Heather McArthur

Deepak Prasad was found guilty of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking.

The court considered aggravating factors, including prior convictions and trafficking for profit, and mitigating factors such as youthfulness, rehabilitation efforts, family support, and remorse.

The Crown sought an 18-month sentence, while the defence proposed a suspended sentence with credit for time on bail.

The court imposed a global sentence of 11 months of incarceration, comprising 11 months for cocaine trafficking and one month concurrent for marijuana trafficking, followed by 12 months of probation with conditions.

Ancillary orders included a DNA order and a lifetime weapons prohibition.

The plaintiffs, Allan and Lorraine D’Souza, sued Home Depot of Canada Inc. and HD Roofing Inc. for misrepresentation, breach of contract, and negligence related to a deficient roof replacement.

They sought general, aggravated, punitive damages, and income loss.

The court found no misrepresentation or breach of contract regarding the warranty or skylight.

While the roofing job was negligent and exacerbated a pre-existing skylight leak, the majority of claimed damages were not causally linked to the negligence or constituted betterment.

The D'Souzas failed to mitigate their damages by refusing Home Depot's repeated offers to repair the deficiencies.

The court awarded limited damages totaling $5,772.38 for specific items, including a portion of ceiling damage, wet insulation, emergency repairs, and a portion of aspenite board replacement.

All other claims were dismissed.

The applicant brought a certiorari application to quash her committal to trial on charges of robbery, forcible confinement, and aggravated assault arising from a home invasion.

She argued there was no evidence she aided or abetted the robbery, as she left the scene before it occurred.

The reviewing judge found that while there was no evidence she aided the robbery, her prior agreement to participate and her act of travelling to the scene provided some evidence upon which a jury could find she abetted the perpetrators.

The application to quash the committal was dismissed.

Deepak Prasad brought an application under ss. 8 and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to exclude evidence (drugs and cash) seized from his residence and car following the execution of search warrants.

The Crown conceded that the redacted Information to Obtain (ITO) could not justify the warrants, leading to a "step six application" to consider unredacted portions.

The court found the judicial summary sufficient for the defence to challenge the warrant.

Applying the Debot criteria (credibility, compelling, and corroboration) holistically, the court determined that the issuing justice had reasonable and probable grounds to issue the warrants.

The information from confidential informants was found credible, compelling, and corroborated by police surveillance and investigation, establishing reasonable grounds to believe in ongoing drug trafficking and the presence of evidence in the specified locations.

Consequently, the application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

The plaintiff subcontractors brought an action against the defendant, an officer of a bankrupt excavation company, claiming she was personally liable for breach of trust under s. 13(1) of the Construction Act.

The defendant handled the company's bookkeeping and finances but argued she was unaware of her status as an officer and merely followed her husband's instructions.

The court found that the defendant knew she was an officer, had effective control of the company's finances, and knew or ought to have known about the breach of trust.

The court held the defendant personally liable and ordered her to pay the outstanding amounts owed to the plaintiffs.

Paul Bliss, a former CTV reporter, sued CTV Television Network Ltd. and Bell Media Inc. for defamation following news broadcasts detailing sexual harassment allegations against him.

The defendants moved to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction, arguing the dispute arose under a collective agreement.

The court found that while the initial broadcast might relate to employment obligations, subsequent broadcasts with salacious details went beyond workplace issues and into general news reporting.

Therefore, the defamation claim did not arise under the collective agreement, and the court retained jurisdiction.

The defendants' motion was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

The defendant Sarah Park, through her insurer State Farm, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the action and crossclaim against her, arguing she was not liable for a car accident caused by her passenger, Giancarlo Hnatiuk, who grabbed the steering wheel without her consent.

State Farm also sought a determination under Rule 21.01(a) that Hnatiuk was not covered by Park's insurance.

The plaintiffs and co-defendant TD Home and Auto Insurance Company (TD) opposed the motions, alleging bad faith, inappropriateness of partial summary judgment, and contributory negligence by Park.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial, as Hnatiuk took control of the vehicle without Park's consent, and his actions were not reasonably foreseeable.

The court also determined that Hnatiuk was not covered by Park's insurance.

Costs were fixed against TD.

The plaintiff, Damiano Di Martino, sought summary judgment against Giuseppe Montana and Calogera Montana for $240,000 arising from a loan agreement.

The court granted summary judgment, finding that a late payment clause in the agreement did not apply to the plaintiff's loan, Mr. Montana was not entitled to deduct claimed expenses or a penalty, and Ms. Montana was jointly liable due to unjust enrichment as the loan funds were deposited into her account for her benefit.

The appellants (Molu's corporations) appealed a Master's decision refusing to issue a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) against three properties.

The CPL was sought in the context of a counterclaim alleging fraudulent conveyance by the respondent (Hassoun) to his wife.

The Master considered both a prima facie fraud test and the three-part Grefford test, finding the appellants failed to meet the onus on either.

The appeal court upheld the Master's decision, finding no error in law or palpable and overriding error, and that the Master's factual conclusions were reasonable and entitled to deference.

Tagg Industries brought a motion for summary judgment against its former employee, Otto Rieder, seeking repayment of a $40,000 loan.

Tagg argued Rieder was fired for just cause, thus forfeiting a bonus that would have forgiven the loan.

Rieder countered that he was fired without just cause and was entitled to common law notice, which would extend to the bonus vesting date, thereby forgiving the loan.

Rieder also sought summary judgment on his counterclaim for wrongful dismissal.

The court dismissed Tagg's motion, finding Rieder was fired without just cause.

The court determined Rieder was entitled to at least one month's common law notice, calculated as a calendar month, which extended to the bonus vesting date, thereby offsetting the loan.

The court also granted summary judgment to Rieder on his counterclaim, awarding him damages for wrongful dismissal.

The defendants, Unifund Assurance Company, Dr. Henry Rosenblat, Dr. Michael Hanna, and Kenneth Wace, brought a motion under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the plaintiff's action, arguing it was frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The plaintiff, Yong Wang, alleged a conspiracy to deprive him of statutory accident benefits, including allegations of forged signatures and improper medical reports.

Applying the 'clearest of cases' standard for Rule 2.1 motions, the court found that despite drafting deficiencies and seemingly far-fetched claims, the allegations could not be dismissed on their face as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The court declined to grant the dismissal order, emphasizing the high threshold for Rule 2.1.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a Master's costs award that declined to award costs to either side, arguing an error in principle and seeking to introduce fresh evidence.

The respondent opposed.

The court denied leave to adduce fresh evidence, finding a lack of due diligence and that the evidence would not affect the outcome.

The court also denied leave to appeal the costs order, finding no error in principle or plain wrongness in the Master's decision that neither party fully prevailed.

The appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs for the appeal.

The defendant, Paul Weeden, was charged with aggravated assault and gun-related offences stemming from a shooting incident outside a Toronto club.

The central issue at trial was the identification of Weeden as the shooter.

The Crown relied on surveillance images, clothing evidence, a rented Dodge Dart, and intercepted communications.

The court found significant similarities between Weeden and the man in surveillance footage and found the intercepted communications to be powerful circumstantial evidence.

Despite some frailties in the Crown's case, the court concluded that the totality of the evidence established Weeden's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant, Paul Weeden, sought to exclude evidence obtained by police, arguing violations of his s. 8 Charter rights against unreasonable search and seizure.

Police entered and cleared Weeden's apartment without a warrant, kicked in a locked bedroom door, and remained inside to "freeze" the apartment while awaiting a search warrant.

The court found that exigent circumstances justified the initial entry and the forced entry into the bedroom, and that no search occurred before the warrant.

However, the court determined that police violated Weeden's s. 8 rights by remaining inside the apartment after it was cleared, as exigent circumstances no longer existed.

Applying the R. v. Grant framework, the court found the Charter breach was committed in good faith, the impact on Weeden's privacy was significant but mitigated by the limited nature of the intrusion, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits, particularly for drug-related charges, favored inclusion.

Ultimately, the evidence was deemed admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The applicants sought to enforce letters of request issued by a Pennsylvania court against the respondents (Royal Bank of Canada, Peter Gordon, and Minden Gross LLP) to obtain documents and information for a civil action in Pennsylvania.

The court granted the application, finding that the evidence sought was relevant, necessary for trial (including pre-trial proceedings), not otherwise obtainable, identified with reasonable specificity, not contrary to public policy, and not unduly burdensome.

The court emphasized deference to the requesting court's findings and rejected arguments regarding pre-trial use and solicitor-client privilege.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action for negligent legal advice, arguing it was statute-barred by the two-year limitation period.

The plaintiff contended the limitation period did not commence until the full extent of legal costs was known.

The court found that the plaintiff discovered all material facts for the claim by November 2010, including the injury, its cause by the defendant's omission, and that a proceeding was an appropriate remedy.

Consequently, the action, commenced in May 2015, was well outside the limitation period and was dismissed.

Mediamix Interactive Inc. appealed a Master's order that upheld the refusal of Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario to produce nine redacted slides from a 24-slide PowerPoint presentation, on the basis of solicitor-client privilege.

Mediamix argued the Master erred in finding privilege and in not finding a waiver of privilege by the disclosure of the other 15 slides.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Master correctly determined the redacted slides were protected by solicitor-client privilege and that no waiver occurred, as the disclosed slides were not privileged.

The court affirmed that disclosing non-privileged portions of a document does not waive privilege over genuinely privileged parts.

The plaintiffs sued the defendant for breach of contract over a real estate transaction.

The parties had agreed the plaintiffs would buy a house with an extended closing, renovate it, and sell it, keeping the profits above the original purchase price.

The house sold for a profit, but the defendant refused to pay the full amount, arguing the plaintiffs had agreed to vary the contract and accept a lesser sum, or alternatively, that various deductions applied.

The court found no valid variation of the contract, as there was no meeting of the minds, no consideration, and any agreement was extracted under economic duress.

The court rejected most of the defendant's claimed deductions, allowing only a deduction for real estate commission fees, and awarded the plaintiffs $212,224.63.

The plaintiff brought an action against the defendant in 2011 for breach of contract.

The defendant failed to file a defence, but the plaintiff's request for default judgment was denied by the Registrar, who directed her to bring a motion.

The plaintiff took no further steps, and the action was dismissed for delay in October 2011.

Over six years later, the plaintiff brought a motion to reinstate the action, claiming she was occupied with other litigation and unaware of the dismissal.

The court applied the four-factor test from Reid v. Dow Corning Corp. and dismissed the motion, finding the delay inordinate, inadequately explained, and prejudicial to the defendant's interest in finality.

The applicants sought a vesting order to rectify a 28-year-old mistake made during the settlement of their father's estate, which resulted in them holding three merged properties as tenants in common rather than separately.

The applicants had previously been denied a technical severance by the City's Committee of Adjustment.

The court dismissed the application without prejudice, holding that while it has jurisdiction to grant a vesting order that contravenes the Planning Act, it must exercise caution.

The court found there was insufficient evidence regarding the City's concerns and directed that any future application must include notice to the City.