Erin Pancer

Following a jury verdict finding the applicant guilty of firearms and drug offences, the applicant brought a post-verdict application for a stay of proceedings under s. 7 and s. 24(1) of the Charter.

The applicant alleged that a police officer breached an order excluding witnesses and lied about it, amounting to an abuse of process.

The court dismissed the application, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the application post-verdict because the alleged conduct engaged trial fairness concerns and should have been raised before the verdict.

In the alternative, the court found as a fact that the officer did not breach the order or lie.

The accused was convicted of multiple firearms and drug offences, including selling firearms to an undercover officer and possessing significant quantities of fentanyl and crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, noting the danger of guns and fentanyl in the community.

Applying the principle of totality, the court imposed a global sentence of 11 years' imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody and strict bail, resulting in 10 years and 140 days remaining to be served.

The accused was charged with firearm and drug offences after police executed a search warrant at his residence targeting another individual.

The accused brought pre-trial Charter applications alleging violations of his rights under sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b), seeking exclusion of evidence under section 24(2).

The Crown sought to prove the voluntariness of the accused's statements and relied on the Garofoli step 6 procedure to uphold the search warrant based on confidential informant information.

The court found the search warrant was constitutionally valid and dismissed the section 9 claim.

However, the court found section 10(b) violations because police compelled the accused to open a safe without re-advising him of his right to counsel, and delayed implementing his right to counsel at the police station.

Despite these breaches, the court admitted the evidence under section 24(2), finding the breaches were not serious and had minimal impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests.

The accused's statements were ruled voluntary and admissible.

Rima Mansour, a 51-year-old woman with no criminal record, sought a 90-day detention review after being detained on tertiary grounds for serious firearms importation and trafficking charges.

The court granted bail, finding that the COVID-19 pandemic constituted a material change in circumstances.

Despite the formidable Crown case and gravity of the offences, the applicant's vulnerability due to pre-existing health conditions, the risks of infection in a correctional facility, and the likely delay in trial proceedings outweighed the public interest in continued detention.

The proposed strict surety release plan was deemed sufficient to address secondary ground concerns.

The accused, Andrew Bond, was found guilty of possession of cocaine for trafficking and illegal possession of a loaded semi-automatic handgun.

This judgment addresses three Charter applications made by the defence during the trial: (1) exclusion of evidence obtained via search warrants based on confidential informants, (2) exclusion of evidence obtained through warrantless cellphone "pinging" and (3) a breach of the right to counsel due to delayed access.

The court upheld the search warrants after a Garofoli analysis, found that the "pinging" was justified by exigent circumstances (or that the evidence would not be excluded under s.24(2) of the Charter), and determined that the delay in access to counsel did not constitute an infringement or cause actual prejudice.

All defence applications to exclude evidence were denied.

The defendant, Dale Lapps, brought an application to resile from an admission made by his counsel regarding the admissibility of his trucking logs in his third trial for importing and possessing cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown opposed the application, arguing that the admission was binding under section 655 of the Criminal Code and professional conduct rules.

The court found that an application was necessary to withdraw an admission and that such withdrawal is only permitted in narrow circumstances, such as mistake or misunderstanding, which were not demonstrated by the applicant.

The application was dismissed, and the admission stood.

The accused, charged with firearms offences related to importing a prohibited device via the 'dark web', brought a pre-trial motion seeking a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay was 37 months, exceeding the 30-month Jordan ceiling.

However, the court deducted 7.5 months of delay caused by defence counsel's unavailability following a conditional adjournment granted due to late-breaking electronic evidence.

The court found the net delay fell below the ceiling and, alternatively, that the case's technological complexity and transitional considerations justified the delay.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with 14 counts arising from a two-month period of criminal conduct directed at his former intimate partner and her three children, including attempted murder, uttering death threats, criminal harassment, and breach of probation.

The defendant pleaded guilty to nine counts and was tried on the remaining five.

He was acquitted of three counts of attempted murder but convicted of attempted possession of a prohibited firearm.

The Crown brought a dangerous offender application under section 753 of the Criminal Code.

The court found the defendant met the criteria for a dangerous offender designation based on a pattern of repetitive criminal harassment involving intimate partners spanning approximately 25 years across two countries.

The court imposed a four-year sentence for criminal harassment followed by a maximum ten-year long-term supervision order, finding that this lesser measure would adequately protect the public, rather than imposing an indeterminate sentence.

The accused was charged with three counts of attempted murder and one count of attempting to possess a prohibited firearm.

The court found that while the accused possessed the specific intent to kill, his actions regarding the attempted murder of the complainant's children did not progress beyond mere preparation, thus failing to establish the actus reus.

Consequently, he was found not guilty of attempted murder.

However, the court found that the accused's actions and inquiries to obtain a firearm constituted an attempt to possess a prohibited firearm, finding him guilty of that charge.

The applicant brought a pre-trial motion alleging that a search warrant executed at his apartment violated s. 8 of the Charter, seeking exclusion of a loaded handgun under s. 24(2).

The search warrant relied heavily on a confidential informant's tip.

The court conducted a step six Garofoli review using the Debot criteria.

Despite weaknesses in the informant's credibility, the court found the tip was compelling and strongly corroborated by police investigation.

The court concluded the authorizing judge had a proper basis to issue the warrant and dismissed the motion.

Kemon Edwards was charged with firearm offences.

The Crown sought to admit expert evidence from Detective Scott Ferguson on the characteristics of an armed person based on surveillance video, and from Dr. Robert Gerard on gunshot residue (GSR) found on the accused's clothing.

The court qualified Detective Ferguson as an expert but limited his testimony to general characteristics, prohibiting him from commenting directly on the video's content to avoid usurping the jury's role.

Dr. Gerard's expertise on GSR detection was accepted, but his testimony was restricted from opining on the percentage of particle transfer from an unpublished study, though he could generally comment on the risk of contamination and the significance of particle numbers.

The court emphasized that contamination risks affect the weight of GSR evidence, not its admissibility, and are for the jury to assess.

The defendants were charged with multiple offences relating to an alleged armed home invasion and robbery.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence, including security video footage, to place the defendants at the scene.

The defence argued that no home invasion occurred and that the occupants of the apartment staged the scene to cover up an accidental discharge of their own firearm.

The court found both the Crown's and the defence's theories equally plausible based on the physical evidence and witness testimony.

As the Crown failed to prove its version of events beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendants were found not guilty of all charges.

The accused was charged with eight firearms offences after police executed a search warrant at his mother's home and found loaded firearms, ammunition, and an overcapacity magazine hidden in a suitcase and gym bag alongside documents bearing the accused's name.

The accused did not reside at the home and was not present during the search.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had knowledge of or control over the contraband, as the evidence was purely circumstantial and other reasonable inferences could be drawn.

The accused was found not guilty on all counts.

The accused, charged with firearms offences, brought a Charter s. 8 application challenging the validity of a search warrant executed at a residence where loaded firearms and ammunition were seized.

The court found the search warrant invalid due to insufficient corroboration of the confidential informant's information regarding the presence of the firearms at the time of the search, resulting in a s. 8 Charter breach.

However, applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court admitted the evidence, finding the police acted in good faith and the serious nature of the offences favoured adjudication on the merits.

Sentencing following convictions for seven counts of transferring a firearm and sixteen counts of possession of a firearm for the purpose of transferring it under the Criminal Code.

The offender purchased 23 firearms using a valid licence over an approximately 18‑month period, with several later recovered at crime scenes and others unaccounted for.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence in firearms trafficking cases given the risk of violent gun crime, while also considering mitigating factors including youth, lack of prior record, educational pursuits, and supportive family background.

After reviewing comparable sentencing authorities and applying the totality principle, the court set a global sentence of eight years.

Enhanced credit for pre‑sentence custody was granted at 1.5:1, resulting in a reduced custodial sentence.

The accused was tried on 29 firearms offences arising from the purchase of 23 handguns over a short period, seven of which were later recovered at crime scenes or from unrelated persons with defaced serial numbers.

The court rejected the accused's evidence that he was a secret firearms collector whose guns had been stolen from lawful storage, finding his testimony not credible and his financing and storage explanations implausible.

Applying the W(D) framework and the circumstantial evidence rule, the court held that the only rational inference was that the accused bought the firearms for resale.

Convictions were entered on seven counts of transferring a firearm and sixteen counts of possession of a firearm for the purpose of transferring it.

The accused was charged with firearm offences after an unloaded 9mm handgun was found in the pocket of a jacket in a closet of an apartment he shared with his girlfriend.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on the presence of the accused's personal papers in the same jacket pocket.

The accused testified and denied any knowledge of the firearm, suggesting the jacket belonged to his brother and he had only worn it once.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework and concluded that while it was more likely the firearm belonged to the accused, a reasonable inference could be drawn that it belonged to his girlfriend, who also had a motive to hide it.

The accused's evidence raised a reasonable doubt, resulting in an acquittal.

The court sentenced the accused for conspiracy to traffic firearms, trafficking firearms, and possession offences involving 13 handguns and ammunition acquired through a licensed purchaser.

Emphasizing denunciation, deterrence, public protection, and the totality principle, the court found the accused was a central actor in a commercial firearm trafficking enterprise motivated by profit.

The court treated the number of unrecovered handguns, the accused's role in directing purchases and distribution, and the risk to the community as significant aggravating factors, while giving limited mitigating weight to youth, family support, and rehabilitative prospects.

A total sentence of 9 years was imposed, with concurrent terms, 2.5 years' credit for pre-sentence custody, a lifetime firearms prohibition, and a DNA order.

In a criminal motion arising from a search warrant challenge, the court addressed redactions to an information to obtain made to protect confidential informant privilege.

The defence sought greater disclosure and leave to cross-examine the affiant, while the Crown conceded the redacted ITO alone could not support the warrants and sought leave to proceed under Step 6 of Garofoli.

The court held that the proposed cross-examination was either barred by informant privilege or unnecessary, and that the combination of the redacted ITO and judicial summaries gave the accused sufficient awareness of the excised material to challenge the authorization.

The Crown's application to proceed to Step 6 was granted.

The applicant, charged with firearms offences, brought a Charter application challenging the search of his residence, the seizure of his cell phone, and the search of text messages on a co-accused's phone.

The court found the search warrant for the residence was overly broad and lacked reasonable grounds, violating s. 8.

The seizure of the applicant's phone was also unauthorized.

Evidence from the residence and the applicant's phone was excluded under s. 24(2).

However, the court held the applicant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages sent to the co-accused's phone, dismissing that part of the application for lack of standing.