support a finding of unjust enrichment or grounds to pierce the corporate veil.

The finding of personal liability was set aside.