G. Hendry

The appellant appealed his eight-month sentence for impaired driving, arguing his guilty plea was uninformed, he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and the judge erred by sentencing him in absentia.

The Superior Court dismissed these grounds, finding the plea was voluntary, counsel had explained the immigration consequences, and the judge reasonably exercised his discretion to sentence the appellant after he absconded.

However, the appeal was allowed in part because the sentencing judge failed to consider the collateral immigration consequences of the sentence.

The sentence was reduced to six months less a day to account for these consequences.

The defendant, a teacher and sports coach, was charged with 30 counts of sexual assault and sexual interference involving 13 complainants (12 female students and 1 male student).

The allegations spanned from 2009 to 2018, involving students aged 9-16 at the time of the alleged offences.

The Crown sought to admit evidence of similar fact conduct across multiple counts.

The trial judge dismissed the Crown's application to admit discreditable conduct evidence across counts, finding that collusive circumstances among complainants undermined the probative value of such evidence.

The judge then assessed each count individually, finding the defendant guilty on 16 counts and not guilty on 14 counts.

Key issues included the credibility and reliability of child witnesses, the impact of collusive discussions among complainants, delayed disclosure, and the distinction between inappropriate professional conduct and criminal sexual offences.

The accused, charged with four robberies, brought a pre-trial application to exclude text messages recovered from his cellphone.

The texts, exchanged with a co-perpetrator, discussed obtaining a vehicle and committing robberies.

The accused argued the texts were more prejudicial than probative, particularly one referencing a plan to rob a bank.

The court dismissed the application, finding the texts highly probative of identity and lacking any improper prejudicial effect.

Certain texts referencing uncharged drug offences were redacted on consent.

The appellant appealed his driving 'over 80' conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting breathalyzer readings despite Charter breaches.

The appellant was detained for an outstanding warrant and subsequently investigated for impaired driving.

A 31-minute delay in administering the roadside screening device (ASD) occurred, during which the appellant was not advised of his right to counsel.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court found multiple Charter breaches under ss. 8, 9, and 10(b), concluding that the police failed to provide the right to counsel when the ASD delay became apparent and failed to provide it for the initial warrant detention.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the breathalyzer evidence and entered an acquittal.

Nicholas Baig pleaded guilty to second-degree murder for the stabbing death of his pregnant wife, Arianna Goberdhan.

The court was tasked with determining the period of parole ineligibility, which must be between 10 and 25 years.

The court considered the nature of the offence, the circumstances surrounding its commission, and the character of the offender, applying principles of denunciation, deterrence, and proportionality.

Aggravating factors included the domestic nature of the homicide, the victim's vulnerability due to pregnancy, the brutality of the attack, the offender's lack of insight, and attempts to cover up the crime.

Mitigating factors included the offender's youth, guilty plea, and lack of prior criminal record.

The court imposed a parole ineligibility period of 17 years.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, raising five grounds: the trial judge's handling of a Charter application, alleged misapprehension of evidence regarding vehicle damage, judicial interventions during cross-examination, the use of the appellant's statements to a breath technician, and the sufficiency of reasons for credibility assessment.

The appeal court found no error in the trial judge's dismissal of the Charter application due to the appellant's procedural failures, nor in the inference of a collision based on witness testimony.

The court also determined that the trial judge's interventions did not create an unfair trial or apprehension of bias, and that the appellant's statements, once introduced by the defence, were available for credibility analysis.

The trial judge's reasons for rejecting the appellant's testimony were deemed sufficient.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to surrender into custody.

The accused was charged with two counts of sexual assault contrary to s. 271 of the Criminal Code and one count of breach of probation.

The Crown's case rested almost entirely on the credibility and reliability of the complainant.

The court found the complainant's evidence to be fraught with significant inconsistencies between her police statement and trial testimony, as well as between her evidence-in-chief and cross-examination.

The complainant's evidence regarding a 15-centimetre tear in her anus was found to be an outright fabrication, contradicted by the medical evidence of her family physician.

Additionally, the accused was in custody during the alleged date of the first assault.

The court found it unsafe to base a conviction on the complainant's evidence due to serious doubts regarding her veracity, credibility, and reliability.

All charges were dismissed.

A youth was charged with two counts of assault arising from an incident where burning flammable liquid came into contact with another youth's face and torso.

The Crown alleged the defendant deliberately threw the burning liquid at the complainant.

The defence argued it was an accidental splash caused by the defendant slipping and falling after being struck with water.

The court found the defendant's evidence credible and consistent, and that both versions of events provided reasonable explanations for how the injury occurred.

The court held that the Crown failed to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt and acquitted the defendant on both counts.

The accused was charged with two counts of sexual assault and two counts of sexual interference involving his distant cousin between the ages of 7 to 9 years old.

The allegations involved two incidents: touching of the complainant's genital area during a family gathering in a bedroom, and touching of the complainant's anus during a piggy-back ride in a lake at a camping trip.

The complainant testified via closed-circuit television at age 15, and her videotaped police statement was admitted.

The accused denied both incidents.

The court found that while the complainant presented as sincere, her evidence suffered from significant reliability problems including inconsistencies regarding material details, problematic circumstances of disclosure to family members prior to police involvement, and concerns with the manner in which the police interview was conducted.

The court found the accused's denials credible and determined the Crown had not discharged its burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and assault following an incident in which he allegedly groped and touched the complainant, a designated driver, without consent while she was driving him and a friend home from a bar.

The Crown alleged multiple instances of unwanted touching of the complainant's breasts and other parts of her body.

The accused testified that he was attempting to get the complainant's attention by touching her shoulder and side, and denied intentionally touching her breasts.

The court found that while the accused did touch the complainant without consent after being told not to do so, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the contact was sexual in nature.

The accused was acquitted of sexual assault but found guilty of assault.

The accused, charged with firearms and drug offences, brought pre-trial applications challenging the constitutional validity of a search warrant executed at their residence.

The warrant was based primarily on information from a confidential informant.

As part of the Garofoli procedure, the accused sought leave to cross-examine the affiant of the Information to Obtain (ITO) the search warrant on various alleged misstatements, omissions, and unsubstantiated claims.

The court granted leave to cross-examine on limited grounds, including the affiant's failure to maintain a proper investigative file, a specific reference to a police occurrence report, and the basis for the night entry request.

Leave was denied for the remaining proposed areas of cross-examination as they were deemed irrelevant or unlikely to elicit testimony discrediting the preconditions for the warrant's issuance.

The accused pleaded guilty to uttering threats to cause death by electronic messaging (Snapchat) directed at the student body of two schools between September and October 2017.

The Crown sought four months custody less pre-trial custody credit, three years probation, a five-year weapons prohibition, and a DNA order.

The defence argued for a suspended sentence with probation, emphasizing the accused's youth (18½ years old), first-offender status, and rehabilitation potential.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with three years probation, finding that pre-trial custody adequately addressed deterrence and denunciation principles, and that rehabilitation and reintegration were paramount given the accused's age and lack of criminal history.

The accused was charged with failing to comply with a roadside demand to provide a breath sample.

The defence raised allegations of racial profiling, arguing the stop was motivated by the accused's race and that the demand was unlawful.

The court found the officers had articulated objective grounds for the stop based on the time of day, location near licensed establishments with a history of drinking and driving incidents, the vehicle's prolonged stop at an intersection, and slow driving.

The court rejected the racial profiling allegation, finding no evidence the officers knew the accused's race before deciding to investigate.

The court also found the demand was lawful based on reasonable suspicion grounded in the smell of alcohol on the accused's breath, corroborated by multiple officers.

The accused failed to establish a reasonable excuse for refusing the demand, as his distrust of police was subjectively sincere but objectively unreasonable.

The accused was convicted.

A first-time offender pleaded guilty to assault causing bodily harm after unprovokedly assaulting a stranger on the street while intoxicated by alcohol and drugs.

The Crown sought 4-6 months custody followed by probation, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court imposed a 9-month conditional sentence with restrictive conditions including house arrest and community service, followed by 2 years probation, along with a 3-year weapons prohibition and DNA order.

The sentencing emphasized rehabilitation prospects, the offender's youth, positive response to charges, and engagement with psychological counselling addressing underlying substance abuse and mental health issues.

The offender was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder for the brutal stabbing of his estranged wife in her home.

The Crown sought a 20-year parole ineligibility period, while the defence sought 12 to 15 years.

The court considered the extreme brutality of the attack, the domestic context, and the offender's lack of remorse as aggravating factors.

Applying the Shropshire principles, the court set the parole ineligibility period at 17 years, the top end of the usual range for spousal murder.

The accused was tried for first-degree murder after the victim was found with 138 stab wounds.

During the trial, the defence sought to have the trial judge instruct the jury on self-defence and provocation, arguing that the victim may have attacked the accused first with a knife found at the scene.

The trial judge applied the air of reality test and concluded there was no evidential foundation for either defence, noting that the placement of the knife was staged and there was no evidence of the victim initiating an assault or provoking the accused.

The request to include the defences in the jury charge was denied.

During a murder trial, the Crown sought to admit statements made by the accused during a prior plea inquiry where a guilty plea was ultimately rejected by the court.

The Crown intended to use these statements to cross-examine the accused if the defence of duress was raised.

The court ruled that statements made during a rejected plea inquiry are inextricably linked to the aborted plea and are inadmissible, as admitting them would undermine trial fairness and have a chilling effect on plea negotiations.

During a first-degree murder trial, the defence sought to admit a portion of a prior court transcript containing a judge's comments ordering an assessment of the accused's fitness to stand trial.

The defence argued the comments provided context to the accused's prior admissions of guilt.

The court ruled the judge's statements were inadmissible, finding they did not provide context to the accused's statements and that admitting them without the subsequent psychiatric assessment finding the accused fit to stand trial would mislead the jury.

The accused was charged with first-degree murder following the stabbing death of his estranged wife.

At the close of the Crown's case, the accused brought an application for a directed verdict, arguing there was insufficient evidence of planning and deliberation to go to the jury.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the accused's prior statements, motive, and post-offence conduct provided sufficient circumstantial evidence upon which a properly instructed jury could reasonably infer that the murder was planned and deliberate.

The defendant pleaded guilty to one count of mischief under $5,000 for defacing transit shelters with anti-Muslim graffiti in the Durham region.

The Crown sought a jail sentence of 4-6 months followed by probation with counselling requirements, emphasizing general deterrence.

The defence sought a conditional sentence with community service and counselling.

The court imposed a 5-month jail sentence followed by 15 months probation, finding that a community-based sentence would not meet the principles of sentencing given the hate-motivated nature of the offence, the defendant's criminal history of breaches, and the need for general deterrence in the community.