Grace Choi

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The appellant failed to appear and sought an adjournment.

The Court of Appeal declined to decide on the adjournment request, finding that the appeal was moot because the appellant was already subject to a subsequent detention order issued by the Board.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board dated July 20, 2005.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal as moot, referring to endorsement C46302.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of child pornography, sexual interference, and sexual assault, as well as his sentence.

He argued that the destruction of a videotaped interview prejudiced his right to make full answer and defence, and alleged ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to seek a stay, failing to request counselling records, and failing to advance a fabrication defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no prejudice from the lost videotape, no merit to the ineffective assistance claims, and no error in the trial judge's consideration of evidence or the sentence imposed.

The appellants were convicted of offences under the Safe Streets Act and the Highway Traffic Act for squeegeeing and soliciting money from drivers of stopped vehicles on roadways.

They appealed their convictions, arguing that the legislation was unconstitutional because it was ultra vires the province as criminal law, and that it violated their rights under sections 2(b), 7, and 15 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the legislation was a valid exercise of provincial power to regulate roadways.

While the provisions infringed freedom of expression under section 2(b), the infringement was justified under section 1.

The court also found no violations of sections 7 or 15.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing errors in the summary conviction appeal court judge's treatment of the defences of consent and self-defence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in law, noting the significant size disparity between the appellant and the complainant, and concluding there was no air of reality to the suggestion of a consensual fight.

The court also found no basis for self-defence, which had been expressly disavowed at trial.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing errors in the summary conviction appeal court judge's treatment of the defences of consent and self-defence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in law, agreeing that there was no air of reality to the suggestion that the complainant consented to a fight given the size disparity and circumstances.

The court also found no basis for self-defence, noting trial counsel had expressly disavowed it.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision that overturned the respondent's conviction.

The trial judge had found that the respondent had no realistic opportunity to consult counsel before a roadside screening device arrived, based on the late hour and the short, anticipated delay of five to ten minutes.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court substituted its own findings of fact, concluding the respondent had a cell phone and faced an unknown delay.

The Court of Appeal held that the Summary Conviction Appeal Court erred in substituting its findings, as the trial judge's findings were supported by the evidence.

The appeal was allowed and the conviction restored.

The appellant appealed his criminal conviction, arguing the trial judge provided inadequate reasons and improperly assessed witness credibility.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the trial judge's reasons were conclusory, failed to properly scrutinize the unconfirmed evidence of the main Crown witness, misapprehended evidence regarding an exchange, and improperly drew an adverse inference from a neutral fact.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the Board's disposition, noting it responded to the alternative section requested by the appellant and was supported by the evidence.

Although the appellant refused to cooperate with some conditions, he had been an exemplary patient in the hospital setting.

The appeal was dismissed, with the expectation that the Board would consider all relevant dispositions at the next annual review.

The appellant appealed her conviction for counselling to commit murder, arguing for a new trial based on proposed fresh evidence.

At trial, her defence of duress was rejected, and the trial judge found she had fabricated some journal entries.

The appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence from her trial counsel to show the continuity of her journal entries and the post-sentence criminal conduct of her former boyfriend.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion and the appeal, concluding that the fresh evidence could not reasonably be expected to have affected the result, as her behaviour with undercover officers was inconsistent with acting under duress.

The appellant appealed a lengthy jail sentence imposed for offences involving violence and a specific victim.

The Court of Appeal noted that the appellant had a very lengthy record for similar offences, including previous convictions relating to the same victim.

The court held that protection of the public and the victim was paramount, and while the sentence was at the high end of the range, it was not manifestly excessive.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent for dangerous driving causing death and dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

The trial judge had imposed conditional discharges.

The Court of Appeal held that a discharge is not legally available for the offence of dangerous driving causing death.

The appeal was allowed, the conditional discharges were set aside, and suspended sentences with probation were substituted.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault by a jury, arguing the verdict was compromised because the jury was not informed of sequestration until five hours into deliberations, and because they returned mixed verdicts on related charges.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reasonable possibility of coercion from the delayed sequestration notice and concluding the verdicts were not irreconcilable.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's instruction on the burden of proof.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent.

The Court of Appeal noted that the sentence of 8 months, combined with credit for pre-trial custody and pre-trial bail equivalent to house arrest, amounted to the equivalent of a penitentiary term.

Although the sentence was lenient and at the low end of the range, the Court admitted fresh evidence showing the offender had resumed caring for his son and found employment.

The Court concluded the sentence was not so inadequate as to warrant interference and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while impaired.

His appeal to the Summary Conviction Appeal Court was dismissed.

He sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, arguing the trial judge applied the wrong test and the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly assessed the evidence of impairment, including the appellant's high rate of speed, abrupt stop, and slurred speech, and that the verdict was not unreasonable.

The Crown appealed the 18-month conditional sentence imposed on the 18-year-old respondent, who had no prior criminal record and a horrific childhood.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentence, finding it was not demonstrably unfit and adequately reflected deterrence and denunciation.

However, the appeal was allowed in part to issue a mandatory DNA order, which the trial judge had erred in omitting.

The appellant was convicted of making harassing telephone calls contrary to s. 372(3) of the Criminal Code.

His summary conviction appeal was dismissed, and he sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal.

The appellant argued that the prosecution was barred by the limitation period, that the calls were not 'repeated', that they were not received by the intended victims, and that he had a lawful excuse.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the offence was a continuing course of conduct within the limitation period, and that the trial judge's factual findings regarding the nature, receipt, and purpose of the calls were supported by the evidence.

The appellant was convicted of the first-degree murder of a three-and-a-half-year-old child.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge erred in his instructions to the jury regarding reasonable doubt, the assessment of evidence, and consciousness of guilt based on post-offence statements to the police.

The Court of Appeal found that the reasonable doubt instruction substantially complied with the law, the jury was properly instructed to consider all evidence, and any shortcomings in the consciousness of guilt instruction did not prejudice the appellant given the overwhelming DNA and forensic evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter in the death of his intimate partner and sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the trial judge failed to give him the benefit of the doubt regarding the jury's verdict, improperly relied on an excluded statement, and failed to consider mitigating factors and pre-trial custody.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the trial judge's reasons lacked clarity on the use of the excluded statement and failed to apply the benefit of the doubt principle.

The Court allowed the appeal, factored in mitigating circumstances and pre-trial custody, and reduced the sentence to 7 years' imprisonment.

The Crown appealed the disposition imposed on a young person.

The Court of Appeal noted that the trial judge gave the matter careful consideration and his assessment was worthy of considerable deference.

The Court also noted that the sentencing principles in the new youth justice legislation must inform their consideration.

The Court concluded that the sentence was not unfit and dismissed the appeal.