Grace Choi

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board dated July 15, 2010.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot because a subsequent order dated February 14, 2011, had superseded the order under appeal.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and designated a long-term offender.

He was sentenced to six years' imprisonment in addition to 31 months of pre-sentence custody, followed by a 10-year supervision order.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred by crediting his pre-sentence custody on a 1-to-1 basis rather than an enhanced basis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's exercise of discretion, particularly given the appellant's dangerousness and the unlikelihood of early release.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of a young person charged with criminal negligence causing death while street racing.

The young person acted as the 'flag man' to start a street race that resulted in the death of one of the drivers.

The trial judge had granted a directed verdict of acquittal, finding the young person's participation insufficient to cause death.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge failed to properly consider party liability under section 21(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Court clarified that the mens rea for an aider to criminal negligence causing death requires intentional assistance of the negligent conduct with knowledge of the principal's intentions, and objective foresight that bodily harm would result.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's decision to sentence him as an adult and to impose a sentence of eight years, less credit for time served, to be served in a youth facility.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's reasons and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for sexual assault, sexual intercourse, and luring a child using a computer.

The offences involved a 12-year-old complainant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly addressed inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence, which was supported by confirmatory emails and letters.

The court also held that the facts supported the luring conviction and that the global sentence of 21 months was fit.

The appellant was acquitted at trial of possessing and accessing child pornography after the trial judge excluded his statement to police due to voluntariness concerns and found the Crown failed to prove knowledge and control of the files found on his computer.

The summary conviction appeal court judge overturned the acquittal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge erred in relying on the appellant's mother's evidence regarding his cognitive limitations and in failing to infer guilty knowledge.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the acquittal, holding that the summary conviction appeal court judge failed to accord proper deference to the trial judge's factual findings and misapprehended the trial judge's permissible use of the mother's evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, raising three grounds: failure to consider exculpatory portions of out-of-court statements, applying uneven scrutiny to the evidence, and improperly admitting similar fact evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's treatment of the statements, noting they were only probative of the appellant lying to police.

The court also found the trial judge properly cautioned himself against uneven scrutiny and reasonably admitted the similar fact evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sexual assault conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in relying on the principle in Browne v. Dunn to discount his evidence and in finding him evasive during cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge did not err in concluding there was a breach of the Browne v. Dunn principle, as the complainant was not cross-examined on significant contradictory details later testified to by the appellant.

The court found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's credibility assessments and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of driving over 80.

At trial, he raised a Carter defence, calling a toxicologist and a friend to testify about his alcohol consumption.

The trial judge rejected this evidence and convicted the appellant, noting the rigorous circumstances of the breath testing.

The summary conviction appeal judge dismissed the appeal.

On further appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge violated the Boucher principle by using the breath test circumstances to assess his credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that because the Crown called the Intoxilyzer technician to testify rather than relying solely on the certificate of analysis, the presumption of accuracy was not engaged, and the trial judge was entitled to consider all evidence, including the test results.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a decision dismissing his summary conviction appeal.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding that the proposed appeal was essentially fact-driven, raised no issue of law of general importance, and lacked sufficiently strong grounds to warrant leave.

The self-represented appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no legal error, unreasonableness, or miscarriage of justice in the Board's conclusion that the appellant remained a significant threat.

The court noted that the appellant's request for an outpatient assessment could be raised at her next annual review.

The applicant sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal from a Superior Court of Justice decision that allowed the Crown's appeal and remitted the matter for a new trial.

The applicant had originally been acquitted of assaulting a peace officer and breach of recognizance.

The summary conviction appeal judge found a misapprehension of evidence central to the trial decision.

The Court of Appeal refused leave, finding no exceptional circumstances or matters of general importance to justify a second-level appeal.

The appellant hospital appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that ordered the transfer of a mental disorder detainee to another hospital but failed to provide for interim custody or privileges pending the transfer.

Although the detainee was eventually transferred, rendering the appeal moot, the Court of Appeal exercised its discretion to hear the case because the issue is evasive of review and likely to recur.

The Court held that the Board's failure to include interim custody and privilege terms was unreasonable and legally wrong, as it resulted in a disposition that was not the least onerous and least restrictive to the detainee.

The Crown appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that granted the respondent limited community access for special purposes.

The Court of Appeal found the Board's order was supported by evidence from the treating psychiatrist and was not unreasonable.

The Court allowed the appeal only to the extent of adding uncontested conditions prohibiting the respondent from possessing intoxicants and weapons, which had been inadvertently omitted from the Board's order.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board detaining him in a medium security facility, seeking a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant suffers from a serious psychiatric disorder, is resistant to treatment, lacks insight, and represents a serious risk to public safety if untreated.

The Board's order was held to be reasonable.

The appellant pleaded guilty to robbery and failure to comply with a youth sentence.

The sentencing judge accepted a joint submission that included a one-day jail sentence to allow the appellant to collect his belongings.

However, this inadvertently triggered s. 743.5(1) of the Criminal Code, converting his remaining youth sentence into an adult sentence.

On appeal, with the Crown's consent, the court varied the sentence to time served to reflect the parties' original intent.

The court also corrected the weapons prohibition to a lifetime ban under s. 109(3) due to the appellant's prior robbery convictions.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his detention at a minimum secure unit.

He argued the Board erred by admitting reports referencing stayed charges, that the six-month delay in issuing reasons was unreasonable, and that the refusal to grant a conditional discharge was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's reliance on risk assessment tools appropriate, declining to grant a remedy for the delayed reasons despite urging promptness, and upholding the detention order as necessary for public protection given the appellant's lack of insight and history of non-compliance.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's credibility and in refusing to allow him to show his arms to demonstrate he had no tattoos.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge fully appreciated the evidence, acknowledged the complainant's lies, and gave adequate reasons for accepting her testimony.

The court also held that the ruling on demonstrative evidence was a matter of the trial judge's discretion.

The appellant was convicted of prostitution-related offences, including living off the avails of a person under eighteen, which carries a mandatory minimum sentence of five years.

On his sentence appeal, the appellant sought to challenge the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence for the first time.

The Crown objected.

The Court of Appeal held that an appellate court should generally decline to hear a new constitutional argument if it requires resolving contentious evidentiary disputes that were not vetted at trial.

The court directed that the appellant could not raise the constitutional issue on his sentence appeal.

The appellant was found guilty by a jury of criminal harassment and invitation to sexual touching.

Prior to sentencing, psychiatric assessments suggested he may have been not criminally responsible due to mental disorder (NCRMD) at the time of the offences.

The trial judge ruled he lacked jurisdiction to enter an NCRMD verdict after the jury was discharged.

On appeal, the appellant introduced fresh psychiatric evidence.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence under the Palmer test, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial, finding that the fresh evidence could reasonably be expected to have affected the result.