G. Hendry

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, raising five grounds: the trial judge's handling of a Charter application, alleged misapprehension of evidence regarding vehicle damage, judicial interventions during cross-examination, the use of the appellant's statements to a breath technician, and the sufficiency of reasons for credibility assessment.

The appeal court found no error in the trial judge's dismissal of the Charter application due to the appellant's procedural failures, nor in the inference of a collision based on witness testimony.

The court also determined that the trial judge's interventions did not create an unfair trial or apprehension of bias, and that the appellant's statements, once introduced by the defence, were available for credibility analysis.

The trial judge's reasons for rejecting the appellant's testimony were deemed sufficient.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to surrender into custody.

The accused was charged with two counts of sexual assault contrary to s. 271 of the Criminal Code and one count of breach of probation.

The Crown's case rested almost entirely on the credibility and reliability of the complainant.

The court found the complainant's evidence to be fraught with significant inconsistencies between her police statement and trial testimony, as well as between her evidence-in-chief and cross-examination.

The complainant's evidence regarding a 15-centimetre tear in her anus was found to be an outright fabrication, contradicted by the medical evidence of her family physician.

Additionally, the accused was in custody during the alleged date of the first assault.

The court found it unsafe to base a conviction on the complainant's evidence due to serious doubts regarding her veracity, credibility, and reliability.

All charges were dismissed.

A youth was charged with two counts of assault arising from an incident where burning flammable liquid came into contact with another youth's face and torso.

The Crown alleged the defendant deliberately threw the burning liquid at the complainant.

The defence argued it was an accidental splash caused by the defendant slipping and falling after being struck with water.

The court found the defendant's evidence credible and consistent, and that both versions of events provided reasonable explanations for how the injury occurred.

The court held that the Crown failed to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt and acquitted the defendant on both counts.

The accused was charged with two counts of sexual assault and two counts of sexual interference involving his distant cousin between the ages of 7 to 9 years old.

The allegations involved two incidents: touching of the complainant's genital area during a family gathering in a bedroom, and touching of the complainant's anus during a piggy-back ride in a lake at a camping trip.

The complainant testified via closed-circuit television at age 15, and her videotaped police statement was admitted.

The accused denied both incidents.

The court found that while the complainant presented as sincere, her evidence suffered from significant reliability problems including inconsistencies regarding material details, problematic circumstances of disclosure to family members prior to police involvement, and concerns with the manner in which the police interview was conducted.

The court found the accused's denials credible and determined the Crown had not discharged its burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and assault following an incident in which he allegedly groped and touched the complainant, a designated driver, without consent while she was driving him and a friend home from a bar.

The Crown alleged multiple instances of unwanted touching of the complainant's breasts and other parts of her body.

The accused testified that he was attempting to get the complainant's attention by touching her shoulder and side, and denied intentionally touching her breasts.

The court found that while the accused did touch the complainant without consent after being told not to do so, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the contact was sexual in nature.

The accused was acquitted of sexual assault but found guilty of assault.

The accused, charged with firearms and drug offences, brought pre-trial applications challenging the constitutional validity of a search warrant executed at their residence.

The warrant was based primarily on information from a confidential informant.

As part of the Garofoli procedure, the accused sought leave to cross-examine the affiant of the Information to Obtain (ITO) the search warrant on various alleged misstatements, omissions, and unsubstantiated claims.

The court granted leave to cross-examine on limited grounds, including the affiant's failure to maintain a proper investigative file, a specific reference to a police occurrence report, and the basis for the night entry request.

Leave was denied for the remaining proposed areas of cross-examination as they were deemed irrelevant or unlikely to elicit testimony discrediting the preconditions for the warrant's issuance.

The accused pleaded guilty to uttering threats to cause death by electronic messaging (Snapchat) directed at the student body of two schools between September and October 2017.

The Crown sought four months custody less pre-trial custody credit, three years probation, a five-year weapons prohibition, and a DNA order.

The defence argued for a suspended sentence with probation, emphasizing the accused's youth (18½ years old), first-offender status, and rehabilitation potential.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with three years probation, finding that pre-trial custody adequately addressed deterrence and denunciation principles, and that rehabilitation and reintegration were paramount given the accused's age and lack of criminal history.

The accused was charged with failing to comply with a roadside demand to provide a breath sample.

The defence raised allegations of racial profiling, arguing the stop was motivated by the accused's race and that the demand was unlawful.

The court found the officers had articulated objective grounds for the stop based on the time of day, location near licensed establishments with a history of drinking and driving incidents, the vehicle's prolonged stop at an intersection, and slow driving.

The court rejected the racial profiling allegation, finding no evidence the officers knew the accused's race before deciding to investigate.

The court also found the demand was lawful based on reasonable suspicion grounded in the smell of alcohol on the accused's breath, corroborated by multiple officers.

The accused failed to establish a reasonable excuse for refusing the demand, as his distrust of police was subjectively sincere but objectively unreasonable.

The accused was convicted.

A first-time offender pleaded guilty to assault causing bodily harm after unprovokedly assaulting a stranger on the street while intoxicated by alcohol and drugs.

The Crown sought 4-6 months custody followed by probation, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court imposed a 9-month conditional sentence with restrictive conditions including house arrest and community service, followed by 2 years probation, along with a 3-year weapons prohibition and DNA order.

The sentencing emphasized rehabilitation prospects, the offender's youth, positive response to charges, and engagement with psychological counselling addressing underlying substance abuse and mental health issues.

The offender was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder for the brutal stabbing of his estranged wife in her home.

The Crown sought a 20-year parole ineligibility period, while the defence sought 12 to 15 years.

The court considered the extreme brutality of the attack, the domestic context, and the offender's lack of remorse as aggravating factors.

Applying the Shropshire principles, the court set the parole ineligibility period at 17 years, the top end of the usual range for spousal murder.

The accused was tried for first-degree murder after the victim was found with 138 stab wounds.

During the trial, the defence sought to have the trial judge instruct the jury on self-defence and provocation, arguing that the victim may have attacked the accused first with a knife found at the scene.

The trial judge applied the air of reality test and concluded there was no evidential foundation for either defence, noting that the placement of the knife was staged and there was no evidence of the victim initiating an assault or provoking the accused.

The request to include the defences in the jury charge was denied.

During a first-degree murder trial, the defence sought to admit a portion of a prior court transcript containing a judge's comments ordering an assessment of the accused's fitness to stand trial.

The defence argued the comments provided context to the accused's prior admissions of guilt.

The court ruled the judge's statements were inadmissible, finding they did not provide context to the accused's statements and that admitting them without the subsequent psychiatric assessment finding the accused fit to stand trial would mislead the jury.

The accused was charged with first-degree murder following the stabbing death of his estranged wife.

At the close of the Crown's case, the accused brought an application for a directed verdict, arguing there was insufficient evidence of planning and deliberation to go to the jury.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the accused's prior statements, motive, and post-offence conduct provided sufficient circumstantial evidence upon which a properly instructed jury could reasonably infer that the murder was planned and deliberate.

During a murder trial, the Crown sought to admit statements made by the accused during a prior plea inquiry where a guilty plea was ultimately rejected by the court.

The Crown intended to use these statements to cross-examine the accused if the defence of duress was raised.

The court ruled that statements made during a rejected plea inquiry are inextricably linked to the aborted plea and are inadmissible, as admitting them would undermine trial fairness and have a chilling effect on plea negotiations.

The defendant pleaded guilty to one count of mischief under $5,000 for defacing transit shelters with anti-Muslim graffiti in the Durham region.

The Crown sought a jail sentence of 4-6 months followed by probation with counselling requirements, emphasizing general deterrence.

The defence sought a conditional sentence with community service and counselling.

The court imposed a 5-month jail sentence followed by 15 months probation, finding that a community-based sentence would not meet the principles of sentencing given the hate-motivated nature of the offence, the defendant's criminal history of breaches, and the need for general deterrence in the community.

The Crown sought a ruling on the admissibility of in-court statements made by the accused, Nelson Tayongtong, on two separate dates (March 11 and March 17, 2015).

The Defence opposed, arguing the statements were made to persons in authority, that the accused lacked an operating mind, or that their admission would lead to an unfair trial by revealing mental health issues.

The court found that the statements were not made to persons in authority, thus the confessions rule did not apply.

Even if it did, the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had an operating mind.

The court also determined that the statements could be redacted to avoid disclosing mental illness to the jury.

Consequently, the in-court statements were ruled admissible.

The defendant was charged with communicating by telecommunication with a person he believed was under 18 years of age for the purpose of facilitating a sexual offence contrary to section 172.2(2) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant posted advertisements on Craigslist's "Casual Encounters" section and engaged in electronic communications with an undercover police officer posing as a 15-year-old girl named "Krissy." The defendant sent explicit sexual messages and photographs, requested voicemails and photos, and ultimately provided his residential address to facilitate a meeting.

The defendant claimed he did not subjectively believe he was communicating with a child and that he took reasonable steps to ascertain the person's age.

The court rejected both defenses and found the defendant guilty.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while over 80 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

A police officer lawfully stopped the defendant for traffic violations and sobriety concerns.

The officer formed reasonable suspicion and administered an approved screening device test, which the defendant failed.

However, the officer delayed providing Charter rights to counsel by approximately 10 minutes after arrest.

The defendant brought a Charter application alleging a breach of s. 10(b) rights and sought exclusion of breath samples under s. 24(2).

The court found a s. 10(b) breach but declined to exclude the evidence, finding the nexus between the breach and the evidence too tenuous and that admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The defendant was convicted.

The applicant brought an application for certiorari to quash his committal for trial on charges of attempted murder and transferring a firearm.

He argued the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional errors by allowing the Crown to re-open its case and by improperly weighing after-the-fact conduct evidence.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding that the decision to re-open the case was an evidentiary ruling not subject to certiorari, and that there was some evidence upon which the judge could reasonably order committal on the attempted murder charge.

Two defendants were charged with operating motor vehicles on Highway 401 while performing a stunt (speeding 80 km/h over the limit), racing, and careless driving.

The Crown's evidence established that the defendants were paced by a police officer at 180 km/h in a 100 km/h zone.

The defendants claimed they were travelling at 120-140 km/h and invoked the defence of necessity, arguing they accelerated to create distance from a vehicle following closely behind.

The court found the Crown's evidence credible and reliable, rejected the necessity defence as failing the modified objective test, and applied the Kienapple principle to stay the careless driving and racing charges, resulting in convictions for performing a stunt.