COURT FILE NO.: CR-20-00000167-00BR DATE: 20200603

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN Respondent – and – RIMA MANSOUR Applicant

Counsel: Erin Pancer, for the Respondent Eric S. Neubauer, for the Applicant

HEARD: May 29, 2020

JUSTICE S. NAKATSURU

[1] Ms. Rima Mansour is a 51-year old woman with no criminal record. She finds herself detained at the Vanier Center for Women while awaiting her trial. Charged with very serious offences after she was arrested October 31, 2018, at the Canada/U.S. border. Twenty-five firearms were secreted in the gas tank of the rental car that she was driving back to her home in Toronto. She has tried to get bail twice before. She was detained on the tertiary ground both times.

[2] Ms. Mansour again tries for bail on this 90-day detention review. Things in the world have changed since her bail hearing and her bail/detention review. The COVID-19 pandemic has upended daily life.

[3] I granted Ms. Mansour bail. These are my reasons why.

A. Overview of the Allegations

[4] In the fall of 2018, the Toronto Police Service, Firearms Enforcement Unit, began an investigation named Project Belair focused on the importation of firearms from the United States into Canada. The investigation used a police agent that introduced an undercover officer to a target in order to buy a firearm. In September and October, meetings with the target were conducted and two firearms were purchased. A search of the serial number of one of the guns revealed that the gun had been purchased a week earlier from a person residing in Tampa, Florida.

[5] With the help of agents of the United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, surveillance was conducted on this residence. On October 29, 2018, a Nissan Rogue with Ontario plates was seen in front of this residence along with another vehicle with Virginia plates. Two males were seen driving the cars. The individual driving the Rogue was stopped by the police and he identified himself with a Maryland driver’s license. Ms. Mansour was nowhere to be seen at the time of the surveillance. However, the GPS in her cellphone later seized placed her in the Tampa area.

[6] On October 31, 2018, the Nissan Rogue was stopped attempting to cross into Canada at the Fort Erie Peace Bridge. The driver was Ms. Mansour. The car had been rented to Ms. Mansour on October 17. Ms. Mansour had entered the United States four days prior to October 31, 2018. When questioned by CBSA agents at various times about her travels, she allegedly gave inconsistent accounts. Later, lottery tickets were found in the rental car. These tickets were purchased in states allegedly inconsistent with where Ms. Mansour initially said she had been.

[7] The Nissan Rogue was searched on secondary inspection. The rear passenger seat to the car was removed with a socket wrench the CBSA agents had found in the car. Removal of the rear seat showed alterations indicating someone had accessed the fuel tank. Search of the inside of the fuel tank revealed 25 handguns sealed in plastic.

[8] A gas gauge sensor that normally sits in the gas tank and advises the driver of the gas levels in the gas tank, was found on the floor of the car. Without the sensor, the gas gauge did not work and read empty. Photographs of a gas gauge removed and in the hands of someone were later located on Ms. Mansour’s cellular telephone. Subsequent investigation revealed that Ms. Mansour had travelled to the United States on multiple occasions in October and earlier that year. A subsequent search of her personal vehicle at her residence, a 2009 Nissan Rogue as well, revealed tool marks around the gas tank area which the police believed were similar to those observed on the rented Rogue where the firearms were found.

B. Prior Bail Proceedings

[9] On December 5, 2018, Justice of the Peace Nestico presided over Ms. Mansour’s bail hearing. The same release plan as proposed on this application was presented to the Justice of the Peace: $52,000 surety release with house arrest, 24/7 supervision, and tight conditions. The sureties proposed were Lauren Speers, a lawyer who is a close family friend, Ms. Mansour’s son, Jahfar Mansour, a bonded security guard and aspiring police officer, and her son, Grivanni Binger, a community worker. The Justice of the Peace found that that Ms. Mansour had discharged her onus on the primary and secondary grounds. With respect to the latter, he found that all the sureties were responsible people, understood their roles, and would provide the close supervision that was obviously necessary. However, the Justice of the Peace found that given the grave nature of the charges and the Crown’s reasonably strong case, after considering the applicable factors under s. 515(10)(c), Ms. Mansour’s detention was necessary on the tertiary ground.

[10] On May 16, 2019, Ms. Mansour sought her release in a joint bail and detention review brought pursuant to ss. 520 and 525. She argued errors in the initial bail decision and several material changes in circumstances including: Ms. Mansour claimed she had experienced multiple incidents of body numbness accompanied by high blood pressure levels, degrading and inadequate treatment by hospital staff, the worsening of her arthritis, and several indignities suffered at Vanier such as unnecessary strip searches and being left to soil herself.

[11] Justice B. O’Marra noted that both parties agreed that detention was not required on the primary or secondary ground. He further concluded that the Justice of the Peace did not err in ordering Ms. Mansour’s detention on the tertiary ground. Her detention remained justified under the tertiary ground given the formidable Crown case and the gravity of the offences in light of the proliferation of serious crimes committed by the use of handguns.

C. A Section 525 Detention Review

[12] In this case, Ms. Mansour has brought an application for a s. 525 review of her detention. She is unaware of any attempt either by the Crown or her jailor to fulfill their obligations for such a review since the dismissal of her application by Justice O’Marra. The Crown does not dispute this. Regardless of whether this review has been properly instituted, my responsibility is to scrutinize Ms. Mansour’s current detention. The parties are in agreement on this.

[13] The overarching question I must determine is whether the continued detention of Ms. Mansour is justified within the meaning of s. 515: R. v. Myers, 2019 SCC 18. In determining whether the detention is still justified, I may consider any new evidence or change in the circumstances of the accused, the impact of the passage of time, any unreasonable delay on the proportionality of the detention, and the rationale offered for the original detention order. In that determination, I must show respect and deference for any findings of fact made by previous decision-makers if there is no cause to interfere with them. However, I am required to weigh the relevant factors in light of the time which has elapsed and any other relevant consideration.

D. Analysis

1. Primary Ground

[14] All agree that detention is not necessary to ensure Ms. Mansour’s attendance at court.

2. Secondary Ground

[15] In the previous bail proceedings, the court found that Ms. Mansour had discharged her onus on the secondary ground. Her detention was not necessary for the protection or safety of the public having regard to all the circumstances including any substantial likelihood that Ms. Mansour, if released, would commit a criminal offence or interfere with the administration of justice. Indeed, before Justice O’Marra, the Crown had conceded this to be the case.

[16] Now the Crown takes the position that the COVID-19 pandemic has changed this. She submits that the pandemic has put all of us into a state of self-isolation and that everyone has been asked to avoid contact with individuals outside of family who live in the same household. Thus, Ms. Pancer argues that Ms. Speers and Mr. Grivanni Mansour, two of the main proposed sureties, will not be able to attend at Ms. Mansour’s residence and will only be able to check up on her house arrest by way of the landline. Given that the other surety, Jahfar Mansour, works as a security guard 30 to 40 hours a week, Ms. Mansour would be left unsupervised at her home for a significant period of time. The Crown submits that the youngest son who lives at home and is not being put forward as a surety, is in no position to supervise his mother. Put another way, the Crown now argues the release plan that was possible before the pandemic, is no longer a feasible plan.

[17] I do not agree. I find that the sureties will still be able to closely monitor and supervise Ms. Mansour while following public health guidelines for COVID-19. Practicing social distancing does not mean that the sureties will not be able to physically attend at her residence to check up on her in addition to calling her on the telephone landline. It just means they should remain 2 meters apart. They will also be able to take Ms. Mansour with them to court, essential errands, or exercise while maintaining the requisite distance from her. If the requisite distance is not always possible, they can take other precautions such as each wearing a mask and diligent hand-washing.

[18] The release plan offered satisfied both the Justice of the Peace and the reviewing Justice. It remains the same. The pandemic has not fundamentally changed their assessments of the secondary ground.

[19] Looking at all the circumstances, I too agree that Ms. Mansour has discharged her onus on the secondary ground. Ms. Mansour is a mature woman. She has no criminal record. She has worked productively in a responsible job. She has no history of acting in any manner that would endanger the public. I have no reason to believe she would not abide by her release conditions. She has lived and will live when released with her two sons, 25-year-old Jahfar and 18-year-old Andrew. Her other son, Grivanni, lives a short distance way. Her sons are willing to make whatever arrangements necessary to secure their mother’s release including Grivanni supervising his mother when Jahfar is at work. Ms. Speers, the surety who has offered to put up the most, is a lawyer who can be trusted to understand what her obligations are. The sureties are responsible. The release plan of house arrest and close supervision is strict but realistic.

[20] Moreover, given her subjective experiences about how she has suffered while in jail, Ms. Mansour will be strongly motivated not to return to custody.

[21] Everything in the record supports a finding that while on release, she will not commit any criminal offences or interfere with the administration of justice.

[22] Deference should be afforded to the prior bail decisions on this point. Ms. Mansour has shown cause that her detention is not necessary on the secondary ground. Thus, her continued detention cannot be justified on the secondary ground.

[23] A last observation. Ms. Mansour has offered to be placed on a condition for electronic monitoring offered by the provincial government’s Electronic Supervision Program if it is required on the secondary or tertiary ground. She is unable to privately fund GPS ankle monitoring. I find any such electronic monitoring to be unnecessary. Given all the circumstances including the allegations, Ms. Mansour’s background and past circumstances, the strict supervision plan offered, and the responsible sureties presented, the limited resources of the Electronic Supervision Program are best left for those cases where it could make a significant difference between release or detention. In Ms. Mansour’s case it would essentially be redundant.

3. Tertiary Ground

[24] This case turns on the consideration of the tertiary ground and the material change in circumstances brought by the COVID-19 pandemic. The parties do not dispute that this is a material change since Justice O’Marra dismissed Ms. Mansour’s ss. 520 and 525 bail/detention review. The parties have focused their submissions on this issue. That acknowledged, all the circumstances must still be considered. There can be no short cut in the analysis: R. v. St. Cloud, 2015 SCC 27, [2015] S.C.J. No. 27.

Statutory Circumstances

[25] The Crown’s case against Ms. Mansour is a circumstantial one. Even though Ms. Mansour has challenged the admissibility of some of the evidence including allegedly false statements that she gave to the CBSA agents at the border, she acknowledges the remaining evidence is enough to point to her involvement. In my opinion, like Justice O’Marra, I am of the view that the Crown’s case is a formidable though circumstantial one. Even apart from the alleged lies she told to others about where she had been in the United States on her four-day trip, the circumstances of the alteration of her rental car and its gas tank is highly probative. The gas tank sensor and a wrench were found on the floor of the vehicle. The fuel gauge was not working. The firearms took up half the space of the gas tank shortening the distance that she could have travelled once the firearms were placed in the car. A rental car employee will testify that the rental car was fine prior to Ms. Mansour taking possession. This evidence is strong evidence that Ms. Mansour either knew about or was willfully blind to the firearms hidden in the gas tank.

[26] That said, both parties agree that the case rests mainly on consent, knowledge and control of the firearms. This will depend upon whether the jury has a reasonable doubt about Ms. Mansour’s mens rea should she testify or call other evidence on that issue. Of course, I must not speculate what her defence may be. Ms. Mansour has not presented any evidence on this detention review about that. I will just observe that in this case, no witness sees Ms. Mansour place firearms in the gas tank or be present with the firearms before they were hidden. When the police followed the rental car to the alleged straw purchaser’s home in Tampa, Ms. Mansour was neither driving the car, present as an occupant, nor seen in the vicinity. The firearms themselves were well concealed and not visible to an occupant of the car. Thus, while strong, it would be premature to conclude her convictions are inevitable.

[27] In terms of seriousness of the offences, Ms. Mansour is facing over 30 charges including conspiracy to import and traffic firearms, importation, careless storage, possession of prohibited firearms, and offences under the Customs Act. For the importing or trafficking in firearms offences, the maximum penalty for each offence is 10 years and the minimum sentence is 3 years. On an objective basis, the offences are serious especially given the minimum sentences even for a first offence. On the other hand, these offences are not the most serious offences in the Criminal Code in terms of the maximum length of sentence.

[28] The circumstances of the offences are most grave. This factor pulls the strongest for her detention. I do not need to express in any detail the danger posed by illegal firearms to the safety of the community. It is self-evident. In this case, numerous firearms are involved. They are alleged to have been imported by Ms. Mansour from the United States, a troublesome source of handguns that have caused such devastation and sorrow on the streets of our city. In addition, Ms. Mansour is said to have conspired with others to import and traffic in these weapons. Finally, the plan was sophisticated and would have been most effective if it were not for the good police work conducted. The only potential mitigating circumstance may be the role played by Ms. Mansour. While it will be for the trier of fact to determine, there is a reasonable case for a trier to conclude that Ms. Mansour was not at the top of this scheme to import and traffic the firearms and was only involved as a “mule”, a lower-level person engaged to transport the firearms across the border. Moreover, it is possible that she did not know the exact number of firearms secreted in the gas tank.

[29] In terms of the length of imprisonment, if found guilty, Ms. Mansour would be sentenced to a lengthy term of imprisonment. It is conceivable that there are mitigating circumstances in her favour on sentence that may partially offset the obvious aggravating factors. Regardless, it is not disputed that a significant punishment will be meted out, given the general deterrence concerns in play.

[30] To place a Myers perspective on the length of sentence Ms. Mansour is likely to receive, her current pre-trial custody does not yet proximate the sentence she will receive if convicted. Thus, to date, it is not a concern that she will do more time in pre-trial custody than she would if convicted.

[31] In sum, looking at the statutorily enunciated circumstances under s. 515(10)(c), they support the detention of Ms. Mansour. Some pull more strongly than others in favour of that. Although the defence raises further and more specific challenges to the admissibility of some of the Crown evidence, fundamentally these factors have not changed since the initial bail hearing. In short, again I must pay some deference to the conclusions of the jurists who considered these factors.

The COVID-19 Pandemic

[32] A significant factor for me to consider is the present pandemic. But let me be clear. It is but one of the circumstances that must be balanced along with the other circumstances when assessing the test on the tertiary ground.

[33] On this proceeding, I have had the most recent affidavit of Dr. Aaron Orkin, an expert in epidemiology, dated May 20, 2020. In addition, Ms. Christine Bintakies, the senior nurse at Vanier, testified about how Vanier was dealing with COVID-19. Finally, the institutional medical records of Ms. Mansour formed a part of the application record.

[34] Much has already been written in judicial decisions about COVID-19 and bail. No doubt more will be. Without specifically going over all the cases, I agree with the jurisprudence holding that the current pandemic is a factor that can support release from pre-trial custody. Put in terms of the test for the tertiary ground, this just makes common sense. The reasonable public’s confidence in the administration of justice will not be undermined when an accused’s release can assist in addressing a societal crisis. Said in a different way, the community expects the administration of justice itself to play a role in fighting this pandemic.

[35] In assessing the impact of COVID-19 on the tertiary ground, I am guided by the following propositions:

(1) judicial notice can be taken about the nature and effects of COVID-19 and the pandemic; (2) where a detainee is particularly vulnerable to COVID-19 in the institutional setting, this factor significantly supports release; and (3) even if the detainee is not so vulnerable, their own individual health, the health and safety of others such as that of other inmates and correctional employees as well as their families and extended community contacts should be considered on the tertiary ground. General public health policy discourages non-voluntary congregate settings in order to battle this pandemic.

[36] Applying these propositions to Ms. Mansour’s case, the defence submits that she is a vulnerable individual given her unique health status. The Crown responds that there is no evidence that Ms. Mansour is in a high-risk category for COVID-19 should she contract it. Further, she submits that Ms. Mansour is receiving better medical attention while in custody than if she were out-of-custody. Vanier has nursing staff 24/7. Ms. Mansour gets her medications twice daily from nurses. Physicians attend regularly and are on-call at all times. If a medical issue arises, Ms. Mansour can be immediately taken to a hospital.

[37] I do not agree with the Crown arguments. I find that Ms. Mansour is a vulnerable individual. She has medical co-morbidities that puts her at a higher risk of serious health consequences or even death if she falls ill to COVID-19: high blood pressure, arthritis (an auto-immune disorder), and obesity. Moreover, she is not young. Her health issues are well-documented. She receives medication for her high blood pressure and arthritis. Her health issues are also significant. Ms. Mansour was hospitalized in January of 2019, while at Vanier, due to her high blood pressure and body numbness. Her arthritis is so bad she requires double mattresses in order to sleep.

[38] I also note that Ms. Mansour is seeking psychiatric care while at Vanier every two weeks. While the specifics of this has not been set out in the materials, I have little doubt that her current situation forms at least part of the reasons she needs this psychiatric help.

[39] I appreciate that no medical expert directly comments on how her health conditions may impact upon Ms. Mansour specifically should she become ill with COVID-19. However, this is not required.

[40] First, at a bail hearing, credible and trustworthy evidence can be resorted to. Ms. Mansour has provided web links to information of the Public Health Agency of Canada which has identified certain segments of the population to be acutely vulnerable. Dr. Orkin also avers generally to how certain health conditions may make an infection more serious. While Ms. Mansour is not in the highest risk category, given her health problems she remains especially susceptible to serious adverse consequences if she becomes sick with COVID-19.

[41] Second, judicial notice can be taken of the potential serious effects upon Ms. Mansour. This approach was sanctioned by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Morgan, 2020 ONCA 279 at para. 8:

We do, however, believe that if falls within the accepted bounds of judicial notice for us to take into account the fact of the COVID-19 pandemic, its impact on Canadians generally, and the current medical knowledge of the virus, including its mode of transmission and recommended methods to avoid its transmission.

This passage was more recently adopted in R. v. Lariviere, 2020 ONCA 324 at para. 18.

[42] In terms of the Crown submission about the quality of the health care that she receives at Vanier, this submission misses the point. None of the health care she receives can ensure that Ms. Mansour does not fall ill to the virus. It does not shield her from becoming sick. None of the health care she receives at Vanier will make any difference to her prognosis if she falls ill. It does not diminish the potential serious health consequences she may well suffer given her pre-existing health conditions.

[43] In addition to the unique risk to Ms. Mansour’s health, there is the issue of the risk of infection in an institution like Vanier. On this issue, I accept the evidence of Dr. Orkin. Those in an involuntary congregate setting have a higher risk of contracting COVID-19. This is borne out by evidence. It is also borne out by the very nature of these custodial institutions.

[44] I also agree with Dr. Orkin that an important way to combat the pandemic from a public health point of view is to depopulate the jail. From a judicial point of view, I stress that this should be done only when it is legally right to do so.

[45] Now I recognize and applaud the efforts of these institutions in putting both resources and procedures in place to curb any outbreak of COVID-19 in the jails. For instance, Vanier ensures that all new inmates are segregated upon entry into the facility and kept isolated in groupings for 14 days or until they test negative for COVID-19. It is only after that they move into the general population of the facility. Then, there is no travel of inmates between ranges. The correctional staff wear masks, have their temperatures checked each day, and are required to self-assess for any symptoms. There are also discussions ongoing for expanded testing of correctional staff.

[46] However, these efforts do not amount to an impermeable wall that can keep COVID-19 out of the jail. There are a number of reasons why this is the case. Asymptomatic individuals can contract and spread the disease. It is a very infectious disease. Staff and perhaps others who come into the institution can unwittingly become the source of an outbreak. As noted in cross-examination of Ms. Bintakies, staffing requirements may lead to staff who have had contact with new intake inmates having to work in other general population units of Vanier. Further, there are shared facilities such as washrooms, showers, telephones and common spaces whereby the virus can spread once it enters the institution. Inmates are asked to clean and sanitize those spaces. They may not do so effectively. The fact that an outbreak occurred at the Ontario Correctional Institute and that there are COVID-19 cases in other remand centers, while thankfully few in number, is objective evidence supporting Dr. Orkin’s views. Even in Vanier, Ms. Bintakies noted two additional positive COVID-19 tests for inmates along with the two prior cases they had who had been previously released from custody. In short, there is little guarantee that COVID-19 in the jails in the near future will be a contained and static situation. It will be fluid. Moreover, there are practical limitations regarding what more can be done to safeguard inmates and staff due to limited resources and the physical design of such a setting. For example, social distancing is near impossible in jail.

[47] Continued vigilance will be required.

[48] It is true that in assessing the effect of COVID-19 on the tertiary ground, the risk to Ms. Mansour and the public in general must be analyzed. For Ms. Mansour, the risk of infection at Vanier and the risk of serious consequences to her in catching the disease. For the public, the risk of the spread of the disease within correctional institutions and then to the larger population.

[49] Of course, there is no certainty in the assessment of these risks. But these are uncertain times. At the end of the day, I find these risks are real and substantial enough to weigh heavily in favour of release in Ms. Mansour’s case.

[50] A final factor. As a part of my mandate, I must consider that effect of the pandemic on the prospect of Ms. Mansour obtaining a prompt trial: R. v. T.L., 2020 ONSC 1885 at para. 34. One of the purposes of section 525 is to avoid an accused from languishing in jail while awaiting their trial. Ms. Mansour’s first appearance in the Superior Court was October 17, 2019. Since then, she has had three Judicial Pre-trials, the last being on March 23, 2020. Her trial has not yet been scheduled. Again, there is little certainty regarding when Ms. Mansour’s jury trial will take place. There is little certainty about what sort of delay of her jury trial we are looking at. On the one hand, serious planning and efforts are being made to get the trial courts running again as quickly and as safely as possible. There are pre-trial motions in Ms. Mansour’s case that can be heard in the absence of the jury that potentially could be scheduled in the summer. On the other hand, it is hard to predict how the backlog of cases may affect the efficient scheduling of Ms. Mansour’s case. Jury trials themselves are not commencing again until September at the earliest. Moreover, COVID-19 has not gone away. A worsening of the pandemic (i.e. a second wave of infections) may lead to an adjournment of any scheduled trial. Even if commenced, the sickening of a trial witness/participant could affect the integrity of her jury trial. Adding to the uncertainty, Ms. Mansour’s case involves an American investigation and potential witnesses from a foreign jurisdiction. Looked at realistically, Ms. Mansour’s trial will likely be delayed by the pandemic. I cannot see how it could not be.

Balancing of All the Circumstances and Conclusion on the Tertiary Ground

[51] On this detention review, while I must pay deference to the previous decisions made, the balancing of all the circumstances on the tertiary ground must be re-assessed in light of the significant material change in circumstance since the bail hearing and bail/detention review: the COVID-19 pandemic.

[52] Ms. Mansour is an older woman with strong family and community supports. She has no criminal record or any other antecedents that would suggest criminal involvement of this nature. Her release plan is strong. Her release plan is strict with no liberty outside her home except when accompanied by good sureties. There is little chance that she would commit any criminal offence while on release let alone similar offences to that she has been charged with. She will be permitted to live back in the community with her sons after having spent a considerable amount of time in jail already, with no certainty when her trial will be. A woman charged with many serious offences, but, importantly, presumed innocent of them.

[53] While all the statutory circumstances are engaged, as St. Cloud directs, I must not conclude that detention is therefore automatic. In this case, while some factors are quite strong, I find that collectively they do not have maximum force. The Crown’s case is strong, but it is conceivable that Ms. Mansour may not be convicted by a jury. Even the circumstances of the commission of the offences which pull the strongest for detention may be mitigated by a finding that Ms. Mansour played a lesser role in any conspiracy or plan to import and traffic these firearms.

[54] Finally, there is the COVID-19 pandemic and the serious potential consequences to Ms. Mansour given her health conditions if she is infected in jail. A reasonable member of the public is likely to view detaining someone with such a vulnerability differently from detaining someone who does not. The public will see that despite factors favoring detention, given the serious effects of becoming ill by the SARS-CoV-2 virus, confidence in the administration of justice will not suffer if a woman like her, in her unique situation, who will not endanger the safety of the public while on bail, is released.

[55] Added to the analysis, are the challenges to the correctional institutions during these difficult times and the potential that our societal efforts to contain and eradicate this virus may be set back if Ms. Mansour and others like her who pose little risk if released, are detained on the tertiary ground. I note as well that a well-informed and reasonable member of the public will appreciate that additional public resources will be needed and more pressures will exist to keep those institutions safe from COVID-19 if we keep a greater number of inmates, a number more than absolutely necessary, housed in them. This diverted expenditure undoubtedly will have ripple effects on our overall ability to combat the pandemic.

[56] Let me hasten to say, as it has been previously said by other judges, the COVID-19 pandemic is not a free pass out of jail. Accused persons can be rightfully detained on the tertiary ground despite the unprecedented challenges posed by COVID-19 to our correctional facilities. We cannot simply empty the jails in order to fight the pandemic. The public’s confidence in the administration of justice would be deeply shaken if this was the attitude of the justice system. Thankfully, this is not the case. It has never been the case.

[57] Myself, in the matter of R. v. Wilson, unreported, May 22, 2020, I detained an alleged firearms and drug trafficker with a dated, unrelated, and minimal criminal record solely on the tertiary ground. He was alleged to have possessed 16 firearms and 4 kilograms of heroin/fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking. The same tertiary ground concerns and the prevalence of gun violence raised by the Crown in this case were raised in Wilson. The outcome was different because all the circumstances tipped the balance in favour of detention in that case. For example, no evidence was presented that Mr. Wilson was particularly vulnerable to the disease. It is trite but fundamental that each case must be decided on its own facts.

[58] I must view the tertiary ground test through the eyes of a reasonable and well-informed member of the public who is not a legal expert, but who appreciates the specifics of each case, the presumption of innocence, and the Charter values behind the bail provisions. That person will also know that release is the cardinal rule and detention is the exception.

[59] In my final conclusion, the balance tips in favour of Ms. Mansour for her release on strict conditions. The reasonable and informed public will understand that despite the seriousness of the allegations, COVID-19 has changed the balance for Ms. Mansour since her early bail hearing and review. Confidence in the administration of justice will not be impaired by my decision. Put another way, the public will understand why Ms. Mansour was released. And, I believe, approve.

[60] Thus, in performing my independent safeguard function, I find that Ms. Mansour’s continued detention is no longer justified. She is, therefore, released under the strict conditions that I ordered.

Signed: Shaun Nakatsuru J. Justice S. Nakatsuru Released: June 3, 2020

COURT FILE NO.: CR-20-00000167-00BR DATE: 20200603

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN Respondent – and – RIMA MANSOUR Applicant

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT NAKATSURU J. Released: June 3, 2020