Farrah Hudani

The applicant mother sought an interim order to relocate with the parties' two children from Toronto to Ottawa due to a mandatory military posting.

The respondent father brought a motion to dismiss the application, arguing British Columbia was the children's habitual residence.

The court found Ontario had jurisdiction as the children were habitually resident there pursuant to the parties' separation agreement.

The court granted the interim relocation, finding compelling circumstances, and ordered a flexible parenting schedule for the father.

The court declined to order child support, finding the father would suffer undue hardship due to the high costs of travel to exercise parenting time and his existing support obligations for two other children.

The respondent mother brought an ex parte motion under the Children's Law Reform Act seeking an order to enforce a final parenting order from the Supreme Court of India, which had previously been recognized by the Ontario court.

The applicant father had failed to return the child to India and had subsequently obtained an ex parte emergency protection order in Illinois granting him physical care of the child.

The court dismissed the mother's ex parte motion, finding it inappropriate to conduct a best interests analysis to choose between conflicting foreign orders without notice to the father.

The dismissal was without prejudice to the mother returning to court after her pending motions in Illinois were determined or upon providing notice to the father.

The applicant father brought a motion under the Hague Convention for the return of his three-year-old daughter to Florida.

The respondent mother had travelled to Toronto with the child in July 2021 and subsequently decided not to return.

The court applied the hybrid approach to determine the child's habitual residence immediately prior to the alleged wrongful retention in December 2021.

The court found that the focal point of the child's life was in Canada, where she had spent a significant portion of her life and where her primary caregiver and extended family resided.

As the child was habitually resident in Canada, the Hague Convention application was dismissed.

The Divisional Court issued an endorsement to clarify its previous decision overturning a trial judge's parenting order.

The parties sought clarification on whether the trial order or a prior interim order governed the father's parenting time.

The court confirmed that because the trial order was set aside, the interim parenting order from September 22, 2015, continues in effect until a new order is agreed upon or imposed.

No costs were awarded.

The parties, unmarried parents of a three-year-old child, separated after a brief relationship marked by high conflict and incidents of domestic violence.

The mother sought sole decision-making responsibility and permission to relocate with the child from North Bay to Sudbury, while the father sought joint decision-making and equal parenting time in North Bay.

The court granted the mother sole decision-making responsibility, finding that the parties' inability to communicate and the father's lack of trust made joint decision-making unworkable.

The court also authorized the relocation to Sudbury, concluding it was in the child's best interests given the mother's role as primary caregiver, her need for family support, and the father's failure to foster a cooperative relationship.

The father was granted generous parenting time and ordered to pay child support.

The applicant mother sought to relocate with the parties' three children to Cleveland, Ohio, to live with her new spouse.

The respondent father opposed the relocation.

The court considered the children's views and preferences, which strongly favoured the move, alongside the history of the parents' relationship, allegations of family violence, and the mother's restrictive approach to the father's parenting time.

Despite concerns about the mother's willingness to foster the children's relationship with the father, the court found that refusing the relocation would pose a significant risk to the children's best interests given their strong alignment with the mother.

The relocation was permitted, with a detailed parenting plan ordered to ensure the father's ongoing involvement.

The father was also ordered to pay child support, including a significant amount for section 7 expense arrears, while the mother's claim for spousal support was dismissed without prejudice.

The mother brought a motion seeking an order that the father pay his proportionate share of the child's section 7 expenses, including daycare, private school tuition, and extracurricular activities, as well as a retroactive adjustment to child support.

The court granted the request for daycare expenses, finding them reasonable and necessary.

However, the court dismissed the claims for private school tuition, finding it unaffordable and unnecessary, and for extracurricular activities, finding them not extraordinary.

The request for a retroactive adjustment to child support was also dismissed due to insufficient evidence to set aside the parties' prior agreement.

The moving party mother brought a motion seeking an order for the responding party father to pay his proportionate share of the child's section 7 expenses, including daycare, private school tuition, and extracurricular activities, as well as a retroactive adjustment to child support.

The court granted the request for daycare expenses, finding them reasonable and necessary for the mother to work.

However, the court dismissed the claims for private school tuition, finding it unaffordable and unnecessary, and for extracurricular activities, finding them not extraordinary.

The request to retroactively adjust child support by setting aside a prior agreement was also dismissed.

The appellant mother appealed a trial decision denying her request to relocate with her child from Waterloo to Michigan to live with her fiancé.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and admitted fresh evidence of emails demonstrating the respondent father's emotionally abusive and controlling behaviour.

The court found the trial judge erred in principle by failing to apply established mobility jurisprudence, over-emphasizing the maximum contact principle, failing to respect the custodial parent's views, treating the status quo as a default, and placing the mother in a classic double bind.

The appeal was allowed, and the mother was granted permission to relocate with the child.

The respondent (wife) brought a motion to enforce a consent order requiring the applicant (husband) to transfer his interest in a holding company and resign as officer/director, as a spousal tax-free capital rollover.

The husband refused to comply, arguing he was unaware he had signed a personal guarantee for the dental practice's line of credit and that the order should be set aside due to mutual or unilateral mistake, or unconscionability, as it did not address his release from the guarantee.

The court found no valid reason to set aside the order, noting the husband was represented by counsel, had an existing indemnity, and the wife had attempted to secure his release from the bank without success.

The court dismissed the husband's arguments of mistake and unconscionability, emphasizing that buyer's remorse is not a basis to disobey a consent order.

The motion to enforce the order was granted, compelling the husband to comply within seven days, regardless of the guarantee release, and ordering the wife to provide a further indemnity.

Following the dismissal of the appellant's motion for a stay pending appeal of an access order, the respondent sought costs.

The court reviewed the offers to settle made by the appellant and found they did not comply with the strict requirements of Rule 18(14) of the Family Law Rules, as they were conditional or included predeterminations of costs.

However, considering the parties' reasonable behaviour and the factors under Rule 24(12), the court awarded the successful respondent costs fixed at $5,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The applicant father sought to re-open an already decided appeal based on new text message evidence from the respondent mother, which he argued undermined her previous narrative regarding their child's residency in Dubai.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the application, reiterating that re-opening an appeal is a rare event reserved for cases of "very serious injustice." The court found the new evidence irrelevant to its original decision, which focused on the need to respect a U.K. Consent Custody Order and for the father to pursue the matter in the U.K. first, rather than making credibility findings.

Costs were awarded against the father.

The applicant mother unilaterally suspended the respondent father's access to their medically fragile child, Mileena, citing COVID-19 risks.

The respondent father brought a motion for compliance and broader relief, while the applicant mother brought a cross-motion.

The court previously ordered the mother to restore access.

In this decision, the court found the respondent father's current motion for compliance was no longer urgent because the applicant mother had restored access.

The court emphasized the parents' obligation to ensure access and protect the child from parental conflict, warning against future non-compliance and potential police enforcement.

An earlier order regarding COVID-19 precautions was amended by consent.

The appellant mother brought a motion for a stay pending appeal of an interlocutory order that permitted the respondent father to continue in-person access to their immunocompromised child during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The mother also sought the appointment of counsel for the child.

The court applied the three-part test for a stay pending appeal.

While finding the appeal raised a serious issue, the court concluded the child would not suffer irreparable harm due to the strict safety conditions imposed by the motion judge, and the balance of convenience did not favour a stay.

The mother's motion for a stay and appointment of counsel was dismissed, as was the father's motion to admit fresh evidence.

The father brought an application under s. 40 of the Children's Law Reform Act (CLRA) seeking the return of their child to Dubai, claiming wrongful retention in Ontario.

The application judge ordered the child's return to Dubai, erroneously applying the Hague Convention framework despite the UAE not being a signatory.

The Court of Appeal found this was an error, as s. 40 CLRA is distinct from the Hague Convention, particularly regarding the concept of "habitual residence" and the court's broad discretionary powers.

The appeal was allowed, the lower order set aside, and the father's application stayed on condition he commence proceedings in the UK, where a prior consent custody order existed.

The applicant father brought an urgent, ex parte motion for a temporary order preventing the respondent mother from removing their six-year-old daughter from the Greater Toronto Area and requiring the surrender of the child's passport.

The mother had recently removed the child from Dubai to Lebanon, and then to Canada, without the father's consent.

The court found jurisdiction under section 40 of the Children's Law Reform Act, concluding the child was wrongfully removed to Ontario and that a temporary non-removal order was in the child's best interests to prevent further abduction to a non-Hague Convention country.

The parties separated and the husband obtained a divorce and corollary relief in Singapore.

The wife commenced a competing proceeding for divorce and corollary relief in Ontario.

On a motion to determine jurisdiction, the court held that the Singapore divorce, equalization, and spousal support orders were valid and Ontario lacked jurisdiction to review them.

However, the court found that Ontario had jurisdiction over custody, access, and child support, as the children were habitually resident in Ontario and had a real and substantial connection to the province.

The mother sought a stay of an order requiring the return of two young children to their habitual residence in Tennessee, United States, pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.

The mother had removed the children from Tennessee to Ontario without the father's consent.

The application judge found the children's habitual residence was Tennessee and that return would not expose them to grave harm.

The mother could not return to the United States due to immigration restrictions, while the father had a criminal record preventing entry to Canada.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for a stay, finding no serious question to be tried on appeal, no irreparable harm to the children, and that the balance of convenience favoured prompt return to the jurisdiction of habitual residence.

The applicant mother, Andrea Bolla, brought an application for custody in Ontario after wrongfully removing her two children from Botswana, where they habitually resided with the respondent father, Alias Swart.

The central issue was whether the Ontario court should accept jurisdiction, which required the applicant to establish a risk of "serious harm" to the children if returned to Botswana under s. 23 of the Children's Law Reform Act.

The court found the applicant's claims of abuse, corruption in the Botswana legal system, and the children's anxiety to be unsubstantiated or insufficient to meet the high threshold of "serious harm." The court ordered the children's return to Botswana for custody proceedings to continue there, with undertakings from the father to mitigate short-term harm.

The maternal grandparents of an 8-year-old child appealed an order granting custody to the mother and allowing her to relocate to British Columbia.

The grandparents obtained a stay of the custody order pending appeal from a single judge of the Court of Appeal.

The mother sought a review of the stay order.

The panel set aside the stay, finding that the motion judge had relied on a misleading record containing fresh evidence that did not meet the Palmer test, and that the test for a stay was not met given the lower court's factual findings regarding the mother's capability and the child's best interests.