Edward Prutschi

The defendant, Giuseppe Galati, facing a dangerous driving charge, brought an application for disclosure of the York Regional Police's (YRP) Suspect Apprehension Pursuit (SAP) policies and procedures.

The Crown and YRP opposed the request, arguing it was a speculative fishing expedition.

The court, applying the 'obviously relevant' test from R. v. Gubbins, found that the SAP policy was relevant to the credibility of the central Crown witness (PC Skelly) and the defence's ability to make full answer and defence.

The court ordered the YRP to disclose the SAP policy created pursuant to O. Reg. 266/10, but declined to order a broader disclosure of all pursuit-related policies as overly vague.

Alexandra Forrestall pleaded guilty to failing to stop after an accident resulting in death.

The primary issue at sentencing was whether the custodial portion of the sentence should be served in jail or conditionally in the community.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the profound loss of life and the accused's subsequent fabrication of events, and mitigating factors such as an early guilty plea, genuine remorse, youthful first offender status, positive character references, and significant mental health challenges exacerbated by the incident.

The court determined that a conditional sentence was legally available following the Ontario Court of Appeal's decision in *R. v. Sharma* and was appropriate given the specific circumstances, including the accused's health vulnerabilities during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The accused, a Personal Support Worker, was charged with assault against two elderly, dementia-afflicted residents of a long-term care home.

The Crown alleged intentional assaults during patient transfers.

The accused testified that her physical contact with each resident was an automatic, reflexive response to being struck or scratched by the residents themselves.

The court found that the accused's actions constituted immediate, unpremeditated reactions without conscious thought or intention, falling within the middle category of a continuum between pure physiological reflex and considered reprisal.

The court acquitted the accused on both counts.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired and while his blood alcohol concentration exceeded the legal limit, with offences dating to September 1, 2017.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application to stay the charges for violation of the right to trial within a reasonable time.

The trial was scheduled for November 23-24, 2020.

The court found that the net delay of 567 days (18 months and 17 days) exceeded the presumptive 18-month ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The court rejected the Crown's "but-for" analysis in favor of a "common sense" approach to scheduling delays and found no exceptional circumstances to justify the delay.

The charges were stayed.

The applicant challenged the validity of a search warrant executed on his residence and vehicle on the grounds of a breach of section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (unreasonable search and seizure).

The applicant raised three arguments: (1) the ITO failed to establish reasonable grounds to believe trafficking had occurred; (2) the ITO failed to establish reasonable grounds that evidence would be found at the residence; and (3) the warrant was facially invalid for authorizing searches of two separate independent places on a single warrant.

The court rejected all three arguments and found the warrant valid, admitting the evidence obtained from the search.

The Crown sought to permit a police officer to refresh his memory using both handwritten memo book notes and a typed General Report created through an automated voicemail transcription system.

The defence objected to reliance on the General Report.

The court granted the Crown's motion, finding that the General Report was admissible as a stimulus to refresh the witness's memory because the original audio voicemail was made contemporaneously with the events, and subsequent verification did not render it impermissible for use in refreshing memory.

The accused was charged with assault with a weapon and criminal harassment arising from the dissolution of an intimate relationship.

The Crown proceeded on six counts, later withdrawing two counts of possession of cocaine.

At trial, the Crown further withdrew a charge of forcible confinement and a charge of criminal harassment dated March 18, 2019.

The court found the accused not guilty of assault with a weapon (thrown bar stool on March 14, 2019) and criminal harassment (repeated communications on March 29-30, 2019).

The court found insufficient evidence of mens rea for the assault charge and reasonable doubt regarding the accused's knowledge that his communications constituted harassment.

The accused was charged with driving with a blood alcohol concentration of 80 or higher.

The sole issue at trial was the admissibility of breath results.

The accused alleged violations of s. 8 (unreasonable search and seizure) and s. 10(b) (right to counsel) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found no violation of s. 8 regarding the timing of breath samples ("as soon as practicable").

However, the court found a violation of s. 10(b) because the officer failed to inform the accused of his right to counsel immediately upon arrest, instead waiting eleven minutes.

Applying the s. 24(2) exclusionary analysis from R. v. Grant, the court admitted the evidence, finding the breach was of moderate severity, the impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests was limited, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits was strong.

The accused was found guilty.