Gary H. Luftspring

The plaintiff, an Ontario corporation, sued the defendant, a Wisconsin corporation, in Ontario for unpaid royalty payments under a licence agreement.

The defendant brought a motion to dismiss or stay the action, arguing the Ontario court lacked jurisdiction simpliciter or was forum non conveniens.

The court found it had jurisdiction because the defendant carried on business in Ontario through its employees and direct sales.

The court declined to stay the action, finding the defendant failed to establish that Wisconsin was clearly the more appropriate forum.

The moving defendants sought an order declaring a 2001 commercial action deemed dismissed under Rule 48.15(6), or alternatively dismissed for delay under Rule 24.01.

The court held that, because a notice of intent to defend had been filed, the action was not effectively deemed dismissed as abandoned, following the existing interpretation of the transition provision for undefended actions.

On the delay motion, the court accepted that lengthy inactivity was plausibly explained by extended settlement efforts between the principal parties and found the moving defendants had not demonstrated actual prejudice or a substantial risk to a fair trial in what was largely a document-driven promissory note dispute.

The motion was dismissed, limitations issues were left for another day, and the court imposed an expedited timetable under the new Rule 48.14 framework.

The moving parties sought dismissal of a will challenge brought by a beneficiary alleging lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence in relation to two wills.

The court held that the claim was barred by the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002 because the claimant knew or ought to have known of the material facts shortly after the testator’s death yet commenced proceedings more than two years later.

The claimant had received substantial benefits under the wills and actively participated in estate administration, including sale of assets and receipt of distributions.

The court further held that the doctrines of estoppel by convention and estoppel by representation independently barred the challenge because the parties had proceeded on the shared assumption that the wills were valid and the estate trustees relied on that assumption in administering the estate.

The will challenge was therefore dismissed.

The plaintiff sought specific performance of an alleged oral agreement granting him a 10% equity interest in a startup company in exchange for his work.

In the alternative, he claimed oppression under s. 248 of the Business Corporations Act arising from his termination and the denial of equity.

The court found that no binding oral contract had been formed, emphasizing the absence of contemporaneous documentation and the lack of objective evidence of mutual intention to create legal relations.

The plaintiff therefore failed to establish offer, acceptance, and enforceable agreement.

The court also rejected the oppression claim, holding that the plaintiff was not a shareholder, officer, or director and had no reasonable expectation of equity.

The plaintiff, a senior investment banker, alleged he was constructively dismissed when his employer failed to promote him to a promised Team Leader position by a fixed date.

The court found that the employer had not breached the employment contract, as it was taking reasonable steps to implement the promotion within a reasonable timeframe and had paid the plaintiff significant increased compensation.

The court concluded the plaintiff voluntarily resigned to join a competitor start-up.

The constructive dismissal claim was dismissed, but the plaintiff was awarded minor amounts for unpaid cash incentive pay and a declared dividend.

Following certification of a national class proceeding and dismissal of defendants’ summary judgment motions, the court determined costs arising from the certification and related motions.

The court applied Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and principles governing costs in class proceedings, including fairness, reasonable expectations of the parties, and the access to justice objectives of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The litigation involved extensive evidence, numerous defendants, and complex factual and legal issues affecting approximately 10,000 class members with alleged losses approaching $150 million.

The court rejected requests for substantial indemnity costs and declined to refer costs to formal assessment, instead fixing costs directly.

Significant partial indemnity costs and disbursements were awarded to the plaintiff, apportioned among the defendant groups.

The plaintiff brought a motion to certify a class action against the promoters, lawyers, and other entities involved in a charitable donation tax shelter scheme called the Donations for Canada Gift Program.

The Canada Revenue Agency had disallowed the charitable tax credits claimed by the participants, finding they lacked donative intent.

The defendants brought motions for summary judgment.

The court certified the action as a class proceeding, finding that the pleadings disclosed causes of action in negligence, negligent misrepresentation, fraud, conspiracy, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment.

The court dismissed the defendants' motions for summary judgment, concluding that a trial was required to fully appreciate the evidence and resolve the complex factual issues, including whether the contracts were vitiated by fraud.

The appellants appealed an order of the motion judge regarding the assessment of a solicitor's account.

On consent, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in concluding that a Master's order had to be set aside before he had jurisdiction.

The corporate client was permitted to proceed directly to an assessment of its account, while the individual client was not.

Costs of the appeal were awarded to the appellant.

The applicant, an African Canadian youth hockey player, alleged racial discrimination by his hockey club, including unequal playing time and being instructed to fight.

The respondents requested the application be dismissed under section 45.1 of the Human Rights Code, arguing the matter had already been dealt with by a Greater Toronto Hockey League (GTHL) special committee.

The Tribunal found that the GTHL proceeding appropriately dealt with the substance of the application and dismissed the human rights application.

The appellants, former directors and officers, sought a declaration that their insurer was obligated to pay 90 or 100 per cent of their defence costs for civil and regulatory proceedings arising from conduct in 2001 and 2003.

The insurer had been paying 50 per cent, arguing the policy only covered the 2001 conduct.

The application judge dismissed the application.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the policy's allocation provisions ambiguous when read with the definition of 'Loss'.

Because the factual record was insufficient to resolve the ambiguity or determine if the doctrine of contra proferentem applied, the Court allowed the appeal and directed a new hearing on the allocation issue.

Following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal, the court received written submissions regarding costs.

Given the complexity of the matter and the significant amount at issue, the successful respondent was awarded costs of the appeal fixed at $23,623.26 on a partial indemnity scale, inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The appellant insurer appealed a summary judgment ordering it to pay 80 percent of the defence costs incurred by the respondent's directors and officers in a class action for prospectus misrepresentation.

The insurer argued that a pollution exclusion clause in the directors' and officers' liability policy excluded coverage because the class action arose following a tailings dam collapse and the release of toxic waste.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's finding that the exclusion clause applied to pollution losses rather than all losses connected to a pollution-related claim, and that the allocation endorsement was properly applied since the claims involved both covered and uncovered losses.

Dr. Levman, a veterinarian, appealed a ruling by the Executive Director that prohibited any horse he treated from racing in Ontario.

The ruling was based on Dr. Levman purchasing unapproved and improperly labelled drugs from an unauthorized source and using them on racehorses.

The Commission upheld the ruling, finding that Dr. Levman prioritized his convenience and clients' demands over regulatory compliance and horse safety.

However, the Commission amended the penalty from a lifetime ban to a four-year suspension, ending September 24, 2009, noting his cooperation and lesser involvement compared to other veterinarians in similar cases.

The appellants suffered losses in their margin accounts with a securities dealer and sued the dealer.

They later sought to amend their claim to add the Investment Dealers Association of Canada (IDA) as a defendant, alleging negligence in its regulatory oversight.

The motions judge dismissed the motion, finding no reasonable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the IDA, as a voluntary regulator, owes its duty to the public at large rather than to individual investors, and that policy considerations such as indeterminate liability negate any prima facie duty of care.

The appellant landlords appealed a Board of Inquiry decision finding that their use of rent-to-income ratios to screen prospective tenants constituted constructive discrimination under the Human Rights Code.

The Divisional Court upheld the Board's findings that the sole use of such criteria disproportionately excluded protected groups and was not a bona fide requirement.

However, the Court amended the Board's forward-looking prohibition against using income criteria, noting that recent amendments to the Code and O. Reg. 290/98 now expressly permit landlords to use income information in specific ways.

Three complainants alleged that the respondent landlords discriminated against them by using minimum income criteria and rent-to-income ratios to deny them rental accommodation.

The Ontario Board of Inquiry found that the use of these criteria constitutes adverse effect discrimination on the basis of sex, marital status, family status, age, citizenship, place of origin, and receipt of public assistance.

The Board held that the landlords failed to establish that the income criteria were reasonable and bona fide, as there was no empirical evidence showing that rent-to-income ratios accurately predict a tenant's likelihood of defaulting on rent.

The Board ordered the landlords to cease using income criteria and awarded general and specific damages to the complainants.