Eric W.G. Taylor

This decision concerns a judicial screening on a "faint hope" application under section 745.6 of the Criminal Code, in which Ronald Cyr seeks a reduction in his parole ineligibility period following a first-degree murder conviction.

The court reviews the statutory criteria, the facts of the offence, the applicant’s conduct and character, and the positions of the parties.

The judge finds that there is a reasonable prospect a jury could reduce the parole ineligibility period and orders that a jury be empaneled to hear the application.

The appellant, Lerrell Stennett, appealed his convictions for dangerous operation and impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm, and an ancillary victim surcharge order.

The accident involved the appellant losing control of his vehicle on a wet highway, resulting in multiple collisions and serious injuries to himself and passengers.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty based on circumstantial evidence of excessive speed for the conditions and a projected blood alcohol concentration indicating impairment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal from conviction, finding no misapprehension of evidence, no improper inference from consequences, and no circular reasoning.

The court allowed the appeal from sentence only to set aside the victim surcharges, as the regime was later ruled unconstitutional.

The appellant appealed convictions for aggravated assault and assault with a weapon.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in his credibility assessment by impermissibly using the absence of evidence of a motive to fabricate as proof of no motive, and by making blanket credibility findings without sufficient analysis of individual counts or conflicting evidence.

The court applied the curative proviso to one count (Count 6) but not others.

The appeal was allowed for four counts, with a new trial ordered for three and an acquittal entered for one.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder and attempted murder, sought review of a single judge's decision denying bail pending his application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada from a Court of Appeal detention order.

The Court of Appeal panel dismissed the application, holding that s. 679(1)(c) of the Criminal Code does not apply to bail pending leave to appeal from a bail decision under s. 680, but rather to appeals from conviction/sentence.

While the Court could exercise its power under s. 65.1 of the Supreme Court Act to stay the detention order, the original release plan, which relied on specific sureties, could no longer be met, and substituting new sureties would constitute a significant refashioning of the original order, which was characterized as a "close call."

The appellant, Pierre Labelle, appealed his convictions for indecent acts, criminal harassment, and communicating for sexual services with a minor.

The primary issues on appeal were the trial judge's treatment of non-identification evidence, the reasonableness of the criminal harassment conviction against one complainant (J.V.), and the alleged improper use of the appellant's willingness to fabricate evidence as positive evidence of guilt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the non-identification evidence lacked probative value, the criminal harassment conviction was reasonable based on the evidence, and the trial judge correctly used the appellant's fabrication as a basis for rejecting his evidence, not as positive evidence of guilt.

Trayon Johnson, charged with second-degree murder and attempted murder, applied to introduce his exculpatory police statement made on October 20, 2017, under the *Edgar* exception.

The court granted the motion, finding that despite instances of dishonesty and manipulation during the 12-hour interview, a contextual analysis left doubt regarding the spontaneity of the statement.

In such cases, the statement should be admitted for the jury to assess its weight and the accused's credibility, not for the truth of its contents.

The jury will be instructed on how to use the statement to assess Johnson's reaction and credibility when confronted with the allegations.

The applicant, Richard Ireland, jointly charged with second-degree murder and attempted murder alongside Trayon Johnson, sought to sever his trial from Johnson's.

Ireland argued that Johnson's police statement, which heavily implicated Ireland and expressed fear of him, would cause incurable prejudice despite excisions of prior discreditable conduct.

The Crown opposed the severance.

The court dismissed the application, emphasizing the presumption of joint trials for co-accused, even with "cut-throat" defences.

It held that proper jury instructions could mitigate any prejudice, and that the interests of justice, including efficiency and avoiding inconsistent verdicts, favoured a joint trial.

This decision addresses jury instructions on modes of participation for two accused, Richard Ireland and Trayon Johnson, in a joint jury trial for second-degree murder and attempted murder.

The Crown's application for Ireland as a principal (s. 21(1)(a) Criminal Code) and Johnson as an aider (s. 21(1)(b) Criminal Code) was granted.

The Crown's application for Johnson as a co-principal (s. 21(2) Criminal Code) was dismissed, as was Johnson's request for the jury to be instructed only on s. 21(2) and thus preclude a second-degree murder verdict for him.

The court found an air of reality for Johnson's conviction as an aider but not as a co-principal for second-degree murder.

Trayon Johnson, charged with second-degree murder and attempted murder, sought an order under s. 638(1)(b) of the Criminal Code to challenge prospective jurors for cause.

He proposed augmenting the traditional *Parks* questions with multiple-choice options to address subconscious racial bias against men of African ancestry.

The court acknowledged the existence of racial stereotypes and unconscious bias, finding that appropriately-constructed multiple-choice questions could be more effective than standard "yes/no" questions in identifying such biases.

The proposed multiple-choice questions were approved to ensure an impartial jury.

Cameron Bakker was found guilty of manslaughter by a jury.

This decision provides written reasons for five pre-trial and trial rulings: (1) the Crown's application to introduce the accused's prior statement about street fights (dismissed due to voluntariness concerns and prejudicial effect outweighing probative value); (2) defence counsel's attempt to introduce hearsay through Crown witnesses (restricted as improper); (3) defence counsel's application to exclude members of the public from the courtroom during a witness's testimony (partially granted to exclude specific intimidating individuals, not the general public); (4) defence counsel's request for a jury charge on the defence of accident (declined due to lack of an air of reality); and (5) the response to a jury question regarding the definition of a reasonable person and the relevance of intoxication in self-defence and objective foreseeability for manslaughter (intoxication deemed irrelevant to these objective standards).

Joseph Haddad appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, which ordered his detention at a forensic mental health centre subject to conditions, specifically challenging a condition prohibiting him from attending within 250 metres of his mother's home.

Haddad was found not criminally responsible for an index offence involving discharging a shotgun.

The Board's decision to impose the condition was based on concerns for public safety, psychological harm to neighbours, and the appellant's transition to community living.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, deferring to the Board's reasonable decision, noting that the condition served to address victim safety and was not a significant restraint on the appellant's liberty, especially as his physician did not recommend visits to the family home.

The appellant, J.P., appealed his convictions for assault, assault with a weapon, uttering a threat, unlawful confinement, choking, and sexual assault.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's credibility findings, specifically arguing that the judge failed to address a material conflict regarding noise from the alleged assaults and the lack of significant facial bruising.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's credibility assessments.

The court noted that the noise issue was only one factor in the credibility analysis and that the complainant's bruising was corroborated by a witness, supporting the trial judge's conclusions.

This decision provides reasons for an inquiry into an incident where the accused, David Baichoo, appeared in a security gown, naked underneath, on the first day of his first-degree murder trial.

The incident, which led to the loss of a trial day and compromised the dignity of the proceedings, was attributed to the Toronto South Detention Centre (TSDC).

The court found that the TSDC's reliance on unreliable body scans for contraband and the indifference of staff, particularly Sgt. Polanski, led to the deplorable situation.

Despite the subsequent abandonment of the defence's application for costs, the court issued these reasons to highlight systemic failures in the treatment of accused persons and to ensure accountability.

This ruling addresses the admissibility of foot impression evidence in a first-degree murder trial.

The Crown sought to introduce expert testimony and circumstantial evidence linking the accused's shoes to an impression found at the crime scene.

The defence objected, challenging the expert's qualifications and the relevance of the evidence due to perceived weaknesses in the chain of reasoning and lack of uniqueness of the shoe tread.

The court found the forensic identification officer qualified as an expert in foot impression analysis and deemed the evidence sufficiently necessary and relevant, ruling it admissible.

The applicant sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after being detained on tertiary grounds for attempting to possess and import a firearm.

The application was based on a material change in circumstances, specifically the tendering of a new surety (applicant's brother) and electronic monitoring.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the proposed changes did not constitute a material change relevant to the original reasons for detention, which focused on the strength and seriousness of the case and the need to maintain public faith in the administration of justice.

Following a five-day trial, the court found both defendants guilty of breaking and entering into a dwelling to commit an indictable offence (home invasion).

The defendants and a third party, armed with firearms and other weapons, broke into an occupied residential home at night.

During the struggle with the homeowner, one of the intruders was killed.

The court imposed penitentiary sentences of 9 years for each defendant, less pre-trial custody credits, resulting in sentences of 8 years 9 months for one defendant and 8 years 5 months for the other.

The court also imposed ancillary orders including weapons prohibitions and DNA sampling orders.

The Crown charged two defendants with breaking and entering a dwelling with intent to commit an indictable offence.

The case involved circumstantial evidence of identity, including BlackBerry Messenger communications recovered from the deceased intruder's phone.

The court admitted hearsay evidence under the present intentions exception and the co-conspirator's exception to the hearsay rule.

The Crown established that the defendants were members of a conspiracy to commit the break-in through analysis of cryptic text messages, DNA evidence, and circumstantial connections.

Both defendants were convicted.

This ruling addresses whether the applicants, Melissa Merritt and Christopher Fattore, had a reasonable expectation of privacy (REP) in data stored on a 'loaner phone' provided by police after their original phone was seized.

The court applied the totality of circumstances test, considering the subject matter (data), the applicants' interest in it, their subjective expectation, and its objective reasonableness.

The court found that the applicants did have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the personal data on the loaner phone, primarily because police had previously informed Ms. Merritt that a warrant would be required to access data on their seized family phone, fostering a reasonable belief that the same protection would apply to the replacement device.

The applicants, charged with multiple murders, brought an application to exclude electronic intercepts and tracking warrant evidence, alleging violations of section 8 of the Charter.

The application challenged the necessity of judicial authorization for police email exchanges in an undercover operation, the police's actions in repacking belongings containing listening devices, and the validity of a tracking warrant based on alleged material errors and omissions in the information to obtain.

The court dismissed the application, finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in the email communications, that police actions regarding the trailer were within the scope of implied invitation, and that the tracking warrant was valid.

The applicants, facing multiple murder charges, brought a last-minute application to seal emails seized under a general warrant and prohibit Crown and police access, alleging facial invalidity and abuse of process.

This application followed an earlier agreement to return non-privileged emails to the Crown.

The court, acting as the trial judge on the eve of trial, deferred the full review of the warrant's validity to pretrial motions, emphasizing trial management and procedural fairness.

The court also found the warrant not facially invalid on a preliminary review and noted the defence's failure to adhere to the prior agreement regarding email return.