Frederick L. Myers

The plaintiff, previously declared a vexatious litigant, commenced an action against her former criminal lawyer without obtaining prior leave of the court, in direct contravention of a 2009 order.

Pursuant to Rule 2.1.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which mandates dismissal of proceedings instituted by vexatious litigants without leave, the court dismissed the plaintiff's action.

The court emphasized the administrative nature of this rule, requiring no judicial decision beyond confirming the breach of the vexatious litigant order.

Costs were awarded to the defendant on a full indemnity basis.

The applicant sought interim custody of the parties' two children under the Children's Law Reform Act.

The respondent challenged the Ontario court's jurisdiction, arguing the children should be sent to Arizona.

The court found it lacked jurisdiction under s. 22(1)(a) and (b) as the children were not habitually resident in Ontario and lacked a real and substantial connection.

However, under s. 40(b), the court made an interim custody order in the applicant's favour, finding it in the children's best interests to remain with the primary caregiver.

The court stayed the application, ordering the respondent to commence proceedings in Qatar (the children's habitual residence) by October 1, 2016, failing which he would be deemed to acquiesce to Ontario's jurisdiction.

The respondent's motion to send the children to Arizona was dismissed.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed an action under Rule 2.1 as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

This endorsement addresses the subsequent costs submissions.

The court found the plaintiff's conduct reprehensible, including making scurrilous allegations and extortionary threats against the defendants and their counsel, and attempting to exploit a vulnerable individual.

Consequently, the court awarded full indemnity costs to all successful defendants, emphasizing deterrence against such litigation tactics.

A case management judge reviewed the statement of claim, noting that one plaintiff, Ms. Laronde, was unrepresented and her claims lacked clarity.

The court initiated a process under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to consider dismissing her action as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

Pending a written hearing, Ms. Laronde's action was stayed pursuant to s.106 of the Courts of Justice Act, and further filings from her were restricted.

This endorsement concerns the costs award following the dismissal of the plaintiff's vexatious action under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff's claim against a Crown Prosecutor was found to be an abuse of process, exhibiting characteristics of Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument (OPCA) claims.

The court emphasized that while access to justice for self-represented parties is important for bona fide claims, it does not extend to abusive or vexatious proceedings.

The plaintiff's conduct was deemed reprehensible, warranting costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court fixed costs payable by the plaintiff to the defendant at $2,256.39.

The defendant sought to dismiss the plaintiff's amended statement of claim as frivolous or vexatious under Rule 2.1.01(6), following a previous order striking out parts of the original claim with leave to amend.

The court found that while the claim might be weak, it was not "obvious on the face of the pleading" that it was frivolous or vexatious, and the pleaded facts logically related to a theoretical cause of action for breach of an articling principal's duties.

The court declined to issue a notice under Form 2.1A, allowing the action to proceed to defence or a potential summary judgment motion.

This application, involving a constitutional challenge to parts of the Human Rights Code, was dismissed under Rule 2.1.01(6) as an abuse of process.

The applicant had previously brought a similar constitutional challenge that was dismissed for lack of standing.

The court affirmed that it lacked jurisdiction to review the prior decision and that commencing a second proceeding for the same relief constituted an abuse of process.

The plaintiff, a declared vexatious litigant, commenced a new proceeding without obtaining the required leave under section 140(3) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The registrar brought the action to the court's attention.

Pursuant to Rule 2.1.03(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which mandates dismissal or stay for such unauthorized proceedings, the court dismissed the action.

The court noted the plaintiff's brazen disregard for a prior injunction and clarified that the dismissal is an administrative enforcement of court processes.

The Superior Court of Justice, on its own initiative under Rule 2.1, dismissed an action brought by Daniel Irmya and others as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The plaintiff, Irmya, had filed a Notice of Action and a motion seeking various remedies related to a real estate transaction, claiming fraud and negligence by the defendants.

The court found no plausible legal basis for the claims, noting Irmya's intention to profit from a cheap property acquisition rather than assist.

The court emphasized that while access to justice for self-represented litigants is important, claims must be legally recognizable and not merely based on personal beliefs or community works.

The action was dismissed, and the defendants were awarded costs.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's action as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, identifying it as an Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument (OPCA) claim.

The plaintiff failed to deliver written submissions in response to a notice indicating the court's consideration of dismissal.

The court emphasized that OPCA claims are an abuse of process and should be summarily dismissed without extensive judicial analysis, referencing Meads v. Meads.

The applicant, Saeed Yahyavi, brought an emergency motion to restrain the sale of his home by the respondent, Nadi Inc., under power of sale.

The applicant alleged that Nadi Inc. failed to disclose and account for a $250,000 payment received from a settlement in a fraudulent conveyance action, which should have been credited against the judgment debt secured by the mortgage on his home.

The court found that Nadi Inc. knowingly misstated the amount due in the notice of sale by improperly characterizing the settlement funds as punitive damages and costs rather than a realization on the judgment.

The court declared the notice of sale void and enjoined Nadi Inc. from completing the sale.

The applicant was ordered to pay $1,100,000 into court, and the issues regarding the proper amount due were referred to a Master for accounting.

The court, acting under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, dismissed the plaintiff's action against the remaining two defendants (The Beer Store and The City of Toronto) for being frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

Despite a prior order to re-draft her statement of claim to focus on a slip and fall incident, the plaintiff submitted an 83-page document that continued to allege a broad criminal conspiracy involving numerous irrelevant parties, including the presiding judge, and subsumed the slip and fall claim within these unsubstantiated allegations.

The plaintiff failed to deliver further submissions after being notified of the court's consideration to dismiss the action.

The plaintiff, Paula Lloyd, brought a motion seeking to enforce a debt against the defendant, Winners Apparel Ltd. The court found that previous judgments, one in the plaintiff's favour and one for costs against her, resulted in a set-off, leaving no amount owing by the defendant.

Furthermore, the plaintiff's prior bankruptcy in 2009 meant any debt would have vested in her Trustee, and she provided no evidence of the debt being reconveyed to her upon discharge.

Consequently, the plaintiff had no right to enforce the debt.

The motion was dismissed, and the defendant was awarded $4,000 in costs.

The applicant's motion to strike the respondent's pleadings for persistent failure to provide financial disclosure was granted, while the respondent's cross-motion to strike the applicant's pleadings was dismissed.

The respondent had ignored disclosure orders for three years, providing disorganized and incomplete financial information, making a contested trial impossible.

The court emphasized the critical importance of early, voluntary, and complete financial disclosure in family law proceedings and the duty of parties to promote a just outcome.

The respondent's conduct was deemed willful and egregious, warranting the striking of his pleadings.

The court considered dismissing the plaintiff's action under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, finding it appeared frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The plaintiff's claims, including complaints about inflated legal aid fees and family trust irregularities, were found to be a collateral attack on a prior judgment by Justice Campbell.

The court determined that all claims had been previously determined, and commencing new proceedings to re-litigate unsuccessful claims constituted an abuse of process.

The action was dismissed, and the defendants were awarded costs.

The Superior Court of Justice considered a Rule 2.1 review initiated by defendants Geoff Pollock & Associates and Nisha Subba, concerning an action and motion brought by plaintiff Daniel Irmya.

Irmya had filed a Notice of Action claiming significant damages for conversion, unjust enrichment, and fraud related to a real estate transaction, but failed to file a Statement of Claim.

He subsequently filed a motion seeking various orders, including permission to represent plaintiff trusts and extensive financial disclosure from the defendants.

The court found Irmya's motion record to be vexatious on its face and the relief sought either unavailable or premature.

Consequently, the court ordered a Rule 2.1 notice to be issued to Irmya, indicating a potential dismissal of his motion and the entire action, and stayed all proceedings pending the outcome of this review.

This endorsement addresses two procedural matters: a proposed summary judgment motion by the Slades against Frank Manzo, and Tanfi Limited's request for a case conference to vary an order regarding a stay of a writ of possession.

The court declined to take steps on the Slades' proposed motion due to lack of proper notice to Mr. Manzo.

Regarding Tanfi's request, the court clarified that the stay of the writ of possession, which had been extended until the disposition of the Slades' appeal, had expired upon the Court of Appeal's dismissal of that appeal.

The court stated that no further order was required for Tanfi to enforce its summary judgment, and declined to schedule a case conference as it was unnecessary.

The court also directed that no further informal communications be made to the judge's assistant.

The plaintiff sought an interim injunction against the defendants for alleged breaches of an oral retainer/employment agreement, fiduciary duties, and confidentiality.

The court found serious issues to be tried regarding whether Mr. Macklin and his company breached their agreement, owed fiduciary duties as a "de facto general manager," and took confidential property.

The balance of convenience plainly favoured the plaintiff, as the potential harm to its business was deemed irreparable and difficult to quantify, while the defendants' inconvenience was less significant.

An interim injunction was granted, prohibiting the defendants from accepting business from specific entities related to the plaintiff's flower transport business until a further interlocutory motion hearing.

The plaintiff's action against her former employer, LCBO, alleging work-related illness and injuries from 1996-2004, was dismissed under Rule 2.1.01.

The court found that the claims, which stemmed from unsuccessful WSIB claims, were precluded by the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, 1997, which vests exclusive jurisdiction in the WSIB and makes its decisions final and unreviewable by courts.

The action was deemed frivolous and an attempt to re-litigate a prior dismissed claim.

The court, acting under Rule 2.1, dismissed the applicant's proceeding as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

This decision followed a prior endorsement where the applicant was invited to provide submissions explaining why the application should not be dismissed, but no submissions were received.

The court found the proceeding sought relief it could not grant.